The Identity Debate: My copy and Me
> Lee Corbin wrote:
>
> > Yes, one's duplicate's attributes *do* vary from one's, but
> > to a ridiculously small degree.
>
> Even people who differ by "ridiculously small" degrees are different
> people, Lee. There is no equivalency between them, which means they are
> not "one person in two places at the same time."
"It seems to me that you keep ducking *my* question, or my insinuations,
at
least: isn't it true that you *are* the same person that you were yesterday
despite the fact that there are small differences between you? And if you
agree to that, then you can see why logically I can consider myself to be the
same person as a close duplicate."
Ahh, it has been a couple months since we had this discussion. I still find
it difficult to understand how people can assert that a copy of you is you.
gts may at the same time consider himself the same person as he was a few
minutes ago while considering himself a different person than a copy made a
few minutes ago and still be logically consistent. You said "And if you
agree to that, then you can see why logically I can consider myself to be
the same person as a close duplicate" But gts is made up of the same atoms,
molecules, and neurons in the same pattern performing the same functions as
gts t-10s was. However, a duplicate of gts is made up of entirely different
atoms, molecules, and neurons, even though they are in the same pattern.
Imagine this thought experiment. You walk into a room, a non-destructive
scanner copies you and creates a duplicate, now you and your duplicate are
isolated. Can you see, feel, hear, taste anything that your duplicate can?
If you think you can, then you are indeed the same person in two different
places, but this hardly seems logical. If you think you cant, then you are
two separate persons in separate places, albeit persons that are identical.
However, since everything you experience is now separate, the you in the
other room is a different person. If it is a kept a secret who is the
original and who is the copy, then no test can tell them apart. But just
because no one can tell who the original is, does not mean there wasn't an
original in the first place.
I consider there to be three parts to a person
1) the pattern of his molecules / atoms
If we took our brain and put it into a blender, we still have the same
atoms, but no person, so the pattern is important
2) the molecules / atoms that make up his pattern
If we took different molecules / atoms and put them into the same pattern
(copying) then the person behaves identical to the original, but can not
sense, feel, what the original feels when sensory isolated. Therefore they
are different persons, and the atoms that we are made up of are important.
Destroying the original does not change this.
3) the rate of change of those molecules / atoms in that part are orders of
magnitude smaller than the total atoms / molecules that make up the pattern,
so at any given time the vast majority of the molecules and atoms that make
up your pattern are the same as the ones at the instant before.
If none of our atoms are replaced, we remain the same person (same pattern,
same atoms) if all are replaced, we are a different person (same pattern,
different atoms, different subjective experience). If only one atom were
changed per second, then the vast majority of our atoms in our pattern are
the same as the second before. It seems reasonable that if the rate of
replacement is kept significantly low (whatever the existing natural rate
is, say .001% of neurons are replaced each day) than at any given instant
the vast majority of you (99.999%) is the same atoms and pattern as you were
the instant before.
Our brains are in a constant state of change, we are not made up of the same
atoms today that we were made up of 1 year ago, yet we still consider
ourselves to be the same person as we were a year ago (albeit with some new
bits). Does this mean that we are justified in saying that a copy is me,
because just as the atoms in our brains change over time to eventually all
be replaced, a copy merely replaces all of those atoms at once. I think
logically the significant difference is that in one case all of the atoms
are replaced, thus none of the molecules and atoms that make up your pattern
were the same ones that made up your pattern the instant before. It is
clear from case 2) that the molecules are important to the subjective you,
to your continual perception of consciousness, because in a different group
of molecules with the same atoms separated sensory experiences occur.
Replacing All of your atoms in your pattern is a far different effect than
replacing less than all, or less than 1 millionth of them. As in ANY case
other then replacing them all, that vast majority of atoms that make up your
pattern are the same ones that were making up your pattern the instant
before.
I, for one, will not ever walk into a destructive copying or uploading
mechanism, as this will surely lead to my demise. If I were to pursue
uploading, I would prefer a few neurons be replaced at a time, at a rate
near or less the normal background replacement rate of the atoms that make
up my pattern. If I were to pursue distributed backups, I would create
other neurons that are linked to mine at the same or slower rate than they
are naturally replaced. If my pattern were distributed amongst multiple
groups of atoms in that particular pattern at any given time, then the
destruction of one (as long as it were a minority of the overall group)
would not lead me to consider myself a different person. Thus uploading and
distributed backups are both possible while retaining a continuity of
consciousness with logically sound perception that you are still the same
you.
GTS, I believe Harvey, myself, and a few others seem to be the rare defenders
of this position (that a copy is not me and were I destroyed and
copied, I would still be dead) Last time it came up it was even mentioned
that being destroyed and copied is no different from going to sleep and
waking up. I would hardly consider these similar, as one involves a complete
destruction of you, and the other does not. 'How do you know you
are the same person when you wake up that you were when you went to sleep'
was the question I believe. Such questioning seems to ignore basic
principles in science such as parsimony and occam's razor. I am reasonable
in assuming I am the same person because a) my atoms are the same b) my
pattern is the same C) there is no destructive scanner copying machine in my
room that I wake up out of
Michael
------------------------------
"gts" <gts_optexinc.com>
> Even people who differ by "ridiculously small" degrees are different
> people Lee, There is no equivalency between them
The test for equivalence is to exchange the objects (or people) and see if there is any change. If external observers can not tell if the exchange actually happened and if the people directly involved can not tell either then they are equivalent and although there are two bodies there is only one person at that instant.
John K Clark jonkc_att.net
----------------------------
John K Clark wrote:
> > Even people who differ by "ridiculously small" degrees
are different
> > people Lee, There is no equivalency between them
> The test for equivalence is to exchange the objects (or
> people) and see if there is any change. If external observers
> can not tell if the exchange actually happened and
> if the people directly involved can not tell either
> then they are equivalent and although there are two bodies
> there is only one person at that instant.
But in this case there are changes if we exchange the objects, even if
they are very small changes. The differences can be detected objectively
by those who might make very accurate measurements, and subjectively by
the persons themselves who might make very accurate self-assessments.
-gts
----------------------------
Michael F Dickey wrote:
> I still find it difficult to understand how people
> can assert that a copy of you is you.
I'm glad to see I'm not the only one. :)
The closest I can come to believing anything remotely similar would
involve an instantaneous destructive teleportation, as mentioned here
previously (by Jef Allbright, I think).
It would not be necessary that my actual atoms be transported to another
location. There is an equivalency principle of physics that states that
subatomic particles of the same type are identical, e.g., one electron
is identical to any other electron. (In fact, according to one theory
there is only one electron in the entire universe, but I digress.)
If subatomic particles at the destination location could be assembled in
the exact states as those that comprise me at the origin location,
instantaneously and destructively such that I vanish here and appear
there in the same instant, then I see at least a faint possibility that
my sense of self might live on in that teleported duplicate. I think the
teleportation process would need to take place in less than the shortest
meaningful division of time, which is the time it takes for a photon to
traverse one Planck length -- a very, very short time interval.
The above assumes of course the truth of my materialist view of
consciousness as an entirely physical phenomenon. If materialism is
wrong then we're ghostly spirits potentially capable of all manner of
weirdness.
-gts
-----------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: John K Clark [mailto:jonkc_att.net]
"gts" <gts_optexinc.com>
> Even people who differ by "ridiculously small" degrees are different
> people Lee, There is no equivalency between them
"The test for equivalence is to exchange the objects (or people) and see
if
there is any change. If external observers can not tell if the exchange
actually happened and if the people directly involved can not tell either
then they are equivalent and although there are two bodies there is only one
person at that instant."
That is not the only test for equivalence. If you claim that they are only
one person, then by necessity they should share the same sensory input. If
we were to separate the two bodies we would find they experience different
sensory input. E.g., one can not see what the other sees. Thus the only
possible explanation is that they are two bodies and two people. How can
you assert that they are only one person when they clearly do not share the
same simultaneous subjective consciousness?
Michael
-----------------------
On Wed, 23 Oct 2002, Dickey, Michael F wrote:
> Ahh, it has been a couple months since we had this discussion. I
Surprise, I've got deja vu all over. That matrix is so glitched I can't
see past artifacts. Do people never read archives these days?
> still find it difficult to understand how people can assert that a
> copy of you is you. gts may at the same time consider himself the same
A perfectly synched copy of you is you. Because there is no measurable
difference between them, by definition.
> person as he was a few minutes ago while considering himself a
> different person than a copy made a few minutes ago and still be
> logically consistent. You said "And if you agree to that, then you
If there was no bifurcation both copies think exactly the same thing at
the same time. If they don't, they're obviously not copies.
> can see why logically I can consider myself to be the same person as a
> close duplicate" But gts is made up of the same atoms, molecules,
and
> nuerons in the same pattern performing the same functions as gts t-10s
> was. However, a duplicate of gts is made up of entirely different
> atoms, molecules, and nuerons, even though they are in the same
> pattern.
I thought we were talking about in machina models. There is no way to make
perfect copies of life animals, and to keep them synched without
trajectory forcing via heavy instrumentation with nanoware.
I'm not going to read and reply to the rest of it. Read The Fine Manual.
---------------------
> still find it difficult to understand how people can assert that a
> copy of you is you. gts may at the same time consider himself the same
"A perfectly synched copy of you is you. Because there is no measurable
difference between them, by definition."
If a perfectly synched copy of me is me, then how come my copy would not experience the same sensory information that I experience? Don't I experience all the sensory input that I experience? Would I then see, hear, and feel what my copy feels? If not, then that copy is not me, it is someone else who thinks they are me.
Just because there is no measurable difference between two sub atomic particles, does not mean they are the *same* sub-atomic particle, does it? What if two electrons have the same mass, same spin, same momentum, etc. etc. etc. Are they the 'same' electrons, or do they have an existence independent of one another, and are merely identical?
No measurable difference does not mean that two entities are one, only that they are identical.
Michael
---------------------
Dickey, Michael F.
> No measurable difference does not mean that two entities are one, only
> that they are identical.
The Identity of Indiscernibles is a principle of analytic ontology first
explicitly formulated by Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz in his Discourse on
Metaphysics, Section 9 (Loemker 1969: 308). It states that no two distinct
substances exactly resemble each other. This is often referred to as
'Leibniz's Law' and is typically understood to mean that no two objects have
exactly the same properties. The Identity of Indiscernibles is of interest
because it raises questions about the factors which individuate
qualitatively identical objects. Recent work on the interpretation of
quantum mechanics suggests that the principle fails in the quantum domain.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible/
http://dmoz.org/Society/Philosophy/Philosophy_of_Logic/Identity/
- scerir
---------------------
Michael Dickey writes
> Ahh, it has been a couple months since we had this discussion. I still
find
> it difficult to understand how people can assert that a copy of you is
you.
> gts may at the same time consider himself the same person as he was a few
> minutes ago while considering himself a different person than a copy made
a
> few minutes ago and still be logically consistent. You said "And if
you
> agree to that, then you can see why logically I can consider myself to
be
> the same person as a close duplicate" But gts is made up of the same
atoms,
> molecules, and neurons in the same pattern performing the same functions
as
> gts t-10s was. However, a duplicate of gts is made up of entirely different
> atoms, molecules, and neurons, even though they are in the same pattern.
What one must first do, however, is dispense with the idea
that the *particular* atoms have anything to do with one's
identity. Namely, if during the next nanosecond it were
somehow possible to remove atom1 from your body and replace
it with an identical atom---and QM assures us that all atoms
of a given element excluding different isotopes are equivalent
---then I don't think that you would notice the difference.
If one does agree with me, then, that the *particular* atoms
have nothing to do with your personal identity, then the
objection you make in your last paragraph falls to the ground.
> Imagine this thought experiment. You walk into a room, a non-destructive
> scanner copies you and creates a duplicate, now you and your duplicate
are
> isolated. Can you see, feel, hear, taste anything that your duplicate can?
No, I certainly can not! But then here it is assumed that
you are addressing *one* of the two, and that is what that
*one* will say.
> If you think you cannot [right, I cannot], then you are
> two separate persons in separate places, albeit persons
> that are identical.
So say you. I contend that we are actually the same
*person*, though clearly what is to be contended is
what is meant by that construction. (This is, of
course, the entire basis of the discussion.)
> I consider there to be three parts to a person
>
> 1) the pattern of his molecules / atoms
>
> If we took our brain and put it into a blender, we still have the same
> atoms, but no person, so the pattern is important
>
> 2) the molecules / atoms that make up his pattern
>
> If we took different molecules / atoms and put them into the same pattern
> (copying) then the person behaves identical to the original, but can not
> sense, feel, what the original feels when sensory isolated. Therefore they
> are different persons, and the atoms that we are made up of are important.
> Destroying the original does not change this.
>
> 3) the rate of change of those molecules / atoms in that part are orders
of
> magnitude smaller than the total atoms / molecules that make up the pattern,
> so at any given time the vast majority of the molecules and atoms that
make
> up your pattern are the same as the ones at the instant before.
>
> If none of our atoms are replaced, we remain the same person (same pattern,
> same atoms) if all are replaced, we are a different person (same pattern,
> different atoms, different subjective experience).
What evidence would you ever have that this is the case?
Is there any way that you can know that this is not being
done to you each millisecond in an operation that requires
only one nanosecond? If you talked to someone who was,
in your terms, a thousand different people each second
you'd still have a very normal conversation with him.
It begins to devolve into unstable concepts to imagine
that you, or he, are a thousand different people during
an ordinary second.
> Our brains are in a constant state of change, we are not made up of the
same
> atoms today that we were made up of 1 year ago, yet we still consider
> ourselves to be the same person as we were a year ago (albeit with some
new
> bits). Does this mean that we are justified in saying that a copy is me,
> because just as the atoms in our brains change over time to eventually
all
> be replaced, a copy merely replaces all of those atoms at once? I think
> logically the significant difference is that in one case all of the atoms
> are replaced, thus none of the molecules and atoms that make up your pattern
> were the same ones that made up your pattern the instant before. It is
> clear from case 2) that the molecules are important to the subjective you,
> to your continual perception of consciousness, because in a different group
> of molecules with the same atoms separated sensory experiences occur.
> Replacing All of your atoms in your pattern is a far different effect than
> replacing less than all, or less than 1 millionth of them. As in ANY case
> other then replacing them all, that vast majority of atoms that make up
your
> pattern are the same ones that were making up your pattern the instant
> before.
But I still think that you are incorrect for the reasons I gave above.
> I, for one, will not ever walk into a destructive copying or uploading
> mechanism, as this will surely lead to my demise.
Yet as I have said many times before, you would soon
be in the small minority as more practical people
used teleportation to get about quickly and cheaply.
Finally, you'd be seen to be an old fogey from the
last century who had some strange hang-up about atoms.
Lee
-----------------------------
"Dickey, Michael F" <michael_f_dickey_groton.pfizer.com> Wrote:
>If you claim that they are only one person, then by necessity they should
>share the same sensory input.
Certainly, otherwise they would no longer be identical because they would
have different memories.
>If we were to separate the two bodies we would find they experience
>different sensory input.
Not if they were equally distant from the center of a symmetrical room, then
each would see exactly the same thing the other saw.
> I still find it difficult to understand how people can assert that a copy
>of you is you.
For some reason I don't understand people always look at things from the
point of view of "The Original", but do you have any reason for thinking
that right now, at this very instant, you are "The Copy" and was made
only one
hour ago?
John K Clark jonkc_att.com
---------------------
Both are made of atoms and both contain the same information so if an exact
copy of me is not me then just what is it that the one has and the other
does not? I can't think of a damn thing unless it turns out that religious
people were correct after all and everybody possesses a non material soul
that can only be made by God. I'm not holding my breath.
John K Clark jonkc_att.com
---------------------
--- John K Clark <jonkc_att.net> wrote:
> Both are made of atoms and both contain the same
> information so if an exact
> copy of me is not me then just what is it that the
> one has and the other
> does not?
Each has a different history. One is "the original".
It is unique. It is the first of its kind. It is
'unprecedented'. It's history runs from its moment of
origin, up to the present.
The other is the nth copy of "the original". Its
history begins from the moment of its production.
Part of that history is the origin of its 'design'.
For any copy of something, by the very definition of
copy (duplicate, xox, etc), its pattern, its form and
function, its design, its specifications require, and
are completely dependent upon, an original (in the
general case, or "the" original, in a specific case)
(with the exception of a copy of an (n-x)th copy;
n>x).
Jeff Davis
-----------------------
The following---that I posted a year or two ago on Cryonet (and I
think on Extropians---is pertinent to the identity question, and
I know several of the present debaters have not seen it:
In over thirty years of lively disputes about identity, I have found
that people fall, along one particular scale, into seven categories:
1. Will travel by space warp, but won't permit disassembly of atoms.
He or she objects to disintegration and reassembly of the atoms
constituting his or her own person (given, of course, that this
has become technologically reliable). This is the most skeptical
position of the seven.
2. Will permit teleportation, but only if the same atoms are used.
Subject agrees (as always, for suitable reward) to be disintegrated
here and later reassembled at a remote location . However the
subject forbids disassembly here and reconstitution at a distant
location using different atoms.
3. Will teleport, unless there is a delay.
Suppose the original at the point of departure is scanned and the
information is used to construct the remote duplicate, but then there
is a delay before the original is destroyed. This is not acceptable.
The subject anticipates that he or she will experience seeing his or
her duplicate emerge from the distant teleporter station, and that
this will void the transferal of identity to the remote. The local
will then experience disintegration, and that this will mark the
actual death of the subject.
4. Will teleport, but finds backups to be useless.
Subject finds it a waste of money to get "scanned" for the purpose
of getting himself or herself restored in the event of catastrophe.
Not long after the scan is complete, the subject exclaims, "That
information is me the way I used to be! Were I to die, and that
person brought back to life, it wouldn't really be me."
5. Finds backups acceptable, provided that they've had no run time.
Subject finds it desirable to keep frozen physical duplicates in
storage (in case anything happens to him or her), but only provided
that the duplicate, whether physically instantiated or merely kept
safe as information, is completely identical to him or her at a
particular past instant. In this case, he or she expects to survive
physical destruction of the present body, but not if that body has
already been reanimated and is having experiences elsewhere.
6. Anticipates future experiences of duplicates, but only one in
particular.
This is the nearly incoherent "closest continuer" theory. If you
must die, but N duplicates of you were made at several points in
the past, then you "really are" whichever one of them survives
and is the most similar to you. Somehow your soul, or identity,
is transferred by hidden celestial machinery into this particular
one, but not into any of the others.
7. Logically, but not necessarily emotionally, anticipates all
experiences of all duplicates past or future, near or far.
By subscribing to "the faith of a physicist", the subject believes
that any physical object at any coordinates whatsoever is the same
person that he or she is, provided only that the physical process
running in the object resembles him or her closely enough.
The extreme difficulty of sitting across a table, watching
your physical duplicate, and honestly being able to exclaim,
"There goes I, by the grace of God", or of being able to say
with a straight face, "Logically, I anticipate the dinner that
I had last night as much as I anticipate tonight's repast",
prevents almost everyone from accepting level seven.
My own belief is that nonetheless, one is lead inexorably
through countless thought experiments to level seven, and to
the realization that the other concepts of personal identity
are outmoded legacies of evolution which cannot sustain
careful scrutiny.
Lee Corbin
------------------------
On Wed, 23 Oct 2002, Jeff Davis wrote:
> Each has a different history. One is "the original".
> It is unique. It is the first of its kind. It is
> 'unprecedented'. It's history runs from its moment of
> origin, up to the present.
Please show you how you can tell which is the original, without resorting
to external storage. (Space is unlabeled. Trajectory tracking requires
external storage of information).
Analogy: Two CDs from the same master containing OpenBSD contain the same
software. If the bit pattern would flip synchronously on both of them it
would be still the same pattern.
> The other is the nth copy of "the original". Its
> history begins from the moment of its production.
> Part of that history is the origin of its 'design'.
> For any copy of something, by the very definition of
> copy (duplicate, xox, etc), its pattern, its form and
> function, its design, its specifications require, and
> are completely dependent upon, an original (in the
> general case, or "the" original, in a specific case)
> (with the exception of a copy of an (n-x)th copy;
> n>x).
This is meaningless, as long as you can't provide a measurement procedure
allowing you to tell two copies apart.
Why do we keep having the same discussion, year, after year, after year?
Eugen Leitl
----------------------------
NOTE - one need not acknowledge an immaterial nature to the soul to realize that the continuity of perception depends not only on the continuous existence of a pattern but also on the continuous existence of the substance that makes up that pattern.
I am attempting to appeal to reason. Acknowledging that the same atoms are necessary to ensure a continuity of consciousness (or the survival of *me* and not a copy) does not make some special appeal to the nature of any particular atoms besides them being what comprise your pattern at that moment in time. No one is denying that from one second to the next that the set of atoms that make up your pattern is identical. But the atoms that make up your pattern can change while you are still the same person. This depends on the portion of the atoms that are changing. I contend that whatever the natural background rate of change is, is a fine base line for me, as we all ready accept that and deal with that. However, I would not be in favor of replacing half my brain any more than I would be in favor of removing half of my brain.
This is not the same thing as looking at any two things (apples, people, sub atomic particles) and saying all of their measured properties are the same *except* one is to my left and one is to my right. The only way to remove this distinction is to have the two things take up the same spatial location. The only way to do that is to destroy one and immediately replace it with another. Thus if one thing is destroyed and replaced with an identical copy in the same place, no test can tell these apart. However, this is NOT what copying does. When I am copied there is a copy standing to the side of me
Going to sleep and waking up, or merely existing as time moves could be considered analogous to continually being destroyed and recreated as a perfect copy, BUT there is no reason to suspect that this is actually occurring. Just because it is *possible* that it is occurring does not make it just as likely that it IS occurring.
1 - the pattern
The pattern is important to the definition of a person. If the same atoms are re-arranged into a different pattern, (say, in a blender) then that person is no more.
2 - the atoms
If the same pattern is recreated with different atoms (a copy) then the copy and the original each share their own unique sensory experiences and are thus each their own unique person.
3 - Copying vs. replacing
If an instanteous scanning copying machine
- the particular atoms -
What one must first do, however, is dispense with the idea
that the *particular* atoms have anything to do with one's
identity...If one does agree with me, then, that the *particular* atoms
have nothing to do with your personal identity, then the
objection you make in your last paragraph falls to the ground.
- replacing only a few atoms at a time -
Namely, if during the next nanosecond it were
somehow possible to remove atom1 from your body and replace
it with an identical atom---and QM assures us that all atoms
of a given element excluding different isotopes are equivalent
---then I don't think that you would notice the difference.
> If you think you cannot [right, I cannot], then you are
> two separate persons in separate places, albeit persons
> that are identical.
"So say you. I contend that we are actually the same *person*, though clearly what is to be contended is what is meant by that construction. (This is, of course, the entire basis of the discussion.)"
To contend that two separate entities with separate sensory experience and locations in space are the same entity (person, whatever) is illogical. Even if they have the same memories and previous sensory experiences, they are separate, unique, distinct individuals. They are very similar, of course, but they are not the *same* person, unless you contend that people in two separate rooms can possibly be the same person.
> If none of our atoms are replaced, we remain the same person (same pattern,
> same atoms) if all are replaced, we are a different person (same pattern,
> different atoms, different subjective experience).
"What evidence would you ever have that this is the case? Is there any way that you can know that this is not being done to you each millisecond in an operation that requires only one nanosecond?"
What evidence do I have that the universe exists beyond my imagination? My evidence is that there is no evidence to remotely suggest we are being destroyed and copied with each nanosecond, therefore it is reasonable to assume that we are not.
> I, for one, will not ever walk into a destructive copying or uploading
> mechanism, as this will surely lead to my demise.
"Yet as I have said many times before, you would soon be in the small minority as more practical people used teleportation to get about quickly and cheaply."
Too bad for them, as all the evidence indicates that they are killing themselves each time they step into it.
The same person vs. the same person
There seems to be two different contentions of a copy and an original being the 'same person' One contends that the two seperate entities are 'one' person. The other contends that each individual
-------------------------------------
Dickey, Michael F.
> No measurable difference does not mean that two entities are one, only
> that they are identical.
"The Identity of Indiscernible ...states that no two distinct substances exactly resemble each other. Recent work on the interpretation of quantum mechanics suggests that the principle fails in the quantum domain. "
Thanks, this serves to re-enforce the point (and it is quite interesting additionally) If the principle fails in the quantum domain then two distinct particles may have identical quantifiable descriptions, but they must, by definition, be at two different places. Thus they are still spatially separated, and still unique in some aspect. Even if all of their properties are identical, they can not exist in the same place at the same time.
> But in this case there are changes if we exchange the objects, even if
> they are very small changes. The differences can be detected
"Two physical objects in the same quantum state are provably indistinguishable. Okay? If they weren't, e.g. the equilibrium equation wouldn't be true."
They are distinguishable because they are not in the same place at the same time.
Michael
---------------------------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: Lee Corbin [mailto:lcorbin_tsoft.com]
Michael Dickey writes
> You said "And if you
> agree to that, then you can see why logically I can consider myself to
be
> the same person as a close duplicate" But gts is made up of the same
atoms,
> molecules, and neurons in the same pattern performing the same functions
as
> gts t-10s was. However, a duplicate of gts is made up of entirely different
> atoms, molecules, and neurons, even though they are in the same pattern.
"What one must first do, however, is dispense with the idea
that the *particular* atoms have anything to do with one's
identity."
I disagree, the 'particular' atoms do have something to do with ones identity, and I have attempted to show this logically, please point out any fallacious aspects to my argument, as I would be eager to hear them. The particular atoms have no special attributes, no magical properties, the only significance to them is that they happen to be the atoms that make up that pattern at that time.
If the particular atoms had nothing to do with ones identity, then if we transferred the pattern, then subjective experience would be retained, would it not? This is obviously not the case, because if we transfer the pattern into another group of atoms (make a copy) then the other group of atoms, which now share the same pattern as the original, do not have the same sensory experience as the original pattern / group of atoms.
claim - the pattern is important to identiy, the atoms are not
hypothesis - copy the pattern but is different atoms, see if they share the
same sensory experience
result - copy made, copy and original, although difficult to distinguish, do
not share same sensory experience
conclusion - identity can be copied, but does not retain subjective continuity
claim - the atoms are important, the pattern is not
hypothesis - use the same atoms, but change the pattern, see if identity is
still recognizable
result - mushed pattern up in blender, does not answer question 'who are you'
conclusion - pattern is an integral part to identity.
claim - the atoms AND the pattern are important to identity
hypothesis 1 - change atoms, retain pattern
result 1 - accomplished by transferring pattern to new atoms, entity two does
not experience the same subjective sensations that reference pattern does (see
above). Conclusion, changing atoms but retaining pattern must be new identity.
hypothesis 2 - change atoms, change pattern
result 2 - mushed pattern in blender, then copied new pattern, entity does not
exhibit any identity
hypothesis 3 - retain atoms, change pattern
result 3 - mushed pattern in blender, same atoms. No identity recognizable
hypothesis 4 - retain atoms, retain pattern
control reference, no changes made, entity has recognizable identity matching
that of previous state in time.
Through these thought experiments, it is clear that a copy, which is made of new atoms with the same pattern, will not experience the same subjective events that the reference or original does, even if we can not determine who is the reference and who is the original, one of them was. And they are two distinct identities. If a copy is made the retains the original pattern but is using new atoms, and comparing it with the original reveals separate sensory experiences, and they must be two distinct separate entities, then copying the pattern to new atoms and destroying the original will result in a new entity that would not have shared a subjective continuity of experience with the original. The original was destroyed.
"Namely, if during the next nanosecond it were somehow possible to remove atom1 from your body and replace it with an identical atom---and QM assures us that all atoms of a given element excluding different isotopes are equivalent ---then I don't think that you would notice the difference. If one does agree with me, then, that the *particular* atoms have nothing to do with your personal identity, then the objection you make in your last paragraph falls to the ground."
You assert, if I can correctly interpret this, that if we replaced one atom and you appeared to be the same person, then this is identical to replacing ALL atoms and then assuming that you are the same person? If you read through your statement, your logical conclusion 'If one agrees with me, the particular atoms have nothing do to' should more accurately be said 'if one agrees with me, than THAT particular atom has nothing to do with your personal identity' You jumped from one atom having no significance to ALL atoms having no significance. Presenting this as a simple logical argument shows why I would disagree with it, as the conclusion does not follow logically from the premise.
premise - replacing one atom in your brain does not significantly affect your
personality
conclusion - Therefore replacing all atoms in your brain does not significantly
affect your personality
I would agree with you that the particular atom you are referencing has nothing to do with your personality if it is replaced with an identical atom. But give the fact that if we replace recreate the pattern in all new atoms and the copy does not share its sensory experience with the original, then it is reasonable to assume that replacing all atoms without keeping the original means that the copy does not share continuity of sensory experience with the original either. Replacing 1 atom is far different than replacing all atoms.
> If you think you cannot [right, I cannot], then you are
> two separate persons in separate places, albeit persons
> that are identical.
"So say you. I contend that we are actually the same *person*, though clearly what is to be contended is what is meant by that construction. (This is, of course, the entire basis of the discussion.)"
Agreed, there seems to be some confusion as to what 'the same person' means. People seem to be confusing 'those two people are the same (identical)' with 'That is the same person' If we copied an apple, one could point at both apples and claim they are identical, but one can not (logically) point at both apples and claim that are the *same* (i.e. only one) apple, as they obviously exist separately spatially. I do not disagree that one can point at an original and a copy and state a) I can not tell which is which (unless referencing the copying process) and b) their personalities are identical, they are similar people, if not entirely the same. But I would disagree if one claims that they are 'one' person, as they are obviously two, albeit identical, people, each with their own distinct existence and sensory experience.
> 3) the rate of change of those molecules / atoms in that part are orders
of
> magnitude smaller than the total atoms / molecules that make up the pattern,
> so at any given time the vast majority of the molecules and atoms that
make
> up your pattern are the same as the ones at the instant before.
>
> If none of our atoms are replaced, we remain the same person (same pattern,
> same atoms) if all are replaced, we are a different person (same pattern,
> different atoms, different subjective experience).
"What evidence would you ever have that this is the case?"
Would you like to present evidence that if none of your atoms are replaced or your pattern does not change then you are a different person? My evidence is the fact that no other evidence exists suggesting otherwise and it is the simplest explanation for observed phenomena. Just because we can imagine other possibilities that are outside the realm of the testable does not mean they are all equally valid as explanations. If you are referring to 'if all atoms are replaced we are a different person' see the above thought experiments for the evidence.
"Is there any way that you can know that this is not being done to you
each millisecond in an operation that requires
only one nanosecond?"
No, is there anyway I can know true knowledge? Is there anyway I can know that the entire universe was not created just a microsecond ago with all our atoms arranged in a manner to trick us into thinking that it has been around a while? But just because I can not KNOW that this is not the case does not mean it isn't reasonable to assume that is not the case. If someone should present evidence that I am being destroyed and re-copied every microsecond in operations that only require nanoseconds then I would take that into account and make a judgment accordingly, however just because we can imagine that this is a possible scenario does not make it a plausible one. How would you know that you ARE being copied and destroyed each microsecond? What test would show it? This is similar to the 'how do you know you are not destroyed and copied every time you go to sleep' argument. I know it because I do not wake up in a destructive scanner in a large laboratory, I wake up in my bedroom in my house.
"If you talked to someone who was, in your terms, a thousand different people each second"
I do not believe I ever implied that.
> I, for one, will not ever walk into a destructive copying or uploading
> mechanism, as this will surely lead to my demise.
"Yet as I have said many times before, you would soon be in the small minority as more practical people used teleportation to get about quickly and cheaply. Finally, you'd be seen to be an old fogey from the last century who had some strange hang-up about atoms."
That strange hang up being based on science and reason. Oh well, to bad for the rest of them. I'll wait for wormholes (which may come about before destructive copier / teleporters anyway)
Michael
-----------------------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: John K Clark [mailto:jonkc_att.net]
"Dickey, Michael F" <michael_f_dickey_groton.pfizer.com> Wrote:
>If you claim that they are only one person, then by necessity they should
>share the same sensory input.
"Certainly, otherwise they would no longer be identical because they would
have different memories."
AND
>If we were to separate the two bodies we would find they experience
>different sensory input.
"Not if they were equally distant from the center of a symmetrical room,
then
each would see exactly the same thing the other saw."
Aside from the unusual special case you noted above, if you accept that to be one person one must share sensory input with oneself, then noting and accepting that a copy and an original *do not* share sensory input would acknowledge that they are two, separate, distinct individuals. If a copy does not experience the same sensory information that an original does, then it is obvious that they (the two of them) are not one person. If the original were destroyed in the process, it is still just as logical to assume that the copy would not share sensory experience with the original had he not been destroyed. Thus they are not the same people (i.e., the original does not experience the sensory input of the copy)
To assert that this new copy is sharing subjective experience with the original even if the original were destroyed is no different than asserting it would have some magical telepathic link with the original were it not destroyed. If that turned out to be the case if this thought experiment were actually performed, I would definitely rethink my position. But somehow I doubt that would be the result of the experiment.
"Both are made of atoms and both contain the same information so if an exact copy of me is not me then just what is it that the one has and the other does not? I can't think of a damn thing unless it turns out that religious people were correct after all and everybody possesses a non material soul that can only be made by God. I'm not holding my breath."
But both are not made up of the *same* atoms. Reference the thought experiments mentioned previously, but in short, if I copied your pattern to new atoms, but kept you around. You would not share sensory experience, thus the copy and the original you are two separate individuals (although identical) To assert that a copy is you implies a telepathic magical connection that transcends both the patterns and the atoms. It is clear the subjective experience of the original you ends with the destruction of the original you, because if the original was still hanging around after a copy, the copy and the original you would not share sensory input. If you did, *that* would imply some kind of religious magical soul.
Michael
------------------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: Eugen Leitl [mailto:eugen_leitl.org]
On Wed, 23 Oct 2002, Travis Shutt wrote:
> It's seems I may have heard somewhere that there are no two subatomic
> particles that are the same? So it seems that any copy of yourself
"Two systems in the same quantum state are indistinguishable. It's not
just
a good idea, it's the law."
But to be in the same quantum state, they must occupy the same space, which is impossible. That is also the law. Thus one can not look at a copy and an original and claim they are the same because there atoms and molecules are each individually identical, they are different because one is on the right of you and one is on the left.
> would theoretically be different, but I'm not sure how that would
> apply to your soul or psychological make up.
"If you can build me a soul detector, you have a case."
Its not necessary, just keep the original and the copy around and ask one if he sees what the other sees, if not, there is no soul.
On Wed, 23 Oct 2002, Jeff Davis wrote:
> Each has a different history. One is "the original".
> It is unique. It is the first of its kind. It is
> 'unprecedented'. It's history runs from its moment of
> origin, up to the present.
"Please show you how you can tell which is the original, without resorting to external storage."
It is not necessary to prove which one is the original to acknowledge that one of them must be.
"This is meaningless, as long as you can't provide a measurement procedure allowing you to tell two copies apart."
You can, they do not occupy the same time and space, thus they are different from one another.
"Why do we keep having the same discussion, year, after year, after year?"
Because all of our lives and existence depend on this subject.
Michael
----------------------
On Thu, 24 Oct 2002, gts wrote:
> Sure. However it is not possible for two objects to exist in the same
> quantum state in the first place, as per the Pauli Exclusion
> Principle.
No. PEP says that no two electrons in an atom (that is, the _same_ atom)
can have identical quantum numbers. This has nothing to do that two or N
different atoms in the same quantum state are indistinguishable.
This is useless for macroscale objects because you can't put them into the
same quantum state. However, we don't think using single quantum states.
Here it is perfectly possible to put discrete systems (say, a computer
simulating a virtual robot arm in a blocks world) in a synchronized state
(state as in information processing state, not quantum state).
Similiarly, you can theoretically synch two recently copied meat people
into same state in regards to cognition (the spatiotemporal pattern of
molecular activity called life), and keep them that way.
It's a tour de force, and hence only useful as a gedanken. It is
considerably easier with discrete deterministic systems, but it's still
mostly useful as a gedanken. I can't see any possible uses for this off
hand.
Eugen
-----------------------
> Sure. However it is not possible for two objects to exist in the same
> quantum state in the first place, as per the Pauli Exclusion Principle.
> -gts
In QM no information can be cloned (xoxed)if
the number of states is equal or greater than 3
[Wootters, Zurek, 1982].
Or, in other terms, a cloning (xoxing) of 2 non
orthogonal states violates the unitarity of evolution
[D'Ariano, Yuen, 1996].
Or, in other terms, the linearity in QM (linear
superposition of quantum states) forbids the
perfect xoxing. Fortunately! Leibniz principle!
scerir
------------------------
On Thu, 24 Oct 2002, gts wrote:
I'm overposting today, but...
> Seems to me that that the supposed paradox is explained much more
> easily by noting the simple fact that the similarity of their visual
> experiences is due only to an optical illusion. The paradox is
It is not similiarity, and no illusion. It's the boundary condition
asserting conservation of identity. As soon as you deviate from them, you
get two (or N) people.
> illusory, literally. Let them each have access to a compass and then
> compare their experiences.
They can't. Trajectory forcing causes selective agnosia. Depending how it
is implemented, they both would see what A would have seen, or what B
would have seen, or something inbetween. You can tell them that there are
several of instances of them in perfect sync. It wouldn't matter, they
couldn't consciously diverge. The perfect mirror man routine (didn't the
Stooges use to do that?).
As soon as they would see something different their input would have to
deviate. They would have become distinguishable. You can still cause the
fork to fuse by brute force. After the prongs fuse again they will all
remember seeing the same thing when questioned about the event which
caused the temporary bifurcation.
Eugen
-------------------------
gts wrote:
> However the problem also goes deeper than the question of absolute
> copies: it is about the continuity of the sense of self. Even
> assuming a perfect copy of me can exist, how can I be in two places
> at one time as you say is possible?
>
> If I am tasting wine in Napa Valley while my allegedly perfect
> duplicate is guzzling beer in Tijuana, then does my wine taste like
> beer? Or does my duplicate's beer taste like wine? Or do we both
> complain that our drinks have been adulterated with wine or beer as
> the case may be?
>
> The idea that a person can be in two places at one time, Lee, is to my
> way of thinking sheer and utter nonsense.
It seems to me that gts and Lee are still not connecting in the sense of
understanding what the other person is saying.
<referee>
I see Lee saying that while there are two separate physical bodies (copies),
doing separate things in separate places, that it makes the most sense to
say that it is the same *person/identity* doing all these things at the same
time. It comes down to whether or not you accept this radical definition of
identity as useful.
I see gts arguing something else, that it's silly to say that the same
person can be in two places at once, and in the context that he's talking
about, of course he's right.
</referee>
Right now we have a lot of discussion about the meaning of "identical"
with
offshoots into quantum physics and philosophy of Identity of Indiscernibles,
which is in itself an interesting topic -- but all this debate is apart from
the concept Lee is championing.
I observe the same thing that bothered me during an earlier discussion about
altruism. I see endless debate swirling about definitions, but completely
missing the key point. I observe Lee energetically stirring the pot, and it
often seems that he is intentionally being obtuse, but perhaps this is
because he believes this is the best way for people to come to their own
conclusions.
It would be nice to get to the stage in the discussion where each
understands the other's viewpoint, and then move on to the more interesting
implications of various concepts of identity.
- Jef
--------------------
Dan Fabulich wrote:
> The point of this is just in certain situations
> we can ignore rather significant differences.
I can agree with that. It makes sense from a pragmatic viewpoint.
However I am no pragmatist; I must insist that the differences between
the objects remain real even if we decide they are not relevant to
whatever purpose we have in mind.
For example if for pragmatic reasons you find it useful to drink coffee
from a real garbage truck then I won't object, but please don't expect
me to keep a straight face when you tell me the garbage truck is
actually a coffee cup. :)
> We can draw the distinction out more clearly with an example.
> You don't believe in personal continuity over time, so we'll speak in
> your language for a moment. Consider Lee, who *does* believe that
he's the
> same guy he was yesterday. Is his belief relevant in figuring out
> whether he really IS the same guy he was yesterday? No; at least,
> not in a language in which persons are defined to be different
> people across time (due to a metaphysical commitment to temporal
> parts or whatever). Just because he thinks he persists doesn't
> mean he really does.
>
> Now consider the scenario from within a language more like
> Lee's, in which people *do* persist over time (at least
> under ordinary circumstances). You believe that you don't.
> But is that relevant in figuring out whether you really do
> persist over time? Again, no, not in this language; in
> this language, it's the "same person" at different times,
> as a point of definition, regardless of what you think
> about the matter.
All I see above are two valid arguments that neither Lee nor I should
beg the question of identity. My assertion that personality changes
constantly through time is certainly not evidence that it changes
constantly, nor is his assertion that personality persists evidence that
it persists. In terms of my personal inventory method of checking for
identity, any such statements we or our alleged dupes might make would
not be evidence for either case. However if for example Lee stated that
his personality persists and his copy stated that his does not persist
then we would have clear evidence that Lee is not his copy. This would
be so not because either assertion is true. It would be so simply
because the beliefs conflict.
>> I don't think so. A true duplicate would describe himself
>> in exactly the same way as his original and have exactly
>> the same idea of what is relevant to his identity.
>> To use Eugene's word, they would be "synched" in every way.
>
> All this says is that the duplicates would agree as to
> whether they were the same person; they'd find
> the same properties relevant, whatever those
> properties might be. This is obvious. :)
Right, it is perfectly obvious. It is also perfectly obvious that two
individuals who did *not* give the same account of themselves and who
did *not* offer the same ideas of what is relevant would *not* be the
same person. And there we have a simple and obvious test for the
equivalency of identity.
And as you know it is my contention that given enough time to discuss
and compare notes, the original and his alleged dupe would eventually
find some area of disagreement. The disagreement might be large and very
significant to them or it might be small and insignificant to them, but
it would be a disagreement nonetheless. That disagreement would be
evidence of their inequality *even if they agreed it was insignificant
to them*.
To use the simplest kind of example, the original might say "I am
looking up at the sky" while the other says "I am looking down at
my
shoes." That difference in their self-descriptions is sufficient reason
to call them different people, even if they are friendly to Lee's way of
thinking and so prefer to sweep their differences under the rug for the
purpose of making a dubious argument. :)
-gts
------------------------
"Dickey, Michael F" <michael_f_dickey_groton.pfizer.com> Wrote:
> Aside from the unusual special case you noted above, if you accept that
to
> be one person one must share sensory input with oneself, then noting and
> accepting that a copy and an original *do not* share sensory input would
> acknowledge that they are two, separate, distinct individuals.
Yes. In most cases the two would start to diverge almost immediately and the
differences would only increase as time went by. That's why the prospect of
getting vaporized would make me rather unhappy if my backup was older than a
second or two.
> But both are not made up of the *same* atoms.
The way to tell if two objects are the *same* is to exchange them and note
the changes; if you do this for atoms absolutely nothing changes.
Atoms have no individuality, if they can't even give this interesting
property to themselves how can they give it to us? I'll give you an example.
In my right hand I'm holding a hydrogen atom, his name is Ed. In my left
hand I'm holding another hydrogen atom and his name is Ted. As you closely
watch I bring the two together and cool them down (slow them down in other
words) until it's almost absolute zero. They form an object called a
"Bose Einstein Condensate", something with one quantum state not two
as
there were before. I now heat it back up to room temperature, the condensate
is destroyed and you see two hydrogen atoms just as you did before, but
according to the laws of physics it is imposable to tell even in theory who
is Ed and who is Ted, both now have the same history. Stuff like that
happens all the time at the quantum level.
John K Clark jonkc_att.net
---------------------
Jef the Ref wrote:
> gts wrote:
>> If I am tasting wine in Napa Valley while my allegedly perfect
>> duplicate is guzzling beer in Tijuana, then does my wine taste like
>> beer? Or does my duplicate's beer taste like wine? Or do we both
>> complain that our drinks have been adulterated with wine or beer as
>> the case may be?
> <referee>
>
> I see Lee saying that while there are two separate physical
> bodies (copies), doing separate things in separate places,
> that it makes the most sense to say that it is the same
> *person/identity* doing all these things at the same
> time.
Yes indeed that is what he is saying. However his idea that his view
"makes the most sense" certainly does not alone make his view the
most
sensible. As I see it either I am in Napa or else I am in Tijuana, and
either I am drinking wine or else I am drinking beer.
Please Jef, if you think you can see things as Lee sees them, try to
answer my questions above in his terms in a way that "makes the most
sense." I cannot attempt to do so without writing fantastic gibberish.
-gts
----------------
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On Thu, 24 Oct 2002, Dickey, Michael F wrote:
> But to be in the same quantum state, they must occupy the same space,
No. You're wrong. Read it up.
> which is impossible. That is also the law. Thus one can not look at
Which law?
> a copy and an original and claim they are the same because there atoms
> and molecules are each individually identical, they are different
> because one is on the right of you and one is on the left.
That's not a property of the objects. Translation is featureless for
unlabeled space. That's a property of the observer. *You* are labelling
them. The composite system of you and first object and you and second
object is distinguishable.
> > would theoretically be different, but I'm not sure how that would
> > apply to your soul or psychological make up.
>
> "If you can build me a soul detector, you have a case."
>
> Its not necessary, just keep the original and the copy around and ask one
if
> he sees what the other sees, if not, there is no soul.
Two people in perfect sync see and think in unison. If they don't, they
are not in perfect sync.
> On Wed, 23 Oct 2002, Jeff Davis wrote:
>
> > Each has a different history. One is "the original".
> > It is unique. It is the first of its kind. It is
> > 'unprecedented'. It's history runs from its moment of
> > origin, up to the present.
>
> "Please show you how you can tell which is the original, without resorting
> to external storage."
>
> It is not necessary to prove which one is the original to acknowledge that
> one of them must be.
Bzzzzt. You just resorted to external storage. Try again.
> "This is meaningless, as long as you can't provide a measurement
procedure
> allowing you to tell two copies apart."
>
> You can, they do not occupy the same time and space, thus they are
different
> from one another.
Translation in a flat potential box does not change the quantum state of a
system (nonflat potential is equal to labelling space along the gradient).
If it did, equilibrium constant would break, and the world as we know it
would cease to exist. We all would die instantly.
Because we're alive you're wrong.
> "Why do we keep having the same discussion, year, after year, after
year?"
>
> Because all of our lives and existence depend on this subject.
Stuff and nonsense. CR, or morphing to a healthy lifestyle, or relocating
to safe neighbourhood is far more important, yet I notice a remarkable
absence of such discussions on this list.
The identity discussion is irrational in face of the fact that you daily
do and fail to do decisions influencing your life, yet are highly
inconsistent in assigning relevance (emotion is metric for resource
assigment).
I'm equally inconsistent, yet I'm aware of the fact. I'm trying to change
my evaluation function. Speaking of which, I'm out of this thread.
-----------------------
Eugen Leitl wrote:
> On Thu, 24 Oct 2002, gts wrote:
>
>> Sure. However it is not possible for two objects to exist
>> in the same
>> quantum state in the first place, as per the Pauli Exclusion
>> Principle.
>
> No. PEP says that no two electrons in an atom (that is, the
> _same_ atom) can have identical quantum numbers.
Actually PEP was later generalized to all fermions -- not only electrons
as originally conceived by Pauli.
According to the modern version of PEP, fermions cannot have the same
quantum numbers when contained in a "closed system" but I'm not aware
of
any rule that limits the definition of "closed system" to atoms only.
Certainly a molecule is a closed system describable in terms of quantum
mechanics. And if molecules then why not also larger macroscopic
systems?
Position is, after all, one of the four quantum numbers that cannot be
duplicated by two fermions within a system. I note that regardless of
spin, momentum and mass, two electrons cannot occupy the same position
even if they are traveling apparently free through empty space.
-gts
---------------------
Dan Fabulich wrote:
> gts wrote:
>
>> I can agree with that. It makes sense from a pragmatic viewpoint.
>> However I am no pragmatist; I must insist that the
>> differences between the objects remain real even if we decide
>> they are not relevant to whatever purpose we have in mind.
>
> Are the differences between a horse and a horse's head
> "non-real" when we say that there's only one thing in the barn?
I would simply ask you to clarify your meaning. Do you really mean to
imply there is no horse body attached to that horse head? If so then the
difference in the barns is very real. If not then there is no
difference.
> Are the differences between
> your whole right hand and your right hand minus a molecule
> (which is still a hand) "non-real" when we say that you have
> just one right hand?
Here you are describing a real difference. My right hand minus one
molecule would not be my right hand. The difference may be small and you
might judge it insignificant in deciding which hand you will claim as
yours, but the difference is nevertheless real.
>> However if for example Lee stated that his personality
>> persists and his copy stated that his does not persist
>> then we would have clear evidence that Lee is not his copy.
>> This would be so not because either assertion is true.
>> It would be so simply because the beliefs conflict.
>
> Conflicting beliefs aren't necessarily relevant...
I see beliefs as extremely relevant for purposes of distinguishing
between two people who appear on the surface to be identical. Beliefs,
attitudes, opinions, etc... this is the stuff of which personalities are
made. Even Lee has agreed that my person changed when I experienced a
religious conversion and became a devoted disciple of Thor. Yet
apparently he disagrees that smaller personality changes should also
matter. He (and perhaps you also) might say that large changes in
personality such as religious conversions "count" but that small changes
in personality "don't count." You and he are certainly entitled to
feel
that way but your subjective judgments about what degree of change
should count does not affect the hard objective fact that even small
changes in personality are real. The decision to ignore small
differences does not make them unreal.
> Most of us are happy to say that there's just one person, even
> when her opinion changes over the years..
As am I, for most purposes. However we are here getting at the very
nature of identity and personality. It is wise here I think to use more
exact language.
I mentioned in another message to you, one to which I don't think you
replied, that in my view we persist through time only in a manner
analogous to that by which a whirlpool persists through time as it moves
down a river. We refer to these whirling patterns as "I" or "me"
and
speak of them as though they are fixed objects. This is very convenient
for purposes of communication and social development of the species --
it helps to get the bills paid -- but upon closer examination we see
that the whirlpools to which we are referring change with each passing
moment. The "I" idea is merely a useful label used for describing
the
general whirling patterns that comprise our ever-changing personalities.
I believe it a mistake, both psychologically and philosophically, to
consider "I" as a reference to a fixed object. Unfortunately this
belief
is prevalent in the West (but not so much in the East -- Buddha knew
better). This false belief in "I" as a fixed object leads some people
to
feel guilty and depressed for the bad choices they believe their
present-persons made in the past and it leads other people to become
egotistical and narcissistic for the good choices they believe their
present-persons made in the past. Much wiser I say to attribute those
successes and failures to our past-persons, and to learn from them in
the same way that we learn from the successes and failures of others.
-gts
----------------------------
--- Eugen Leitl <eugen_leitl.org> wrote:
> On Wed, 23 Oct 2002, Jeff Davis wrote:
>
> > Each has a different history. One is "the
> original".
> > It is unique. It is the first of its kind. It is
> > 'unprecedented'. It's history runs from its
> moment of
> > origin, up to the present.
>
> Please show you how you can tell which is the
> original,
This is one of those logical 'problems' that I see
repeated again and again on this topic. Just because
someone/everyone is unable to distinguish between two
items doesn't mean they aren't an original and a copy.
Observer ignorance/inability is a separate matter
from the facts of identity. If a tree falls in the
forest and no one is there to hear it, it still makes
the same huge crashing sound. Unless you can
establish that the laws of nature are observer
dependent, you need to retire this 'argument'.
> > The other is the nth copy of "the original". Its
> > history begins from the moment of its production.
> > Part of that history is the origin of its
> 'design'.
> > For any copy of something, by the very definition
> of
> > copy (duplicate, xox, etc), its pattern, its form
> and
> > function, its design, its specifications require,
> and
> > are completely dependent upon, an original (in the
> > general case, or "the" original, in a specific
> case)
> > (with the exception of a copy of an (n-x)th copy;
> > n>x).
>
> This is meaningless, as long as you can't provide a
> measurement procedure
> allowing you to tell two copies apart.
Just because you don't know, or can't know, the
difference, doesn't mean it doesn't exist. What's
more, the argument seems to me not just disingenuous,
but even a bit ridiculous. To make a copy, you have
to have an original from which to make it. It is
impossible then to have the two without
creating/having, in the process of making the copy,
the means of distinguishing the two. Destroying the
evidence, or losing it, or whatever, and then claiming
in full view of everyone, some fanciful state of
affairs, is, well, pure stubbornness.
> Why do we keep having the same discussion, year,
> after year, after year?
Stubbornness?
Jeff Davis
__________________________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
Y! Web Hosting - Let the expert host your web site
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-------------------------
"Jeff Davis" <jrd1415_yahoo.com>
> Just because someone/everyone is unable to
> distinguish between two items doesn't mean
> they aren't an original and a copy.
Here we have a case where the laws of Physics say it is imposable to ever
tell the difference between two things and you say nevertheless there is a
huge difference between the two. You could state exactly the same thing more
concisely and honestly simply by saying they are different because they have
a different soul. You could say it, but I don't care to.
> Just because you don't know, or can't know, the
> difference, doesn't mean it doesn't exist.
All I can say is such an attitude has proven itself to be notoriously
unproductive in the past and I see no reason that will change anytime soon.
I think I'll stick to the scientific method.
John K Clark jonkc_att.net
-------------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: Eugen Leitl [mailto:eugen_leitl.org]
Sent: Thursday, October 24, 2002 12:33 PM
To: Dickey, Michael F
Subject: RE: duck me!
"You're making several wrong assumptions. I won't discuss the matter on the list anymore, because I'm sick and tired explaining the same thing to different people over the years."
I am sorry that you find the discussion not worth engaging in, I am only attempting to understand any valid objection to my logical argument. I still see no reason to expect, as a simplest explanation, that a copy is an entity that is experiencing the same subjective events that an original did. If you can provide any good sites you may know of that illustrate all the common arguments and counter arguments in such a case I would be eager see it.
"In all such cases within some 10 ms copies of meat people will become different, albeit initially very similiar persons. It only gets downhill then."
I do not dispute that once the copy is made, or that the copy and the original become more different with each ms that passes. I dispute that they are ever *not* different in the first place, simply because there are two of them, they must be different.
> >If we were to separate the two bodies we would find they experience
> >different sensory input.
>
> "Not if they were equally distant from the center of a symmetrical
room,
> then
> each would see exactly the same thing the other saw."
>
> Aside from the unusual special case you noted above, if you accept that
to
"It is unusual, because synching is an unusual case."
I am not sure exactly what you mean here or are trying to argue. I am new to this group and this subject, so please forgive my ignorance. What do you mean by 'synching' exactly? (I understand your reluctance to discuss this topic, so do not feel obliged to respond if you do not have the inclination or the time)
>
> But both are not made up of the *same* atoms. Reference the though
"Prove it. Distinguish two protium atoms in ground state."
AND
> particles may have idenatical quantifiable descriptions, but they must,
by
> defination, be at two different places. Thus they are still spatially
"Space is not labeled. Quantum state is not dependent on translation in a perfectly flat potential box."
If you can see two atoms that you are wishing to compare, one is on the right and one is on the left. That is how they are distinguishable. They do not occupy the same space at the same time. This is relevant because it has been argued that you can not tell an exact copy apart from an original (with zero change in time) because there are no distinguishable characteristics (just as you can not tell two identical sub atomic particles apart, you can not tell a collection of sub atomic particles that is identical to another collection apart) I argue that you can at the very least acknowledge that their are indeed two collections, and if there are two collections they must be separate, distinct individuals. And if one can not sense what the other senses, than they do not share subjective experiences. Thus a copy does not share subjective experience with an original, even if you can not tell the original and the copy apart, this is still the case. This is the core of my argument I and still do not understand or can recognize any real objections to it.
> the copy and the original you would not share sensory input. If you did,
> *that* would imply some kind of religious magical soul.
"You and John talking about two different things. You don't actually disagree."
I am trying to understand exactly what John is saying still, I have a separate email going to him.
> seperated, and still unique in some aspect. Even if all of their properties
> are identical, they can not exist in the same palce at the same time.
"They don't have to be in the same place at the same time. Read up on quantum physics."
AND
"Two physical objects in the same quantum state are provably
> indistinguishable. Okay? If they weren't, e.g. the equilibrium equation
> wouldn't be true."
>
> They are distinguishalbe because they are not in the same place at the
same
> time.
"You're wrong. Hint: where is that information stored. Another hint: it's not stored in the system you're measuring. Hint, hint."
They do not have to be in the same place at the same time to not be considered separate particles? The point that I am trying to make with this argument above is that even if all of the measured properties are identical for each particle, they are still two separate particles, they are not one particle. Similarly, even if all measured properties are identical between an original and a copy, it does not mean that the original and the copy are one entity, they are still two, separate, distinct entities. Perhaps I do not understand what you are presenting as a counter-argument here?
Regards,
Michael
--------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: John K Clark [mailto:jonkc_att.net]
"Dickey, Michael F" <michael_f_dickey_groton.pfizer.com> Wrote:
> Aside from the unusual special case you noted above, if you accept that
to
> be one person one must share sensory input with oneself, then noting and
> accepting that a copy and an original *do not* share sensory input would
> acknowledge that they are two, separate, distinct individuals.
"Yes. In most cases the two would start to diverge almost immediately
and the
differences would only increase as time went by. That's why the prospect of
getting vaporized would make me rather unhappy if my backup was older than a
second or two."
> But both are not made up of the *same* atoms.
"The way to tell if two objects are the *same* is to exchange them and note the changes; if you do this for atoms absolutely nothing changes. Atoms have no individuality, if they can't even give this interesting property to themselves how can they give it to us? I'll give you an example."
That is one way to tell if objects are the 'same'. If I change one atom in my pattern, you are right, there are no discernable changes. But if I change *all* atoms in my pattern, there is a discernable change. Because if I did the equivalent of recreating my pattern with a new group of atoms, the original pattern with the original atoms will not experience the same subjective events that the new pattern with the new group of atoms experiences, thus they are different beings. This is the core of my argument. If you copy and original, the original and the copy do not share the same sensory experience, so they *must not* be the same person (that is, *one* entity) They may be the same as in they are both identical to one another (as the change in time approaches zero) but they are two distinct separate entities. Similarly, if you copy an original and destroy the original, there is no reason to suspect that this new copy is a continuation of the subjective experience of the original. To presume as much would imply that the original and the copy are telepathically linked in some way, this is quite unscientific. It would be easy to prove they are not by just not destroying the original, and then asking them both if they are sensing the same events. If they are not, then a copy is not the continuation of the consciousness of the original. I have asserted through these logical arguments that to maintain a continuation of consciousness or subjective experience one must retain the same pattern in the same atoms (that is, in the atoms that make up that pattern)
To use your example of vaporization, if you backed yourself up, and then were vaporized, your backup would not remember being vaporized. *you* were the one who was vaporized. If your backup does not remember that, then it is not *you*, it is a copy of you from a few seconds before. You would not feel as though you woke up after being vaporized.
"In my right hand I'm holding a hydrogen atom,... but according to the
laws of physics it is imposable to tell even in theory who
is Ed and who is Ted, both now have the same history. Stuff like that happens
all the time at the quantum level. "
It does not happen at the macroscopic level, so the analogy is flawed. A better analogy would be to assume that you were to take to hydrogen atoms and mix them up and then ask which was the one in your left hand before you mixed them up. I could not tell, of course, but that does not mean that at one point in time one of them was in your left hand and it does not mean that they are actually 'one' hydrogen atom, as I can clearly see one in each hand.
> Just because someone/everyone is unable to
> distinguish between two items doesn't mean
> they aren't an original and a copy.
"Here we have a case where the laws of Physics say it is imposable to
ever
tell the difference between two things and you say nevertheless there is a
huge difference between the two."
The huge difference is that they are two distinct separate entities. In the case of sub-atomic particles, one is at point xyz in space and the other is at point x+1,y+1,z+1 in space. They exist in two separate spaces, thus they are two different entities. I can point at them, one with each finger, and say 'see, they are two different particles, they may be the 'same', but they are two distinct particles' In the case of an original and a copy, they may also not have any test to tell them apart, but one of them came out of the copy end of the scanner copier and the other came out of the scanner end. Also, the most significant factor telling them apart is that there are *two* of them, one on my right side one on my left. Again, I can point at them and say 'see, they are two distinct separate entities that exist independently from one another' To assert that there is 'no difference' between them is to not acknowledge that there are two of them.
"You could state exactly the same thing more concisely and honestly simply by saying they are different because they have a different soul. You could say it, but I don't care to."
A soul is not necessary to invoke, it is only necessary to look and see two distinct separate entities to realize that there are two of them.
> Just because you don't know, or can't know, the
> difference, doesn't mean it doesn't exist.
"I think I'll stick to the scientific method."
If so, them demonstrate to us, logically and scientifically, that it is reasonable to assume a copy of me shares the same subjective experience as I do.
Michael
---------------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: Eugen Leitl [mailto:eugen_leitl.org]
On Thu, 24 Oct 2002, Dickey, Michael F wrote:
> But to be in the same quantum state, they must occupy the same space,
"No. You're wrong. Read it up."
AND
> which is impossible. That is also the law. Thus one can not look at
"Which law?"
The Pauli Exclusion Principle. GTS already elaborated on this, but to re-iterate
-------------
"The Pauli exclusion principle is a quantum mechanical principle which states that no two identical fermions may occupy the same quantum state. "
Examples of fermions: electrons, protons, neutrons, quarks
from - http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pauli_exclusion_principle
"The Pauli principle is also responsible for the large-scale stability of matter. Molecules cannot be pushed arbitarily close together, because the bound electrons in each molecule are forbidden from entering the same state as the electrons in the other molecules "
"Astronomy provides the most spectacular demonstrations of this effect, in the form of white dwarf stars and neutron stars. In both types of objects, the usual atomic structures are disrupted by large gravitational forces, leaving the constituents supported only by a "degeneracy pressure" produced by the Pauli exclusion principle"
-------------
There is no doubt that the Pauli exclusion principle dictates that it is impossible for two fermions to be in the same place at the same time, or do you assert that this is not the case?
Similarly, if two particles that are otherwise identical take up two distinct places in space, one can tell them apart by tracking their location in space-time. In the same manner, one can keep track of an original and a copy just by watching where they are standing, not that it is really necessary in order to acknowledge that one of them was the original.
> a copy and an original and claim they are the same because there atoms
> and molecules are each individually identical, they are different
> because one is on the right of you and one is on the left.
"That's not a property of the objects. Translation is featureless for unlabeled space. That's a property of the observer."
Does it matter? You can still tell one from the other, even if it is only in reference to you, or some other property of space-time. They are still distinguishable. If we are talking about telling an original apart from a copy (which I think is the topic of this discussion) then one merely need acknowledge that their are indeed two entities, one must be the copy and one must be the original. If they do not experience the same subjective events, then they are distinct individuals.
>
> Its not necessary, just keep the original and the copy around and ask one
if
> he sees what the other sees, if not, there is no soul.
"Two people in perfect sync see and think in unison. If they don't, they are not in perfect sync."
To have the same sensory input, to be 'in synch' then, two people must also occupy the same space at the same time. Which is impossible.
> "This is meaningless, as long as you can't provide a measurement
procedure
> allowing you to tell two copies apart."
>
> You can, they do not occupy the same time and space, thus they are
different
> from one another.
"Translation in a flat potential box does not change the quantum state of a system (nonflat potential is equal to labelling space along the gradient). If it did, equilibrium constant would break, and the world as we know it would cease to exist. We all would die instantly. Because we're alive you're wrong."
What exactly am I wrong about? Do you assert that two different objects can indeed take up the same place at the same time? You are only arguing that your inference from my statement is wrong. Again, if two entities are otherwise identical but are at different locations, one can still differentiate between the two. This is a fact, it is true, and we are not all dead because of it. Just because translation is not a quantum state does not mean you can not use it to tell two particles apart that are otherwise in the same quantum state. One is on my left, one is on my right...
Michael
--------------------------
Anyone who thinks objects do not have intrinsic history, obviously has no
soul.
;-)
- Jef
John K Clark wrote:
> "Jeff Davis" <jrd1415_yahoo.com>
>
>> Just because someone/everyone is unable to
>> distinguish between two items doesn't mean
>> they aren't an original and a copy.
>
> Here we have a case where the laws of Physics say it is imposable to
> ever tell the difference between two things and you say nevertheless
> there is a huge difference between the two. You could state exactly
> the same thing more concisely and honestly simply by saying they are
> different because they have a different soul. You could say it, but I
> don't care to.
---------------------------
Michael F Dickey wrote:
We seem to agree on most every point in this discussion, and your
agreement is refreshing and very welcome, but here is an area in which I
think we differ:
> This is the core of my argument. If you copy and original,
> the original and the copy do not share the same sensory experience,
> so they *must not* be the same person (that is,
> *one* entity) They may be the same as in they are both
> identical to one another (as the change in time approaches zero)
> but they are two distinct separate entities. Similarly, if you
> copy an original and destroy the original, there is no reason
> to suspect that this new copy is a continuation
> of the subjective experience of the original. To presume as
> much would imply that the original and the copy are telepathically
> linked in some way, this is quite unscientific.
I agree wholeheartedly that copies made in different locations are
suspect due to different sensory experience. However imagine a situation
in which we instantaneously destroy and replace your original person
with an exact copy in the exact same position, but made from entirely
different atoms. If I understand you correctly, you are arguing that the
use of different atoms would mean that you would die and that your copy
would not be you. If so then I disagree.
In the special case I describe above I think you would continue as the
same person with same sense of self. In fact you would have no way to
know that anything had actually occurred. The only requirement for this
continuity of self would be that the replacement process take place in
the blink of an eye -- in a time interval shorter than the quantum
interval of time -- such that the duplicated atoms and particles would
appear in exactly the same states as your original atoms and particles.
This observation above is what leads to me ponder the possibility of
instantaneous destructive teleportation. If what I say in the above
paragraph is true then instant destructive teleportation might also work
if the original quantum states (with adjustments for position) could be
duplicated instantaneously by an assemblage of particles at the
destination location.
In the case of instantaneous non-destructive teleportation, in which
your original survives, the two versions of you would diverge in the
first moment such that two distinct people would exist. Those two
distinct people would be like identical twins who share some memories in
common. They would be intimately related, but neither would consider
himself to be the other.
-gts
----------------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: gts [mailto:gts_optexinc.com]
Michael F Dickey wrote:
We seem to agree on most every point in this discussion, and your
agreement is refreshing and very welcome, but here is an area in which I
think we differ:
> This is the core of my argument. If you copy and original,
> the original and the copy do not share the same sensory experience,
> so they *must not* be the same person (that is,
> *one* entity) They may be the same as in they are both
> identical to one another (as the change in time approaches zero)
> but they are two distinct separate entities. Similarly, if you
> copy an original and destroy the original, there is no reason
> to suspect that this new copy is a continuation
> of the subjective experience of the original. To presume as
> much would imply that the original and the copy are telepathically
> linked in some way, this is quite unscientific.
"I agree wholeheartedly that copies made in different locations are
suspect due to different sensory experience. However imagine a situation
in which we instantaneously destroy and replace your original person
with an exact copy in the exact same position, but made from entirely
different atoms. If I understand you correctly, you are arguing that the
use of different atoms would mean that you would die and that your copy
would not be you. If so then I disagree."
AND
"This observation above is what leads to me ponder the possibility of
instantaneous destructive teleportation. If what I say in the above
paragraph is true then instant destructive teleportation might also work
if the original quantum states (with adjustments for position) could be
duplicated instantaneously by an assemblage of particles at the
destination location."
That would indeed be the implication of my argument. In its simplest form, that fact that the copy appears in the same place as the original in the same state removes the only differentiating factor available before, that of position. This falls inline with the same argument of whether or not we are continually destroyed and recreated as we move through time. As I understand it, there is no interval of time shorter than the plank length, thus any sub atomic particles that exist through time do not have a smooth continuous existence, but instead of many brief existences that are tied only by their average similarity in space and time. (the same could be said of moving through space) The implications of this can destroy my theory or support it, here are the two scenarios I can think of.
As all matter travels through time, it exists in many short finite intervals of time, not as a continuous smooth timeline.
(bare with me here as my wording my not be up to par with current lingo)
1) does all matter share the same intervals, that is, if we are to view the existence through time of subatomic particles through some hypothetical unaffected observer, would particles be in synch with one another in the process of being destroyed and recreated at every planck length interval of time? OR..
2) does each sub atomic particle have its own unique timing through the quanta of time. That is, if we were observing multiple sub atomic particles, would all of their destructions and recreations occur at different times when compared with one another?
As I noted above, I believe the same concern exists when moving through space, as space does not exist in any smaller intervals than the Planck length, and the same two scenarios would apply when moving through space.
I have no idea which of these is the accurate description of reality, or if we even know (or can know) or even if I explained it clear enough to make any sense to anyone else!
But assuming that one of these is an accurate description of reality, then the implications are significantly different in regards to copying. In case one, essentially, the entire universe pops into and out of existence at every Planck length interval of time at the same time. This necessarily means that any being in it, composed of a pattern of matter, also pops into and out of existence at this small interval of time. If this is the case, then it matters not if I were destroyed and teleported somewhere else instantly, because the only difference between that and what happens all the time is the position, which I do not feel it is reasonable to presume has any bearing on continual subjective consciousness. This requires, obviously, that the scanning / copying / teleporting process takes place at the plank length of time, in any interval longer the situation changes as the two scenarios are no longer identical. If this is the way the universe works, then I agree with you in your objection.
Assuming that case 2 is the accurate description of reality, then this satisfies one of my previously mentioned requirements, that at any one instant in time the vast majority of the stuff that makes up your pattern is the same that it was an instant of time before. If that were the case then destructive scanning copying transporting would violate that, and make none of the things that made up my pattern part of the things that made up my pattern the instant before. In this case I would not agree with your objection, and would not consider myself the same person if all of my particles were instantly destroyed and recreated by others at the very next instant in time.
I have the sneaking suspicion that case 2 is the more accurate description of reality, but that may be mere wishful thinking.
Regards,
Michael
-------------------------
On Fri, 25 Oct 2002, gts wrote:
> This interesting little gem from scerir seems to have passed by almost
> unnoticed in yesterday's flurry of messages to this thread. I am
> reposting scerir's words without comment:
It is of course completely impossible to imagine quantum systems in the
same state which have not been cloned, yet are in the same state, eh. And
yet are indistinguishable (I repeat my usual recommendation to reread the
appendices for "The Physics of Immortality" for a sketch of a proof
why
you would die instantly if this was not the case). I wonder why I keep
writing this, as no one seems to read my posts anyway.
As usually, physics (which I claim no specific understanding in, despite
having survived PCIII) is either being played fast and loose with, or sees
a highly selective interpretation. If you iterate this, you'll a mechanism
by which people with a clue are being silenced, or driven off the list.
Nevermind the fact that systems in the same quantum state are a gedanken
to illustrate a concept, while synchronizing large scale evolution of
deterministic systems is practically possible, and in fact trivial, albeit
done rarely as there is not much need for it in practice.
What I would really welcome to hear is a succinct explanation of evolution
of (macroscopic or nanoscopic) deterministic discrete systems given in
terms of quantum energy levels (rather, groups thereof) and transitions. I
have some very faint idea which I would like to put some meat on.
> > In QM no information can be cloned (xoxed)if
> > the number of states is equal or greater than 3
> > [Wootters, Zurek, 1982].
> >
> > Or, in other terms, a cloning (xoxing) of 2 non
> > orthogonal states violates the unitarity of evolution
> > [D'Ariano, Yuen, 1996].
> >
> > Or, in other terms, the linearity in QM (linear
> > superposition of quantum states) forbids the
> > perfect xoxing. Fortunately! Leibniz principle!
Eugen
------------------------
"Dickey, Michael F" <michael_f_dickey_groton.pfizer.com>
>This is the core of my argument. If you copy and original, the
>original and the copy do not share the same sensory experience,
>so they *must not* be the same person
If that's the core then I don't see what were arguing about. I've said many
times that usually (but not always) the two would not share the same sensory
experience and yes that would soon make them non identical and yes that
would soon make them different people. All I'm saying is that as long as
they remain the same (and that won't be long in most cases) there is only
one person.
>if you copy an original and destroy the original, there is
>no reason to suspect that this new copy is a continuation
>of the subjective experience of the original.
Oh I think there is an excellent reason to suspect a continuation of
consciousness, just ask the fellow if he had any subjective experience
yesterday or last month or last year and I'll bet he'll say "yes".
In fact
you will probably have an extremely difficult time convincing him that he's
the copy made just last night and not the original. I'll just say that if I
am the copy and the original John Clark was vaporized last night an instant
after I was made then I don't care in the least if the same thing happens
again tonight because I feel fine.
> It does not happen at the macroscopic level, so the analogy is flawed.
Macroscopic objects are made of atoms, you say atoms are what give us a
unique subjective experience but science says atoms are identical and I just
don't see how something without individuality can give us individuality.
Besides your atoms are in flux, you are literally not the man you were a
year ago.
> The huge difference is that they are two distinct separate entities. In
>the case of sub-atomic particles, one is at point xyz in space and
>the other is at point x+1,y+1,z+1 in space. They exist in two
>separate spaces, thus they are two different entities. I can point at
>them, one with each finger, and say 'see, they are two different
>particles,
Are they? How do you know they are not constantly exchanging positions? It's
not as silly a question as it may sound at first because that thought
experiment is at the core of one of the most important ideas in modern
physics, exchange forces. The general idea is that you describe two
electrons mathematically in two different way and then (mathematically)
instantly exchange them, now although the equations at first seem very
different you know that all electrons are the same so the system has not
changed and by knowing that two completely different looking equations
are really the same all sorts of interesting things can be found.
> A soul is not necessary to invoke,
The laws of Physics say the two atoms are identical and a difference in
their history can never be found even in theory but you say the two are
nevertheless somehow very different. The laws of Physics say it's bread and
wine but a Catholic says it's the body and blood of Jesus Christ. Six of
one, half a dozen for the other.
John K Clark jonkc_att.net
-------------------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: John K Clark [mailto:jonkc_att.net]
"Dickey, Michael F" <michael_f_dickey_groton.pfizer.com>
>This is the core of my argument. If you copy and original, the
>original and the copy do not share the same sensory experience,
>so they *must not* be the same person
"If that's the core then I don't see what were arguing about. I've said
many
times that usually (but not always) the two would not share the same sensory
experience and yes that would soon make them non identical and yes that
would soon make them different people. All I'm saying is that as long as
they remain the same (and that won't be long in most cases) there is only
one person."
Then this is where we disagree. There is not 'one person' because there are obviously two of them standing in front of me, even if they are in boxes and sharing the same sensory input. Unless they share the same exact subjective experience at the same exact time (that is, they are two manifestations of one consciousness) then they are logically not one person. You can say that the appear to be if there external conditions are manipulated to make them appear to share the same experiences (e.g. put them both in black boxes, for instance) but the second they are outside of identical subjective experience, it is clear that they do not share the same subjective experience. If they do not share it outside their box, why do you propose that the nature of the universe alters the second they step into that box? At no point in time are they 'one' person as A) they are not two manifestations of one consciousness and b) are obviously two people. Please point out the flaw in this logic.
>if you copy an original and destroy the original, there is
>no reason to suspect that this new copy is a continuation
>of the subjective experience of the original.
"Oh I think there is an excellent reason to suspect a continuation of
consciousness, just ask the fellow if he had any subjective experience
yesterday or last month or last year and I'll bet he'll say "yes"."
So because he thinks he had continually subjective experience then he did? I was not aware that our thoughts formed the structure of the universe. What if we copied the pattern and reproduced as a computer program and that computer program insisted that it had its own subjective history. Would you consider that a continuation of the subjective history of the original, who stands outside the computer looking amused at the computer program? It is quite obvious that even though this program (i.e., a different manifestation of this pattern) believes itself to be the continuation of the consciousness of the original, it does not make it so, and it is not a continuation, as this is clearly impossible with the original still around and watching the event. If we kill off the original, this does not make the problem disappear, the copy is still not a continuation of the original conscious subjective experience.
> It does not happen at the macroscopic level, so the analogy is flawed.
"Macroscopic objects are made of atoms, you say atoms are what give us
a
unique subjective experience but science says atoms are identical and I just
don't see how something without individuality can give us individuality."
That is not what I said, please stop mischaracterizing my arguments. At no point in time did I imply that any particular atom has any property different from any other of the same type. In fact I explicitly stated that this is not the case. The only significance to these atoms is that 1) they are the atoms that the pattern is made of (all other atoms in the universe are not part of the atoms that make up this pattern) and 2) that vast majority of the atoms that make up this pattern at any particular instant in time is the same ones that made up the pattern at the instant before.
"Besides your atoms are in flux, you are literally not the man you were a year ago."
Again, at any particular instant in time the atoms that make up your pattern are the same ones that made up your pattern the instant before. If all of them change over a great deal of time, it matters not, because from one instant of time to the next, that vast majority of them are identical. If your pattern was comprised of 100 atoms, and atom 01 was replaced at one instant in time, then at the next instant in time your pattern is now also comprised of 100 atoms, but atom 01 is now atom 01a. This does not change the fact that NOW at this instant, your pattern is comprised of 100 atoms, at the next instant, atom 74 may be replaced by 74a. But at any one particular instant in time, 99 of your atoms that comprise your pattern were the same as the instant before. It matters not that ALL of your atoms are replaced over a great deal of time at one at a time, it matters if ALL of your atoms are replaced AT ONCE. There is a significant difference between these two scenarios, in one of them almost every single atom that made up your patter was present at the instant before. In the other NONE of your atoms that made up your pattern before are present. We can clearly show that in the second case, when NONE of your atoms are the ones that made up your pattern before, that the new pattern made of new atoms is a different person, because it does not share the same subjective experience as the original group of atoms. You seem to assert that replacing one atom at a time is no different then replacing all atoms. This does not seem logical, given the circumstance described above.
> The huge difference is that they are two distinct separate entities. In
>the case of sub-atomic particles, one is at point xyz in space and
>the other is at point x+1,y+1,z+1 in space. They exist in two
>separate spaces, thus they are two different entities. I can point at
>them, one with each finger, and say 'see, they are two different
>particles,
"Are they? How do you know they are not constantly exchanging positions? It's not as silly a question as it may sound at first because that thought experiment is at the core of one of the most important ideas in modern physics, exchange forces."
Is there any evidence to suggest that they are as the simplest explanation? If not, then it is more reasonable to assume that they are not then it is to assume that they are. You have mentioned using the scientific methodology before, the scientific methodology does not place all possible explanations as equally likely.
> A soul is not necessary to invoke,
"The laws of Physics say the two atoms are identical and a difference in their history can never be found even in theory but you say the two are nevertheless somehow very different."
I say they are different because one is in one place and the other is in a different place. Actually, every atom is different because they are all in different places. Do you dispute this? If you do, then you must be insisting that all atoms are in the same place simultaneously, have any experimental evidence that suggests this as the simplest explanation? They are even more significantly different in this scenario because of ones location it may be part of a pattern that creates a sentient being, while another may be part of a pattern of a rock. Is this not a significant difference?
Michael
-----------------------------------
GTS - John K Clark wrote to Michael F Dickey:
>> if you copy an original and destroy the original, there is
>> no reason to suspect that this new copy is a continuation
>> of the subjective experience of the original.
> Oh I think there is an excellent reason to suspect a continuation of
> consciousness, just ask the fellow if he had any subjective experience
> yesterday or last month or last year and I'll bet he'll say
> "yes". In fact you will probably have an extremely difficult
> time convincing him that he's the copy made just last night
> and not the original.
I agree. In fact I think the words "original" and "copy"
have no real
meaning in any discussion of perfect copying.
This must be where your and my opinions diverge then. If one of these entities steps out of the scanning side of the machine, he is obviously the 'original' If one of these entities atoms that comprised his pattern were at the moment before scanning also part of the groups of atoms that made up his pattern, then this is clearly different from the 'copy'. The copies atoms that make up his pattern at the previous instant in time were obviously part of a different structure, perhaps a pile of stock atoms ready to be assembled. In these cases, the atoms of the original are 'different' from those of the copy in a recognizable manner.
Similarly, as mentioned above, if the vast majority of the atoms that are present in the original were present in the original at the previous instant in time then it is reasonable to assume he has had a subjective continuation of consciousness. It is reasonable to assume this since the opposite of almost all atoms being present at the instant before is no atoms being present at the instant before but sharing the same pattern can be clearly shown to NOT produce a continuation of consciousness (ask a copy and an original if they see the same thing) in only two logical scenarios one can be proven not true, then the other must be true.
> Macroscopic objects are made of atoms, you [Michael] say atoms
> are what give us a unique subjective experience but science
> says atoms are identical and I just don't see how something
> without individuality can give us individuality.
> Besides your atoms are in flux, you are literally not the man
> you were a year ago.
"Indeed you are not even the same man you were a moment ago."
Which is something I have never disputed. We are all different as we travel through time, but as the above example about atoms making up the pattern attempts to show is that there is a significant difference between very few atoms being replaced at one instant to the next verses every atom being replaced at one instant to the next. one (the later) clearly does not include a subjective continuity of consciousness.
This statement and objection also implies that ALL ATOMS must remain the same for continuity to continue, thus if all atoms are eventually replaced, continuity is destroyed, thus, so this argument seems to go, it does not matter if they are replaced all at once or one at time. The above thought experiment clearly shows, however, why replacing all of the atoms at once is different then replacing one at a time, as replacing all creates a new entity with its own subjective consciousness. I only argue that the vast majority of atoms need to be the same as the ones that were present the previous instant. The fact that all atoms are otherwise identical is what makes it possible for you to both 'not be the same man you were a moment ago' (made of all the same atoms) while simultaneously still being the same man you were a moment ago (pattern) the key difference is the RATE of replacement.
Michael Dickey wrote:
>> The huge difference is th...
>> can point at them, one with each finger, and say 'see,
>> they are two different particles,
John Clarke replied:
> Are they? How do you know they are not constantly exchanging
> positions? It's not as silly a question as it may sound...
> changed and by knowing that two completely different looking equations
> are really the same all sorts of interesting things can be found.
"Yes. It is very possible that the universe ultimately contains only a single electron, only a single proton, only a single neutron, etc. (Kinda' reminds me of Platonism.)"
It is possible, but it is not likely. Would you bet your life on the 'possibility' that the universe is made up of only one proton, one nuetron, and one electron? Or would you bet your life on the 'possibility' that the universe is made up of the number of electrons, protons, and nuetrons that seem to be present by counting.
-------------------------
Dan said
"To answer Michael/Jef's objections, *even the history gets obscured in
this example*. If mere history was enough to distingush particles with
perfectly similar quantum properties, *even logically* [by name], a
variety of important proofs in physics would fall apart."
Those are the same innacurate representations of my argument that John seems to subscribe to. I have never asserted that any particular atom has some magical signature that makes us able to tell it apart from all others. The driving factor of this argument is that if two sub atomic particles, other indistinguishable, are indeed recognizable as 'two' seperate particles, then they must, be definition, be different in some way. As GTS pointed out, position is part of the quantum description of a particle that is also described by the Pauli Exclusion principle, which means no two fermions can take up the same space at the same time. If it is acceptable to agree that two atoms exist, and not just one, then, if they are otherwise identical, we must be able to tell them apart by where they are. We can easily see that one is part of a pattern that makes up a consciouss entity, while the other is part of a homogenous pile of atoms that is ready to be assembled into a copy of another pattern. At this state in time, these atoms are clearly different from one another.
"But if identity doesn't inhere in the atoms *or* in the history of those
atoms, then in what does it inhere? How can you tell whether something
counts as "you" or not? The answer, as I've argued, is "whatever
we
decide is relevant.""
I of course disagree, it is not a case of whatever we believe is fine. It is quite clear that a copy and an original do not share the SAME subjective experience, if they do not, then the copy can not be considered a continuation of the subjective conscious experience of the original, but instead must be considered a separate unique being.
----------------------
Ok, whats the problem here? Do other posters find me grossly incapable of clearly expressing my ideas? This seems like I keep saying these same things over and over again and are not seeing what I consider to be valid objections or, it seems, even accurate representations of what I am saying?
Please point out the faults in my originally represented thought experiments and I will concede defeat on any point that is show to be logically invalid, I am not in the business of merely ideologically defending my ideas, I truly see this as the simplest explanation for the way the world is, if someone can point to me why this is not the simplest explanation, please inform me!
1) - the pattern is important to subjective continuity of consciousness
if we destroy the pattern, but keep the atoms, continuity appears to be destroyed. e.g. mashed up an originals brain in a blender, same atoms, different pattern, no response to question 'who are you?'
2) - the atoms are important to subjective continuity of consciousness
if we keep the pattern, but use different atoms, continuity appears to be destroyed. e.g. arranged new group of atoms into pattern identical to original, copy can not experience any subjective sensations that original does, therefore the subjective experience of original and copy are isolated and separate.
(note, it is not the particular atoms that have a magic property, it only matters that some were member of a pattern of a conscious entity, while other did not make up that particular pattern)
3 - the rate of atom replacement is critical
if too many atoms are replaced at once, subjective consciousness continuity is not present. e.g. we replace all atoms, use the same pattern, copy does not experience the same subjective sensations that the original does. If very few atoms are replaced, subjective continuity of conscious appears to be retained. At any given moment the vast majority of the atoms are the same ones that were present in the previous moment.
Regards,
Michael
---------------------
I do not know if the quantum cloning is relevant,
or not, in the present discussion. Maybe not (as
Eugene et al. pointed out).
Anyway, from the philosophical point of view, it might be
interesting to say there are, in theory, two kinds of quantum
cloning machines.
A deterministic quantum cloning machine, which performs
unitary operations (unitary evolution is deterministic).
A probabilistic quantum cloning machine, which performs
measurements and also unitary operations, with a
'postselection' of the measurement results (and copies
are produced with certain probabilities).
Now there are two quantum no-cloning theorems.
1. An arbitrary unknown state can not be cloned, deterministically
or probabilistically, since the linearity of quantum mechanics
forbids xoxing;
2. Deterministic cloning of non-orthogonal states is impossible
because of the unitarity of the evolution).
But these theorems do not rule out the possibility of *probabilistic*
cloning of non-orthogonal states. In example the states secretly
chosen (from a certain set) can be probabilistically cloned if
they are linearly independent. The probabilistic quantum cloning
machine yields perfect copies of the original states, but with
certain probabilities of success.
Due to the existing links between quantum no-cloning, no-ftl-signaling,
Heisenberg's principle (quantum cloning breaks this principle,
because you could measure position of a particle and momentum of
its clone!) it is interesting to check if a *probabilistic* quantum
cloning machine might ....
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9704020
-----------------------
> Amazing! A derivation of the Many-Worlds Interpretation of OM starting
with
> Parmenides. I am pleasantly surprised that the ideas which developed in
my
> mind many years ago are in fact a very close approximation of Parmenides'
> metaphysics. Also, some interesting materiel for the personal identity
> discussion, inexorably leading towards the structuralist concept
championed
> by Lee and me.
> Rafal
Ha-ha. Btw, reading the proceedings of the 1927 Solvay Conference
I realized that W. Pauli (you know, very close to Jung!) sketched
a model (for the so called reduction of the probability wavepacket)
which was ... (hold your breath) ... the Many-Worlds Interpretation.
Of course Pauli was a much more professional physicist (and also
philosopher) and called his model the Many Dimensions Interpretation.
(Unfortunately M. Born stopped Pauli using the old argument of mr.
Occam).
--------------------
I am still way behind in answering mail on this thread, but
must comment on Jef's note
> gts wrote:
> > The idea that a person can be in two places at one time, Lee, is to
my
> > way of thinking sheer and utter nonsense.
>
> It seems to me that gts and Lee are still not connecting in the sense of
> understanding what the other person is saying.
Well, I *do* understand what he is saying, but bow to your
analysis here:
> <referee>
>
> I see Lee saying that while there are two separate physical bodies (copies),
> doing separate things in separate places, that it makes the most sense
to
> say that it is the same *person/identity* doing all these things at the
same
> time. It comes down to whether or not you accept this radical definition
of
> identity as useful.
>
> I see gts arguing something else, that it's silly to say that the same
> person can be in two places at once, and in the context that he's talking
> about, of course he's right.
>
> </referee>
Quite so.
> Right now we have a lot of discussion about the meaning of "identical"
with
> offshoots into quantum physics and philosophy of Identity of Indiscernibles,
> which is in itself an interesting topic -- but all this debate is apart
from
> the concept Lee is championing.
Yes, thank you. But it's common for this to happen in
threads, and of course I don't mind. But those tangents
are not about *my* point (not that those other points
are less important, of course).
> I observe the same thing that bothered me during an earlier discussion
about
> altruism. I see endless debate swirling about definitions, but completely
> missing the key point. I observe Lee energetically stirring the pot, and
it
> often seems that he is intentionally being obtuse,
About what? You haven't said anything about where you
find what I'm saying to be ridiculous. In fact, you
very fairly summed it up above as "It comes down to
whether or not you accept this radical definition of
identity as useful."
Well, I say it *is* useful, and proclaim that my notion
of identity---which dictates acceptance of level 7 in
my hierarchy---is what naturally evolves in SF scenarios
and that the "pattern theory of identity", as most fully
explained in Mike Perry's "Forever for All", is what will
one day be commonplace as programs rule.
Quite seriously, people should read "Forever for All"
if you are interested in seeing the future and saving
your life. Not only are there great and definitive
discussions about identity (with which I wholeheartedly
agree, by the way), but it's a gold mine for *all* the
issues tangential to cryonics. Order it today from
Amazon. It's the one by "R. Michael Perry".
> but perhaps this is because he [Lee] believes this is the
> best way for people to come to their own conclusions.
Jesus H. Christ. Believe it or not, I *never* do this.
What an absurd waste of time. Moreover, I have been
accused of *not* letting people come to their own
conclusions! If I am to be defamed, I demand to be
consistently defamed!
Lee
------------------------
> > The Identity of Indiscernibles is a principle of analytic ontology
> > first explicitly formulated by Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz in his
> > Discourse on Metaphysics, Section 9 (Loemker 1969: 308). It states
> > that no two distinct substances exactly resemble each other. This
is
> > often referred to as 'Leibniz's Law' and is typically understood to
> > mean that no two objects have exactly the same properties.
I once wrote a dialog called "Waiting for Zed" , it rambles on about
a lot
of stuff but the part about The Identity of Indiscernibles is below and
shows how you can use it to work out exchange force and deduce the
laws of Chemistry.
=========
Bob: Ever hear of The Identity Of Indiscernibles? The philosopher who
discovered it was Leibniz about 1690.
Alf: Didn't he co-invent The Calculus along with Newton?
Bob: Yea, same fellow. He said that things that you can measure are what's
important, and if there is no way to find a difference between two
things then they are identical and switching the position of the objects
does not change the physical state of the system.
Alf: Big deal. I'm not talking about some un-provable idea in pure
Philosophy, I'm talking about practical questions, like if it's worth
paying extra for an original, or even more practical if a copy of you is
really you. Maybe Religion can help us with questions like that, but not
Science.
Bob: Actually Science can help us, and Leibniz's idea turned out to be very
practical, although until the 20th century nobody realized it, before that
his idea had no observable consequences because nobody could find two things
that were exactly alike. Things changed dramatically when it was discovered
that atoms have no scratches on them to tell them apart. By using The
Identity Of Indiscernibles you can deduce one of the foundations of modern
physics the fact that there must be two classes of particles, bosons like
photons and fermions like electrons, and from there you can deduce The Pauli
Exclusion Principle, and that is the basis of the periodic table of
elements, and that is the basis of chemistry, and that is the basis of life.
If The Identity Of Indiscernibles is wrong then this entire chain breaks
down and you can throw Science into the trash can.
Alf: That's an awful long chain of reasoning, if it has one weak link
perhaps you should put it in the trash can, how can you base it all on
The Identity Of Indiscernibles?
Bob: I wish Zed was here, he knows a lot more about this than I do, but
let's start with one of the first and greatest discoveries in Quantum
Mechanics, The Schrodinger Wave Equation. It proved to be enormously useful
in accurately predicting the results of experiments, and as the name implies
it's an equation describing the movement of a wave, but embarrassingly it
was not at all clear what it was talking about. Exactly what was waving?
Schrodinger thought it was a matter wave, but that didn't seem right
to Max Born. Born reasoned that matter is not smeared around, only the
probability of finding it is. Born was correct, whenever an electron is
detected it always acts like a particle, it makes a dot when it hit's a
phosphorus screen not a smudge, however the probability of finding that
electron does act like a wave so you can't be certain exactly where that dot
will be. Born showed that it's the square of the wave equation that
describes the probability, the wave equation itself is sort of a useful
mathematical fiction, like lines of longitude and latitude, because
experimentally we can't measure the quantum wave function F(x) of a
particle, we can only measure the intensity (square) of the wave function
[F(x)]^2 because that's a probability and probability we can measure.
Let's consider a very simple system with lots of space but only 2 particles
in it. P(x) is the probability of finding two particles x distance apart,
and we know that probability is the square of the wave function, so P(x)
=[F(x)]^2. Now let's exchange the position of the particles in the system,
the distance between them was x1 - x2 = x but is now x2 - x1 = -x. The
Identity Of Indiscernibles tells us that because the two particles are the
same, no measurable change has been made, no change in probability, so P(x)
= P(-x). Probability is just the square of the wave function so
[ F(x) ]^2 = [F(-x)]^2 . From this we can tell that the
Quantum wave function can be either an even function, F(x) = +F(-x),
or an odd function, F(x) = -F(-x). Either type of function would work in our
probability equation because the square of minus 1 is equal to the square of
plus 1. It turns out both solutions have physical significance, particles
with integer spin, bosons, have even wave functions,
particles with half integer spin, fermions, have odd wave functions.
Alf: Wait a minute. Are you saying that an electron, something that can not
be pinned down and doesn't even have a diameter in the usual sense of the
word, is spinning around like a child's top?
Bob: No, not really. It's called "spin" for historical reasons and
it's true
you can make an analogy with the everyday meaning of "spin", but the
analogy is no better than mediocre. For example, it is possible to tip the
axis of spin of an electron with a magnetic field, you might think that
if you turn an electron by 360 degrees it would end up just as it was
before, after all, if you make one complete turn you end up looking in the
same direction, but that's not true for an electron. Turn an electron once
and it's different, you need to turn it twice, 720 degrees, before
it's the same as it was before.
Alf: So if I spin around twice, the world would look exactly the same to me
after one revolution or two, but for an electron it would look
different. Do you think that means we can only see half the universe that an
electron can see?
Bob: I don't know, when Zed gets here why don't you ask him, but I was
trying to show that we must assume that atoms are interchangeable or modern
Physics becomes incomprehensible. If we put two fermions like electrons in
the same place then the distance between them, x , is zero and because they
must follow the laws of odd wave functions, F(0) = -F(0), but the only
number that is it's own negative is zero so F(0) = 0 . What this means
is that the wave function F(x) goes to zero so of course [F(x)]^2 goes to
zero, thus the probability of finding two electrons in the same spot is
zero, and that is The Pauli Exclusion Principle.
Two identical bosons, like photons of light, can sit on top of each other
but not so for fermions, The Pauli Exclusion Principle tells
us that 2 identical electrons can not be in the same orbit in an atom.
If we didn't know that then we wouldn't understand Chemistry, we wouldn't
know why matter is rigid and not infinitely compressible,
and if we didn't know that atoms are interchangeable we wouldn't understand
any of that. Atoms have no individuality, If they can't even give
themselves this property I don't see how they can give it to us.
John K Clark jonkc_att.net
-----------------------------
Jef writes
> As I see it, and I really don't like speaking for others, but I'll try
here
> with the hope of cutting it short, is that Lee is asking you to consider
> broadening your definition of self to see that the other person, for most
> practical purposes, can be effectively considered to have the same
> self-identity as you.
Thanks, I was too busy to participate. Yes, you are right
about my alternate view to gts's.
> Once you accept that the copy can be considered to be effectively you,
> recognized by your friends as you, and for most practical purposes, is
the
> same as you, with the exception of some different memories, then you can
> logically say that "you" (as your identity can be defined) can
exist in two
> places at once. It's not implying some new interpretation of physics. It's
> just a different understanding or definition of self identity.
>
> In many ways this can be a useful way of looking at things, but personally,
> I think this broadening of the definition of self obscures important
> details. I think I understand Lee's key point, but it seems to me that
it
> would be more accurate and useful to refer to "that branch of me"
over
> there, than to IMO oversimplify it by saying that it's precisely me.
Indeed, in many imaginary scenarios involving you and your
duplicate it becomes necessary to distinguish them. Just
imagine what it would be like; when I have, they continue
to speak using the words "I" and "me".
"After you, Stanley." "No. After you, Ollie" ;-)
When the two duplicates discuss the peculiar state of their
identity, remarks are made by them (say their name is Ken
Smith) that go like this:
"Ken (this)" [pinches cheek] "sees the clock on the wall.
"Ken (over here) [pinches cheek] does *not* see the clock
on the wall."
"Whether Ken sees the clock depends on which version
of Ken someone is referring to!", they both agree.
I say that they are only the same person with respect to
the issue of personal identity, which is to say personal
*survival*. If one of the two Ken's must die, then it's
not a big deal to them because each understands that he
really doesn't die. The physical form that remains after
one dies is *exactly* like the other if the other
(a) lost a very few memories
(b) was teleported a few feet
(c) gained a few memories
Since none of these operations threaten (or *should*
threaten) one's personal identity, for one of the Ken's
to die does not threaten his existence. It is merely
a tremendously *lamentable* waste of resources and
diminution of run time.
I mean this literally for him. Suppose he is a Most
Selfish Individual and he and his duplicate can even
watch with glee other people being tortured because
they only care about themselves. Even if he is such
an MSI and really cares *only* about his own survival
and about his own pleasures and pains:
1. He should regard pain inflicted on his duplicate
as pain inflicted on him to the greatest degree
that he is intellectually capable. "I (over here)
may not be feeling the pain, but that *doesn't*
mean it isn't happening to me!"
2. He should regard memory acquisition as a local
process in some ways and a global process in
other ways. "Just because I, Ken, am not
accumulating additional memories at this end
of the room *does not* mean that I am not
collecting them somewhere else in this room."
Always before in human history, memory accumulation
has been synonymous with experience. This need not be
the case in the future, (but continuing this chain of
thought digresses into other thought-experiments).
3. He *needs* to regard the survival of his duplicate
as survival of himself because the aforementioned
three operations a, b, and c pose no real threat
to him.
Although one's common sense strenuously objects to the
idea of being in two places at the same time, the more
we learn of the nature of time, the less problematical
this will become. I heartily endorse Julian Balbour's
book "The End of Time" which is, I think, the most
difficult but the most rewarding physics book that
I have ever read that does not contain a single
equation.
Lee
----------------------
My resolve to wait until I read all the posts before
replying is collapsing. Jeff Davis writes
> > Please show you how you can tell which is the
> > original,
>
> This is one of those logical 'problems' that I see
> repeated again and again on this topic. Just because
> someone/everyone is unable to distinguish between two
> items doesn't mean they aren't an original and a copy.
That's correct, if you are a philosophical realist.
We believe in a truth that stands outside any one
person's (or many people's) attempts to know it.
We believe that it has prior existence, and we
humans can strive to learn it, and can often estimate
the probability (never 1) that we have found it.
For example, we know that the planets orbit the
sun in ellipses.
> Observer ignorance/inability is a separate matter
> from the facts of identity. If a tree falls in the
> forest and no one is there to hear it, it still makes
> the same huge crashing sound. Unless you can
> establish that the laws of nature are observer
> dependent, you need to retire this 'argument'.
I agree. Interestingly, I learned that in Turkish
it's impossible to posit that old riddle. In that
language, there is a grammatically clear distinction
between "sound" as in what one hears and "sound" as
in what results from a physical process. We say
(Jaynes' example) that "the room is noisy" and "there
is noise in the room", and can become confused about
how those phrases differ (they do). But such confusion
is absolutely impossible in Turkish.
> > > The other is the nth copy of "the original".
> > > Its history begins from the moment of its
> > > production. Part of that history is the
> > > origin of its 'design'.
> > > For any copy of something, by the very
> > > definition of copy (duplicate, xox, etc),
> > > its pattern, its form and function, its
> > > design, its specifications require, and
> > > are completely dependent upon, an original
> > > (in the general case, or "the" original,
> > > in a specific case) (with the exception
> > > of a copy of an (n-x)th copy; n>x).
> >
> > This is meaningless, as long as you can't
> > provide a measurement procedure allowing
> > you to tell two copies apart.
>
> Just because you don't know, or can't know, the
> difference, doesn't mean it doesn't exist.
I agree with you. But I agree with Eugen that the
historical path of a system is not an element of
its identity and should not be used to distinguish
it. If two systems are completely identical (thanks
to Eugen now I don't need to discuss position), then
their history is irrelevant for *all* purposes that
I can think of.
> What's more, the argument seems to me not just
> disingenuous, but even a bit ridiculous. To
> make a copy, you have to have an original from
> which to make it. It is impossible then to
> have the two without creating/having, in the
> process of making the copy, the means of
> distinguishing the two. Destroying the
> evidence, or losing it, or whatever, and
> then claiming in full view of everyone, some
> fanciful state of affairs, is, well, pure
> stubbornness.
I think that you are over-reacting to his point.
Clearly the experiment could be changed so that
the original is destroyed and we have two
duplicates, one in the original position and
one in the remote position. Eugen firmly
believes that each one---considered in isolation
is identical to the original---it's just that if
they are to have even one second's difference in
experiences, he goes ballistic: "NO FORKS!!!!"
> > Why do we keep having the same discussion, year,
> > after year, after year?
>
> Stubbornness?
No. We keep bringing this up because
(i) New people come onto the list who haven't
talked about it for years
(ii) people gradually change their minds about
such difficult issues
(iii) it's a real problem in the sense that at
some point in the future uploaded duplicated
selves will have to have policies on *what
to do*!
Lee
--------------------
Jef writes
> I was happy to see your posting on the Seven Levels
> since it should help move the discussion beyond the
> interminable debate running on about whether the
> same object can be in two places at once.
Always the irrepressible optimist, eh? Actually, on
its own terms that's a good discussion, just not to
the same point as ours.
> My response to your 7 levels is as follows: The first
> four strike me as representing naive understandings
> held by some and not useful to discuss further here.
Some posters of ancient pedigree and high standing on
the Extropian list embrace even level #1, so I don't
think it appropriate to dismiss their views as "naive",
though, from our perspective it does indeed feel as
though we've "moved on" from that. But that's *often*
exactly how it feels when people disagree. The phrase
I especially hate hearing is "I used to believe that
too..." ;-)
>> 5. Finds backups acceptable, provided that they've had no run time.
>>
>> Subject finds it desirable to keep frozen physical duplicates in
>> storage (in case anything happens to him or her), but only provided
>> that the duplicate, whether physically instantiated or merely kept
>> safe as information, is completely identical to him or her at a
>> particular past instant. In this case, he or she expects to survive
>> physical destruction of the present body, but not if that body has
>> already been reanimated and is having experiences elsewhere.
> This is where, for me, it begins to get interesting. The key
> point is how we understand our self-identity.
Yes. Our goal should be two-fold: (1) to obtain a *consistent*
viewpoint that attains the least awkwardness in terms of our
ordinary daily concepts (2) anticipate how people like us will
actually evolve psychologically and conceptually when such things
as uploading and xox's become available.
It should be noted that SF writers play a vital role in (2).
Greg Egan's work was mentioned, and an even better Greg Egan
reference is in his stories in the collection "Axiomatic".
These are by far the *most* advanced stories ever written
on personal identity (IMO), and so far as you and I are
concerned, Greg Egan is fully "up to speed" on personal
identity (i.e., he agrees with us, or at least appears to).
> I define my self-identity as a particular pattern,
> continuously changing, of thoughts, memories, drives,
> etc. moving through time and space.
Yes. See Mike Perry's book "Forever For All" for the
most complete description of our theory; it's called
the "State" theory, or the "Information" theory, or
the "Pattern" theory of personal identity. Derek Parfit
in the book "Reasons and Persons" gave the first widely
known account of it in 1986 or so.
> If another instantiation of myself were to be created,
> then clearly that new entity would begin as equivalent
> to me but then the two entities would proceed to
> diverge increasingly with time.
Yes, all the current contributors agree.
> Argument B
> We could point out that we now have two entities operating
> independently of each other in our society, and that for
> society to function properly we must have individual rights
> and responsibilities....
Quite right. I imagine that legally one would be divorced
from one's duplicate, though I'm far from sure. But it does
not seem relevant to personal *survival*.
> We could argue that just as genes evolve and propagate
> themselves through time without any identity paradox,
> so can replicated humans, each branching off on his
> own path through the universe. In the end it's all
> semantics. The facts stand on their own, and how we
> choose to describe them depends on the scope and context
> we use.
As Korzybski used to demur, never say "that's all just
semantics". Semantics is extremely crucial. Actually,
in cases like this, it's just shorthand. If we argue
over whether abortion is murder, we are debating whether
all the semantic links that go out from *murder* to all
our other concepts are valid. That is, just as murder
is abhorrent and illegal, to define abortion as a species
of murder carries those semantic links. (Or even to
accede to such usage.)
I think that arguing whether your duplicate is yourself
is just shorthand in the same way for what you would do
in countless thought experiments. We can predict your
behavior and you can understand your own behavior if you
know whether or not your duplicate is your self. So just
think of it as shorthand, but I don't think that it should
be dismissed.
>> 6. Anticipates future experiences of duplicates, but only one in
>> particular.
>>
>> This is the nearly incoherent "closest continuer" theory.
If you
>> must die, but N duplicates of you were made at several points in
>> the past, then you "really are" whichever one of them survives
>> and is the most similar to you. Somehow your soul, or identity,
>> is transferred by hidden celestial machinery into this particular
>> one, but not into any of the others.
> I agree this appears quite incoherent. I question why you chose
> to place this so near the top of your list, but I suspect it
> has to with the "anticipation" to which you refer.
Yes, it is connected to what I call the "anticipation dilemma",
but I have known people who believed in 1-6 but didn't go on to
7. Ten or twelve years ago Mike Perry even believed in #6 and
perhaps even now does, though I don't think so.
The horrible idea is well-documented in Nosick's terrible
"Philosophical Investigations", about which I agree with Barrow
and Tipler's remark on page 121 of "The Anthropic Cosmological
Principle": "The interested reader is advised to avoid
"Philosophical Investigations". Nozick sets up all the right
answers and then JUST FAILS TO ANSWER THEM. Most annoying.
He believes in the closest continuer theory.
> I've run into something like this in discussions with
> others, and I think its roots are in the mind/body
> dichotomy. To me this is cleared up by realizing that
> "you" are not your body, nor are "you" in your body.
> Rather, your consciousness is a result of processes
> conducted by your body.
Exactly so. And it's key to point out that there are
a *whole lot of processes* that would qualify to be
you that your body (or a computer) could be running.
>> 7. Logically, but not necessarily emotionally, anticipates all
>> experiences of all duplicates past or future, near or far.
>>
>> By subscribing to "the faith of a physicist", the subject
believes
>> that any physical object at any coordinates whatsoever is the same
>> person that he or she is, provided only that the physical process
>> running in the object resembles him or her closely enough.
>>
>> The extreme difficulty of sitting across a table, watching
>> your physical duplicate, and honestly being able to exclaim,
>> "There goes I, by the grace of God", or of being able to
say
>> with a straight face, "Logically, I anticipate the dinner that
>> I had last night as much as I anticipate tonight's repast",
>> prevents almost everyone from accepting level seven.
> To me, the position stated in #7 is based on following the
> logic in Argument A past its point of usefulness, beyond
> the point where that subjective definition of what constitutes
> a personal identity makes sense. It's a cool idea, and it
> tickles the brain in the way novel ideas do, but it seems
> to me to be much less practical than Argument B.
The key here is what you would do in terms of personal
survival, assuming that you relish future experiences
enough for them to dominate your decision making
process. Assume then, that they do: to *survive*
the 21st century, or even to *survive* tomorrow so that
you can personally ENJOY a certain wonderful encounter
is, let us posit, at the very top of your priorities.
Then, would you (A) drink a potion that has a 90%
chance of being deadly poison or (B) kill yourself
so that a duplicate created five minutes ago can
continue to live?
Yes, perhaps for you this is being between a hard
place and a rock, but for me (A) means that there
is only a 10% chance I get to have the wonderful
encounter (say) while (B) guarantees that I will
(sans about five minutes' worth of memories).
Lee
---------------------
My two cents worth:
A computer hard drive turned off might have a clock ticking over but
otherwise is asleep and turn it on and it is a bit awake and run its
software and it is awake. Sort of anyhow.
Wipe the hard drive clean and reinstall the software from a map you've made
previously and it's a different dog.
You aren't going to find me uploading myself a la Greg Egan. No way. Call me
a materialist. Definitely certainly not with atomic level duplicates.
Quantum level splitting a la Tipler I can cope with, as he describes it.
Atomic level duplicates from maps strike me as continous ritual suicide and
will create a lot of work later on with any quantum duplication/splitting
process a la Tipler. But that's okay!
Nor will you find me using any teleport tech involving dissassembling my
molecules or atoms and assembling an atomic or molecular level body based on
my map elsewhere. I'll jump into a wormhole anytime, by contrast, or the
equivalent.
Direct physical continuity and section-by-section replacement and a
recognition that the three dimensionality of a human brain may need to lie
as a kernel for a more complex brain are all things I adhere to. I also
believe that there are real distinctions between neural nodes and sensory
lines of input and communication lines (whether overtual or virtual). I also
believe that any discussion of these issues have to bear in mind that
so-called software ALWAYS resides on a so-called hardware substrate. Every
copy of a Jane Austin novel is different at the atomic level - and indeed,
the molecular. Every word spoken vibrates different arrangements of air
molecules. Etc..
Also, pesonally, on an area relating to all this - using every spare atom to
form a giant supercomputing substratum and thus (perhaps?) requiring us all
to accept moveable neural nodes (a version of uploading) (presuming we are
all crammed into said supercomputer) ... I can see Tipler's argument,
because it is one proposal to avoid the Big Crunch as a negative event and
ultimately results in a multiverse of choice, however as a generic statment
I myself am quite happy to live at some like my present level immortally but
would prefer a hundred or thousandfold increase in some abilities if
possible, but I wouldn't want to achieve anything that meant people had to
lose their non-brain bodies or accept viruality without choice - nor indeed
that they would have to lose their planets and star, if they're attached to
it. So much lies ahead of course that it's hard to tell what's going to
happen, but for me the focus is on immortality (or amortality) and control
of form and choice (and sysop). Rather than maximum "Uploading" and
computational growth at the expense of the choice of others. Besides which,
to me Robert Heinelin is ALREADY a Matrioshka Brain - at least in principle
- that's why he didn't freeze himself (wink).
Thus my two bits.
Avatar Polymorph
Towards Ascension
_________________________________________________________________
Unlimited Internet access -- and 2 months free! Try MSN.
http://resourcecenter.msn.com/access/plans/2monthsfree.asp
---------------------
On Sat, Oct 26, 2002 at 06:45:16PM +1000, Avatar Polymorph wrote:
> My two cents worth:
>
> A computer hard drive turned off might have a clock ticking over but
> otherwise is asleep and turn it on and it is a bit awake and run its
> software and it is awake. Sort of anyhow.
>
> Wipe the hard drive clean and reinstall the software from a map you've
made
> previously and it's a different dog.
So? Same atoms, different bits.
We can extend the analogy. You can be described in terms of the atoms you
are made of, and the bits that describe their structural relationship with
each other.
I could [warning: gedankenexperiment] kill you and use your body as
feedstock to a hydroponic system for growing food. Then, using a couple
of stem cells from your body and somewhat advanced jiggery-pokery with
someone else's genetic map _and_ an as-yet-not-very-existent artificial
uterus I could create a new foetus and grow it to adulthood using the
atoms from your body.
Same atoms, different bits.
The point of this metaphor is to make clear that what is important is not
the atoms, but the bits: they're what define you.
If it isn't clear enough already, consider this: every red blood cell in
your body today will be dead, gone, and replaced by November 30th 2002.
Most of your muscle tissue will have been completely replaced by November
30th, 2003. Our tissues are not permanent, they turn over regularly; and
the metabolic by-products aren't reused -- the replacements are made of
wholly new atoms, ingested or inhaled. Even your brain cells have a notable
rate of turnover, with some new development occuring -- and the long-term
memory tracks in your brain are laid down by physical, structural changes
in your neurons, and the intracellular components within your neurons are
replaced and remanufactured using fresh atoms over a period of days to
years.
Bluntly, you are to the same Avatar Polymorph that you were ten years ago.
About all you've got in common is some parts of your skeleton and brain --
and even then, if we could magically tag the individual atoms that have
stayed and visualise the map of them you'd resemble a swiss cheese.
Bits define you. Physical continuity is an illusion.
-- Charlie
-------------------
Earlier gts wrote
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-extropians_extropy.org
> [mailto:owner-extropians_extropy.org]On Behalf Of gts
> Sent: Thursday, October 24, 2002 8:00 AM
> To: extropians_extropy.org
> Subject: RE: duck me!
>
> If I am tasting wine in Napa Valley while my allegedly perfect duplicate
> is guzzling beer in Tijuana, then does my wine taste like beer? Or does
> my duplicate's beer taste like wine? Or do we both complain that our
> drinks have been adulterated with wine or beer as the case may be?
No, as you may have surmised already, I don't mean
for any telepathy to be in force. Since childhood
one customarily believes that one's identity ends
with the extent of one's body. Later on, one revises
this inward to just the brain. I'm just revising this
outward to include very similar duplicates.
> I think you should reformulate your arguments and your published essay
> to advance a theory of how me might someday manufacture what might be
> called "clairvoyance tools." ... From that representation angle
you
> might then be able to structure an argument for the possibility of
> something very similar to "being in two places at one time" that
does
> not insult the intelligence of your readers.
Well, now that you understand that it is proposed to
change the *concept* of self---to more readily fit
the physical possibilities sure to occur in one way
or another in the future---then this isn't really
insulting anyone's intelligence (though perhaps at
first it did come across this way).
Because from the outset, in the formal argument
the burden has always been on someone to explain
why two people could be in the same place at two
different times but not at the same time in two
different places. You solve that by asserting
that we are not the same person from second to
second, which has IMO much more awkwardness than
does my proposal.
In particular, one has to question the wisdom of
any sacrifice made for one's future self. Why go
to the dentist if it's someone else who'll
eventually get the toothache? Our *deepest*
programming provided by evolution urges us to
identify with future selves.
Now it is also true that our deepest programming
urges us *not* to identify with contemporary
duplicates (because nature never encountered
any before). If I and my duplicate are tied down
and tortured, very soon each says "Please stop and
to it to him!".
But since I contend that one *survives* if one's
duplicate does (for reasons gone heavily into in
other posts), then one's quick defection under
torture against one's duplicate is seen as the
reaction of animalistic machinery (namely the
pain circuits) getting to the primitive parts of
our brain which are trained to avoid pain to the
present body regardless of intellectual knowledge.
In other words, we have a hard choice here, and I
think that in the future, the choice will be made
to regard one's duplicate as one's self.
Lee
---------------------
Michael writes
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-extropians_extropy.org
> [mailto:owner-extropians_extropy.org]On Behalf Of Dickey, Michael F
> Sent: Thursday, October 24, 2002 8:26 AM
> To: 'extropians_extropy.org'
> Subject: RE: duck me!
>> What one must first do, however, is dispense with the idea
>> that the *particular* atoms have anything to do with one's
>> identity.
>
> I disagree, the 'particular' atoms do have something to do with ones
> identity, and I have attempted to show this logically, please point out
any
> fallacious aspects to my argument, as I would be eager to hear them.
Some others have already provided some arguments that
I consider valid, but perhaps this is a slightly
different angle. Suppose that the science of making
duplicates was vastly more advanced than you thought,
and that before 1940 it had been possible, albeit
very expensive to teleport physical objects and make
duplicates of them, but this had been successfully
kept from the public until now. Moreover, after the
age of micro-electronics, it became possible to
replace all of one's atoms with other atoms many times
per second with no apparent change in behavior of any
mammal on whom this operation was performed.
Finally in the 1990's it became possible to replace all
of one's atoms with entirely different atoms each
nanosecond. While yes, you have no reason to believe
(nor do I) that this has in fact happened, it's
not impossible.
Now an extremely perceptive layman learning these "facts"
would have to conclude that his identity didn't depend
on atoms. After all, suppose that he found that during
some of the hours of his day, he was undergoing replacement
at a furious rate, and during other hours of the day he
was not; yet it was not possible for him to tell the
"bad" hours from the "good" ones. He would face the
fact that life was equally good all the time, atomic
replacement or not.
Thus cries during some of those hours that he was not
the same person from second to second would be found
persuasive either by him or the people who knew him.
It would be of no consequence in his daily agendas,
and he would quickly conclude that it made no sense
at all to pay serious money for "good" hours as
opposed to "bad" hours. The changes would be invisible
to him and it's this very *him* with which we are
concerned.
> The particular atoms have no special attributes, no
> magical properties, the only significance to them
> is that they happen to be the atoms that make up that
> pattern at that time.
That is what *we* are saying, yes.
> If the particular atoms had nothing to do with one's
> identity, then if we transferred the pattern, then
> subjective experience would be retained, would it not?
Yes.
> This is obviously not the case, because if we transfer the pattern
> into another group of atoms (make a copy) then the other group of atoms,
> which now share the same pattern as the original, do not have the same
> sensory experience as the original pattern / group of atoms.
But it's like moving into another room, or having someone
suddenly turn on a light: you suddenly do not have the
same experience as before, yet your identity is untouched.
> claim - the pattern is important to identity, the atoms are not
>
> hypothesis - copy the pattern but is different atoms, see if they share
the
> same sensory experience
> result - copy made, copy and original, although difficult to distinguish,
do
> not share same sensory experience
> conclusion - identity can be copied, but does not retain subjective
> continuity
And of course as I think John said, your result does not
necessarily follow from the claim and hypothesis. You
might be teleported to a different but identical hotel
room and obtain not the same yet an identical sensory
experience. Or you might be "teleported in place", i.e.,
just have your atoms exchanged. As I argued above, this
would soon become seen as no threat to your person.
> claim - the atoms are important, the pattern is not
>
> hypothesis - use the same atoms, but change the pattern, see if identity
is
> still recognizable
> result - mushed pattern up in blender, does not answer when asked 'who
are
> you'
> conclusion - pattern is an integral part to identity.
We agree there.
> Through these though experiments, it is clear that a copy, which is made
of
> new atoms with the same pattern, will not experience the same subjective
> events that the reference or original does, even if we can not determine
who
> is the reference and who is the original, one of them was.
This is where I don't follow, and I think that several other
people don't either. If the original is in the plainest and
most severe soundless cell in the Lubyanka, then after having
his atoms swapped he experiences exactly what he did before
the swap.
And if you are talking about teleporting, I can easily
imagine my surrounding transforming instantaneously,
and I wouldn't be able to tell whether I had teleported
or nanotech had just quickly altered my surroundings
an I had stayed put.
> > > If you think you cannot [right, I cannot], then you are
> > > two separate persons in separate places, albeit persons
> > > that are identical.
> >
> > "So say you. I contend that we are actually the same *person*,
though
> > clearly what is to be contended is what is meant by that construction.
> > (This is, of course, the entire basis of the discussion.)"
>
> Agreed, there seems to be some confusion as to what 'the same person' means.
> People seem to be confusing 'those two people are the same (identical)'
with
> 'That is the same person' If we copied an apple, one could point at both
> apples and claim they are identical, but one can not (logically) point
at
> both apples and claim that are the *same* (i.e. only one) apple, as they
> obviously exist separately spatially. I do not disagree that one can point
> at an original and a copy and state a) I can not tell which is which (unless
> referencing the copying process) and b) their personalities are identical,
> they are similar people, if not entirely the same. But I would disagree
if
> one claims that they are 'one' person, as they are obviously two, albeit
> identical, people, each with their own distinct existence and sensory
> experience.
Here you have company. While as a realist I concede that
if an apple is copied, one is the original and one is only
a copy, they are identical for all practical purposes, and
this includes (for people) survival (and the "personal
identity" which tracks survival).
> > > If none of our atoms are replaced, we remain the same
> > > person (same pattern,same atoms) if all are replaced,
> > > we are a different person (same pattern, different
> > > atoms, different subjective experience).
> >
> > What evidence would you ever have that this is the case?"
>
> Would you like to present evidence that if none of your atoms are replaced
> or your pattern does not change then you are a different person?
Good gracious no! *That* certainly is not controversial,
unless certain parties wish to claim that even a nanosecond
inflicts so much change that we aren't the same person from
instant to instant. But not most of your correspondents!
> If someone should
> present evidence that I am being destroyed and re-copied every microsecond
> in operations that only require nanoseconds then I would take that into
> account and make a judgement accordingly, however just because we can
> imagine that this is a possible scenario does not make it a plausible one.
> How would you know that you ARE being copied and destroyed each microsecond?
Well, a good SF writer can lead you into such a scenario
where you'd have little choice but to accept that as the
case. Why, with an open mind, it would take God only
15 minutes or so to convince me of His existence, were He
to charge down here to Earth in a big enough Holy Chariot
and commence to impress me with miracles and plausible
explanations concerning his absence lately! Sure, any
sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable
from magic, but since I'm a reasonable guy, I'd soon
come to believe in God were that to happen. Likewise
you must consider your reaction were the aforesaid
secret government project that accomplished duplication
revealed to you now.
> > > I, for one, will not ever walk into a destructive copying or
uploading
> > > mechanism, as this will surely lead to my demise.
> >
> > Yet as I have said many times before, you would soon be in the small
> > minority as more practical people used teleportation to get about
quickly
> > and cheaply. Finally, you'd be seen to be an old fogey from the last
century
> > who had some strange hang-up about atoms."
>
> That strange hang up being based on science and reason.
> Oh well, to bad for the rest of them. I'll wait for
> wormholes (which may come about before destructive
> copier / teleporters anyway).
No, you wouldn't. Suppose that you were forced (by the way, have
you ever read much SF?) to teleport the first few times---friends
grab you and throw you in to the teleporter terminal just as the
Thought Police are about to capture you all. And then, to avoid
an incredibly taxing mile-high climb each morning, you just
eventually relent and agree to teleport. The social effect on
you of seeing your friends and loved ones teleport over and over
again with no bad effects would get to you. You would yield to
their exhortations to avoid the grinding climb each day that
was injurious to your health. It would be easier to revise
your beliefs about atoms and identity than to scale that wall
every morning.
Now I agree that this latter argument is not air-tight; sometimes
logic for the sake of consistency must override such social and
psychological inducements. But take it as another indication
that you might view teleportation as less threatening if you
did it a lot. You perhaps do have to go back and question on
what your strong conviction that atoms matter is based.
Mach would presumably teleport because he didn't even believe
in atoms, and yet was a leading scientist and profoundly
knowledgable scientist with great common sense.
Lee
-----------------------
Giu1i0 Pri5c0 writes
> I believe the two spheres would behave differently in some real world
cases
> involving collisions and rotations(slightly different distribution of
> stresses etc.).
Yes.
> Anyway the spirit of the game is I believe: "suppose there is no
way
> to find out the difference, what is the difference"? The answer is
> quite evident if the question is stated in these terms.
It is? Can you imagine a difference that exists but happens
to be beyond our ability to detect, or did you mean a difference
that *in principle* cannot be detected?
In the former case, I would say, it's clear that there is (or
could be) a difference. For example, physicists aren't entirely
*certain* that the exponent is exactly 2 in Newton's gravitation
law, at least not so sure as they are that planets move in ellipses.
But in the latter case, we must inquire deeply into the
propositions and context of the phenomenon, and quickly
entertain the likelihood that a difference undetectable
*in principle* is probably best considered to be no
difference at all.
Lee
----------------------
"Dickey, Michael F" <michael_f_dickey_groton.pfizer.com>
> There is not 'one person' because there are
> obviously two of them standing in front of me,
There are two bodies but I'm interested in people not protoplasm.
A person is not an object he is a adjective, he is the way matter
reacts when it is organized in certain complex ways.
>Unless they share the same exact subjective experience at
>the same exact time (that is, they are two manifestations of
>one consciousness) then they are logically not one person.
Obviously.
>>Me:
>> Oh I think there is an excellent reason to suspect a
>>continuation of consciousness, just ask the fellow
>>if he had any subjective experience yesterday or
>> last month or last year and I'll bet he'll say "yes".
> So because he thinks he had continually subjective experience
>then he did?
Yep, that's why they call it subjective. What else could the word mean?
If you think you've survived then you must have done so.
> I was not aware that our thoughts formed the structure of the universe.
But our thoughts do form ... well... the structure of our thoughts, and
that is what survival is all about. If you are correct then it is entirely
possible that I am "dead" right now and so the word no longer has
any
meaning, at least none that interest me.
>What if we copied the pattern and reproduced as a computer program
> and that computer program insisted that it had its own subjective
>history. Would you consider that a continuation of the subjective
>history of the original
Yes. Silicon or meat, it makes no difference.
>at any particular instant in time the atoms that make up your pattern
>are the same ones that made up your pattern the instant before.
No, not ANY instant in time, not if the particular instant of time
is a year and that time frame is as good as any other.
> If all of them change over a great deal of time, it matters not,
> because from one instant of time to the next, that vast majority
> of them are identical.
If I blow myself up with dynamite the atoms in my body will
not change much from one picosecond to the next and that
time frame is as good as any other, so it matters not.
Pretty silly argument don't you think.
>Would you bet your life on the 'possibility' that the universe
>is made up of only one proton, one nuetron, and one electron?
Yes, I'd bet my life that it might be 'possible' and actually that is
exactly what Richard Feynman, one of the greatest physicists of
the 20'th century thought; but for our purposes it doesn't really
matter if there are one or many because not only is it imposable
for us to know the history of individual atoms it is even imposable
for the universe to do so, thus there is no way an atom can
achieve individuality from its past position or any other achievement.
John K Clark jonkc_att.net
-------------------------
"Avatar Polymorph" <avatarpolymorph_hotmail.com>
>Every copy of a Jane Austin novel is different at the atomic level
But the important part, the part that people admire, I'll even use the word
the soul of the novel is that same. No, your post did not convince me but
that's not your fault because I only saw "A Copy" of your post, if
I saw
"The Original" things would be different.
John K Clark jonkc_att.net
-----------------------------
Extropes,
--- John K Clark <jonkc_att.net> wrote:
> "Jeff Davis" <jrd1415_yahoo.com>
>
> > Just because someone/everyone is unable to
> > distinguish between two items doesn't mean
> > they aren't an original and a copy.
>
> Here we have a case where the laws of Physics say it
> is imposable to ever
> tell the difference between two things
This is too strong a statement, John. *Your
understanding* of the laws of physics, perhaps.
Feynman said something like no one on the planet truly
understands quantum mechanics, so I'm inclined to be
somewhat circumspect. I wish you well with your
confidence on the subject.
> and you say
> nevertheless there is a
> huge difference between the two. You could state
> exactly the same thing more
> concisely and honestly simply by saying they are
> different because they have
> a different soul. You could say it, but I don't care
> to.
Dissing me with the religious thing is uncalled for
and unfounded, but no great matter.
While I'm on the subject of uncalled for stuff, I
think I owe Gene an apology for characterizing his
view on this topic as "disingenuous". I take it
back. I've been studying some of the back and forth
and I find lots of room for different underlying and
unvoiced assumptions, definitional variations, and
good old-fashioned errors.
Concerning errors: I wrote, regarding distinguishing
features of an "original" and a perfect copy, that,
"Each has a different history." Upon further
reflection--I decided to give it a try to see it from
the other point of view--I noticed that the history of
a thing is not inherent in the thing itself. The
history is an abstract notion, a neurological pattern,
a memory record, which exists in each observer,
(including the thing itself, if it has memory
capability), BUT OUTSIDE OF THE THING ITSELF, and
which varies from observer to observer. The events
which make up the history of a thing have had a
formative effect on the thing, but that is no matter.
An observer with a notion of continuity, a notion of
'a history', which he understands to be LOGICALLY
assignable to some thing for identification purposes,
clearly stands outside of the thing itself. The
memory of a thing and the logical connection of past
events to the present reality, are separate from the
thing in the here and now. Thus, it would seem, that
things which have distinguishable histories, may
themselves be indistinguishable.
From this I get closer to understanding Gene's
emphasis on a thing's history not having any value as
a means to tell them apart.
But I'm still not happy. I'm starting to wonder what
is real and what isn't. The here and now is real (or
is it?). The past and the future are not real.(!?)
They're just 'ideas'. Is the concept of continuity
real, and/or true, or a fantasy? Is logic valid?
Always? Only sometimes? Is it enough to
*know*--based on logic--that something is true, or is
something *not true* unless and until proven? Can
something that was authentically true at one time
become not true at a later time as a result of
subsequent events (the creation of indistinguishable
copies)?
I'm still inclined to think that the truth of identity
remains a truth despite unknowability. And, as to
distinguishing between the two identical things(but
not as to which is the original and which the copy), I
fall back on Michael Dickey's point that, as long as
there are two of them, and you can grab one in each
hand, in the here and now, and pin a label on each,
then, unless we're in some kind of simulation and
NOTHING'S REAL, then they are separate, distinct, and
easily distinguishable.
Beyond that I have only one thing to say:
Quack, quack, quackk, quaak, quack, quacckkk,
quaaaakkk, quack, quack, QUACK, QUACK, quack, quackk,
quaak, quack, quacckkk, quaaaakkk, quack, Quack,
quack, quackk, quaak, quack, quacckkk, quaaaakkk,
quack, quack, QUACK, QUACK, quack, quackk, quaak,
quack, QUACK, QUACK, QUACK, QUACK, QUACK, QUACK,
QUACK, QUACK, QUAAAAAAAAAAAAK, quaaaaaaaaackkkkk.
I've been wanting to do that ever since this thread
started. Have a ducky day, and thank you for your
support.
Best, Jeff Davis
"Outside of a dog, a book is man's best friend.
Inside a dog it's too dark to read."
Groucho Marx
-------------------------
--- Charlie Stross <charlie_antipope.org> wrote:
> Most of your muscle tissue will have been completely
> replaced by November
> 30th, 2003. Our tissues are not permanent, they turn
> over regularly;
This is an oft-repeated factoid which I think this is
not quite accurate, or in need of some clarification.
Best, Jeff Davis
------------------------
>> Me
>> Here we have a case where the laws of Physics say it
>> is imposable to ever tell the difference between two things
"Jeff Davis" <jrd1415_yahoo.com>
> This is too strong a statement, John.
No, it is not too strong a statement. One can always invoke new laws of
physics but that is unwise unless there are experimental results
incompatible with known laws and in this case there are no such results.
You'd really be invoking magic. As of now science says there is no way to
recover the history of individual atoms once they have formed a Bose
Einstein Condensate and we don't have the slightest reason to think that
will ever change.
> Dissing me with the religious thing is uncalled for
> and unfounded, but no great matter.
I wasn't trying to be rude but it is a fact in both cases a huge change
in something is claimed when science can detect no change at all.
John K Clark jonkc_att.net
-------------------------
On Sat, Oct 26, 2002 at 12:51:01PM -0700, Jeff Davis wrote:
>
> --- Charlie Stross <charlie_antipope.org> wrote:
>
> > Most of your muscle tissue will have been completely
> > replaced by November
> > 30th, 2003. Our tissues are not permanent, they turn
> > over regularly;
>
> This is an oft-repeated factoid which I think this is
> not quite accurate, or in need of some clarification.
What do ribosomes produce? What is apoptosis? What are stem cells,
and why do we have them?
Get back to me when you can answer these questions.
-- Charlie
------------------------
Lee -
Lee Corbin wrote:
>> It seems to me that gts and Lee are still not connecting in the
>> sense of understanding what the other person is saying.
>
> Well, I *do* understand what he is saying, but bow to your
> analysis here:
Lee, I am quite certain that you usually DO understand what others are
saying, but it has been my experience and observation that you often do not
acknowledge that you understand the other person's points. This often leads
the other person to feel disconnected, repeat their same points, and grow
frustrated with you.
Personally, my intitial frustration with you has been replaced by
appreciation of a sense of playfulness, and I benefit from your eruditeness.
> Well, I say it *is* useful, and proclaim that my notion
> of identity---which dictates acceptance of level 7 in
> my hierarchy---is what naturally evolves in SF scenarios
> and that the "pattern theory of identity", as most fully
> explained in Mike Perry's "Forever for All", is what will
> one day be commonplace as programs rule.
Thanks for the pointer. I ordered the book today from Amazon.
In your posts later today, two points of your points have become clearer, at
least to me: (1) You are talking about "survival of identify", and
(2) you
are saying that in the future, as the technical means become available, it
makes sense for us to value the survival of our identity with importance
equal to our current concept of "survival of self."
If you agree with my statements of understanding above, then I think you and
I are in essentialy complete agreement as to the logical and rational way of
looking at "survival of identity." The challenge will be to overcome
our
human nature that evolved with the more limited concept of "survival of
physical self."
- Jef
-------------------------
Lee raises an interesting question:
Paraphrasing to verify my understanding:
Lee is talking about "survival of identity", and is suggesting that
we make
a
couple of changes in our thinking. (1) He is saying we should broaden
our concept of self-identity to include copies of ourselves, even if they
have branched from the original and have somewhat different experiences.
This concept of identify can be justified by pointing out that we currently
claim
a constant identity despite many changes to our selves over the years.
(2) He is suggesting we overcome our human nature, evolved to think of
ourselves
as constrained within a single body, and begin to value "survival of our
identity"
(as defined above) equally with our current concept of "survival of self".
I think I clearly see Lee's logic, and his statements have value, but I
disagree with what seems to be a value judgment at the end of his reasoning.
I don't see
any reason why I should value other branches of myself equally with myself.
I think it's more useful to consider them as separate individuals who have
the special relationship of being branches of myself.
Stated another way, I can see why we currently value "survival of self",
even if only
because of very strong evolutionary programming. It appears there is an
implied
assumption here that if we agree that "survival of self" is important
to us
now, then we must also
agree that the broader "survival of identity" will be similarly important
to
us with the broader
technical capabilities we will have in the future. I would argue that we
will have
broader choices to go with the broader capabilities, and that it would be
more
advantageous to consider all copies to be separate individuals with special
relationships to each other due to branching.
- Jef
--------------------------
--- Jef Allbright <jef_jefallbright.net> wrote:
> Lee raises an interesting question:
Again I find myself in complete agreement with your
objections to Lee's ideas, Jef, so much so that I
hesitate to respond lest I give a different
impression. However I'd like to to elaborate further
on your message:
> I think it's more useful to consider [our
> separate and independent copies] as
> separate individuals who have the special
> relationship of being branches of myself.
Not only is your view most useful, but I think a
little rational thought shows it to be perfectly true
and obvious.
Lee has failed to offer any reason that any possible
copied versions of ourselves should not be considered
in the same way that we would consider identical twin
siblings with whom we happened also to share some
common memories.
Clearly we would be intimately related to such people
-- I agree with Lee that it would be very odd to meet
someone who looked like me and who remembered some of
the same things I remembered. Due to the common
memories that person would be more closely related to
me than a twin-sibling. However in other respects he
would be no different from a twin-sibling.
Despite those common memories, my other version's
personality would have diverged from mine in the first
moment after the branching, such that he would have
his own independent thoughts and emotions and
experiences. He would have his own cares and
considerations. He would experience his own joys and
pains according to his own personal experiences and
expectations. If he committed a crime then only he
would be responsible. If he succeeded in life then
only he would reap the benefits of those successes. If
he fell in love then only he would feel the closeness
of that bond.
It would be a crime against reason to assume that
other person to be me. And yet here we have Lee
Corbin, who claims with apparent sincerity that after
"thirty years" of research he has concluded that such
branched versions of ourselves should be considered
identical to self. Such rot.
-gts
-------------------------
Jef Allbright wrote to Lee:
> In your posts later today, two points of your
points
> have become clearer, at least to me: (1) You are
> talking about "survival of identify", and
(2) you
> are saying that in the future, as the technical
> means become available, it makes sense for us to
> value the survival of our identity with
importance
> equal to our current concept of "survival of
self."
If survival of identity *separate from self* (i.e., as
a non-living label or record) is the only object here
then this discussion is pointless and trivial.
We might just as well make holographic interactive
talking images of ourselves now so that posterity will
be able to pretend to interact with us after we die.
Such devices would not allow for true *survival*. They
would be nothing more than high-tech tombstones.
-gts
-------------------------
Emlyn O'regan wrote:
> I agree... the soulcatcher chip is not coming under my umbrella of "self",
> or even "identity". Although imagine how useful a soulcatcher
of yourself
> would be...
>
> Emlyn
> (soulcatcher: http://home.iae.nl/users/lightnet/world/soulcatcher.htm)
Right. That soulcatcher chip is an interesting idea but even if it became
reality it would not allow for survival of death.
"Survival of identity," separate from survival of self, is something
we
humans have been procuring for many centuries. We ensure the survival of our
identities in the form of tombstones with epitaphs, published
autobiographies, foundations in our name, etc. I don't think anyone here is
gullible enough to think such things are really a means by which our persons
survive death.
Imagine a tombstone that contained a very high-tech epitaph. Instead of a
sentence or two from you, it would contain a holographic image of your face
and programming that encapsulated your entire personality at the time the
program was coded. That tombstone would be able to interact with your
descendants who might come by to visit you and "mourn your death."
Instead
of reading your epitaph, they would strike up a conversation with you...
"Hi Uncle Albert! We sure wish you had never died! We really miss you!"
"Hello there dear ones! Good to see you! I miss you too!"
"Do you remember the time you took Bobbie and me to the circus?"
"Why yes of course I do! How could I ever forget how you got cotton candy
all over your face!"
"Tell me, Uncle Albert, what's it like after we die? What is the after-life
like?"
"Well, let's see. I guess I would have to say it's very, umm, binary..."
Holographic tombstones could even interact with other holographic tombstones
in some transhuman future in which only the holographic tombstones survive.
We could even enable our tombstones to walk and behave as we did during our
lives.
Such things make for great sci-fi imagery but in the end we're still only
talking about a graveyard full of rotting dead people with high-tech
tombstones.
-gts
-----------------------
> Jef Allbright wrote to Lee:
>>
>> In your posts later today, two of your points
>> have become clearer, at least to me: (1) You are
>> talking about survival of identify, and (2) you
>> are saying that in the future, as the technical
>> means become available, it makes sense for us to
>> value the survival of our identity with
>> importance equal to our current concept of survival
> of self.
gts wrote:
> If survival of identity *separate from self* (i.e., as
> a non-living label or record) is the only object here
> then this discussion is pointless and trivial.
>
> We might just as well make holographic interactive
> talking images of ourselves now so that posterity will
> be able to pretend to interact with us after we die.
> Such devices would not allow for true *survival*. They
> would be nothing more than high-tech tombstones.
gts, I think we're talking about survival of identity in the sense of a
living, growing person who carries our identity into the future, exactly as
we do now now while our identity is limited to a single body. As you've
said, this is more correct than saying our "self" carries into the
future,
because the "self" is continuously changing. So we understand that
it's our
"self-identity", that set of thoughts, memories, and drives that we
*identify* as ourself, that we have such a strong desire to see carried
forward.
Lee has been saying that in the future we will contnue to have the same
attachment and concern for what we consider to be "our self", but
that we
will apply the concept equally to more than one body that carries our basic
identity, even though they've branched.
I'm saying that in this hypothetical future we will fondly appreciate seeing
our "branches" set out on their own, but will think of them as a new
kind of
twin sibling, rather than as "our self".
- Jef
-------------------------------
NOTE : two kinds of survival of identity, that of the identity as defined by the thoughts, memories, experiences that make people recognize you as you, and the identity that continually perceives the same senses as the identity that perceived it the instant before
NOTE: lookup the atom exchange rate in the body.
-------------------------------
Hey gts, lest my post be too closely associated with your addendum, I would
like to add the following statements:
I certainly do not "object" to Lee's ideas. On the contrary, I would
encourage them. However I do disagree with at least one of his current
points, and that's what makes it interesting. (I realize you probably
didn't mean "object" in quite that same sense, but I want to be clear
about
that.)
One of the reasons I continue to subscribe to the Extropy list is that as I
sift through it I continue to find jewels of thought to add to my growing
collection. Let's encourage differences of opinion, and encourage their
expression in as *rational* and *respectful* a forum as we can manage.
- Jef
gts wrote:
> Again I find myself in complete agreement with your
> objections to Lee's ideas, Jef, so much so that I
> hesitate to respond lest I give a different
> impression. However I'd like to to elaborate further
> on your message:
> ...
> It would be a crime against reason to assume that
> other person to be me. And yet here we have Lee
> Corbin, who claims with apparent sincerity that after
> "thirty years" of research he has concluded that such
> branched versions of ourselves should be considered
> identical to self. Such rot.
-------------------------------
Frank Prengel wrote:
>
> So s.o. should put together a "Copy Paradox FAQ" which should
be a
> must-read for everyone allowed to join a discussion like this ... ;-)
Net-based technology enabling us to collect, update and share group
knowledge is now becoming much more practical, and I keep thinking that a
group like Extropians would be among the first to take advantage of it.
However, I've been also been thinking for a long time that this would become
indispensible to competitive business survival and have yet to see it
effectively applied. I see myself consistently underestimating cultural
inertia.
>
> It is my feeling that we should first get rid of the notion of
> consciousness as a *thing*, instead adopting the notion of
> consciousness as a *process*. Then the question of identity looks
> quite different ...
Yes, and when you "widen back" and look at what is carrying out the
process,
you see that many of the supposed paradoxes fit neatly in the wider view.
- Jef
------------------------------
Jef Allbright wrote:
> I certainly do not "object" to Lee's ideas. On the
> contrary, I would encourage them. However I do
> disagree with at least one of his current
> points, and that's what makes it interesting. (I
> realize you probably didn't mean "object" in quite
> that same sense, but I want to be clear about
> that.)
Hmm. By "object" I think I mean the same thing as you.
I "disagree with" the relevant idea. I find it
implausible and contrary to reason.
I'm also astounded that someone as eloquent and as
seemingly intelligent and sincere as Lee would advance
such a preposterous idea. I keep waiting for him to
show me something mind-blowing about the nature or
reality, or else to explain to me that he really meant
something else entirely. I think that is what keeps me
glued to these threads...
-gts
----------------------
NOTES -
definitions
identity (I, me, you)
'same'
two identical things
one thing
you externally and you subjectively
---------------------------
From: Lee Corbin [mailto:lcorbin_tsoft.com]
First of all, I must disagree with your chosen title of this thread offshoot 'Does Our Identity depend on atoms' as this was not ever what I argued. Instead, it should read 'Does the continuation of a particular perceived consciousness depend upon a 'particular' group of atoms (and not just any atoms)' With that in mind, does your answer remain the same?
Of course our identity does not 'depend on atoms' (by this, I assume you mean some particular atoms, and not just any atoms) because we can copy our pattern with any group of items and still have an entity whose identity is for all intents and purposes identical to the reference group of atoms in that particular pattern. I do not dispute this, what I dispute is that the pattern, which is identical to the reference pattern, and is imprinted upon a new group of atoms, is a subjective continuation of the reference pattern. That is, it is not you. The evidence I have for the fact that the same pattern in a different group of atoms is that if we were to copy the pattern and imprint it into a new group of atoms the new group/pattern will be identical to the reference, but would not experience the same subjective events as the reference, and therefore *would not* be a continuation of the subjective experiences of the reference (original)
I feel I have had difficult moving this discussion forward, swimming upstream so to speak, primarily because of misconceptions of my arguments such as that which made you title this thread as such. In making a logical argument it is key to define the terms we are using in discussion, this argument in particular is based upon some pretty vague notions, so let me attempt to define them.
identity (you, me, I)-
definition 1 - a group of thoughts, emotions, experiences that make a person a particular person.
definition 2 - a pattern which contains thoughts, emotions, and experiences that experiences subjective continuity from one moment to the next
As you can see, these two definitions have quite different implications, I think when you say 'identity' you mean something similar to the first, when I say it, I mean something similar to the second.
To put it another way, when you say 'that copy is you' I translate that roughly (as you say it) as all the thoughts, emotions, experiences etc. that make you *you* are present in the copy as well. If this is the definition of *you* I do not dispute that 1) a copy is 'you' (for the instant after copying) and that 2) semantically, there are two 'yous'
However, when I say that 'copy is not you' I mean that the copy may have the same thoughts, memories, emotions that 'you' did, but it does not exist as a continuation of subjective experience.
This is proven by imprinting a reference pattern into a new group of atoms, and retaining the reference pattern. The new pattern does not experience the same subjective experience that the reference pattern does, thus it is not a continuation of the subjective experience of the reference pattern (a simple, easy, logical experiment) This is the argument I have yet to see an objection to. Is a copy (the same pattern imprinted on new atoms identical to a reference pattern) a continuation of the subjective experience of the reference? The answer, NO, it is not, because the new pattern and the reference pattern do not share the same subjective experience.
It seems to me that one of these definitions (yours) can be thought of as identity as change in time approaches zero, and mine (since it fundamentally resides on the continuation of subjective experience) requires a time component.
These two definitions of identity seem to be intermingled in this discussion, am I correct in interpreting your definition of 'identity' (I, me, you)?
I think It is necessary to clarify this definition and probably some others, to make this discussion more useful.
> The particular atoms have no special attributes, no
> magical properties, the only significance to them
> is that they happen to be the atoms that make up that
> pattern at that time.
"That is what *we* are saying, yes."
> If the particular atoms had nothing to do with one's
> identity, then if we transferred the pattern, then
> subjective experience would be retained, would it not?
"Yes."
I should have emphasized 'continuation' of subjective experience, which I guess I skipped over in typing that particular message. As I have emphasized from the get go, a copy will not experience the same subjective events that a reference or original does, thus it CAN NOT be a continuation of the consciousness of the original.
Consider, a reference may be copied *without his knowledge* if a copy was truly a continuation of a particular identity (by my definition) then he would experience what the copy does. If he does not, then they are two, distinct, separate, isolated entities.
> This is obviously not the case, because if we transfer the pattern
> into another group of atoms (make a copy) then the other group of atoms,
> which now share the same pattern as the original, do not have the same
> sensory experience as the original pattern / group of atoms.
"But it's like moving into another room, or having someone suddenly turn on a light: you suddenly do not have the same experience as before, yet your identity is untouched."
Having 'different' experiences then the ones from the previous instant does not preclude continuation of consciousness. You seem to be arguing that an identity (by your definition?) has a different experience in one moment from the next and that is no different than a copy having a different experience in a successive moment from the original before copying. Moving into another room is a far different scenario than having a pattern transferred to another group of atoms while the original group remains intact. When I walk into a room, I may have new subjective experiences, by they are experienced in an entity that experienced them the moment before, with the same pattern, and the same group of atoms.
If I were copied, and them my copied entered the room, he may be said to feel the same, but since I can not sense what he senses, than he can not, by definition, be a continuation of my consciousness. Simply removing me (the reference) from the equation does not change this fact. A copy is not a continuation of the subjective experiences of the original.
> claim - the pattern is important to identity, the atoms are not
>
> hypothesis - copy the pattern but is different atoms, see if they share
the
> same sensory experience
> result - copy made, copy and original, although difficult to distinguish,
do
> not share same sensory experience
> conclusion - identity can be copied, but does not retain subjective
> continuity
"And of course as I think John said, your result does not necessarily follow from the claim and hypothesis."
Since the result says "copy and original, ...do not share same sensory experience" And you say that does not follow, the converse would be that the copy and original DO share the SAME sensory experience. Would you assert then that both the reference and the copy *share* subjective experiences? THAT would indicate an immaterial soul that connected patterns. If they do not, then they must 1) be separate entities (and identities) and 2) the copy must not be a continuation of the subjective experience of the reference (else he would have the same subjective experiences!)
"You might be teleported to a different but identical hotel room and obtain not the same yet an identical sensory experience."
If that were the case, then there is no way I could know that I was destroyed and copied, and thus the original died. But just because I am ignorant of the occurrence, does not mean it did not occur. The people who manned the heisenberg compensators, pattern buffers and refinement beams would very well know what they had done to me.
> Through these though experiments, it is clear that a copy, which is made
of
> new atoms with the same pattern, will not experience the same subjective
> events that the reference or original does, even if we can not determine
who
> is the reference and who is the original, one of them was.
"This is where I don't follow, and I think that several other people don't either."
I really do not know if I can explain it any clearer. This is either because I can not convey my ideas clearly enough, or there is a fundamental misunderstanding of what I am saying. If I walk into a scanner, and a copy is made of me, and we both walk out, I can not see what he sees, and he can not see what I see. I do not share the same subjective experiences as he does. Therefore, he *can not* be a subjective continuation of me, because he does not share the same subjective experiences. To claim that he is means he and I must share the same subjective experiences, ALWAYS, otherwise we have to be different unique individuals (all beit who both think we are the same person) If we do not share the same subjective experiences, than he can not be a continuation of my subjective consciousness. Therefore a copy is NOT me.
> > > If you think you cannot [right, I cannot], then you are
> > > two separate persons in separate places, albeit persons
> > > that are identical.
> >
> > "So say you. I contend that we are actually the same *person*,
though
> > clearly what is to be contended is what is meant by that construction.
> > (This is, of course, the entire basis of the discussion.)"
>
> Agreed, there seems to be some confusion as to what 'the same person' means.
> People seem to be confusing 'those two people are the same (identical)'
with
> 'That is the same person' If we copied an apple, one could point at both
> apples and claim they are identical, but one can not (logically) point
at
> both apples and claim that are the *same* (i.e. only one) apple, as they
> obviously exist separately spatially. I do not disagree that one can point
> at an original and a copy and state a) I can not tell which is which (unless
> referencing the copying process) and b) their personalities are identical,
> they are similar people, if not entirely the same. But I would disagree
if
> one claims that they are 'one' person, as they are obviously two, albeit
> identical, people, each with their own distinct existence and sensory
> experience.
" Here you have company. While as a realist I concede that if an apple
is copied, one is the original and one is only
a copy, they are identical for all practical purposes, and this includes (for
people) survival (and the "personal identity" which tracks survival)."
Good to hear, this clarification of definitions seems very important to continuing a discussion.
> > > I, for one, will not ever walk into a destructive copying or
uploading
> > > mechanism, as this will surely lead to my demise.
> >
> > Yet as I have said many times before, you would soon be in the small
> > minority as more practical people used teleportation to get about
quickly
> > and cheaply. Finally, you'd be seen to be an old fogey from the last
century
> > who had some strange hang-up about atoms."
>
> That strange hang up being based on science and reason.
> Oh well, to bad for the rest of them. I'll wait for
> wormholes (which may come about before destructive
> copier / teleporters anyway).
"No, you wouldn't. Suppose that you were forced (by the way, have you ever read much SF?) to teleport the first few times---friends grab you and throw you in to the teleporter terminal just as the Thought Police are about to capture you all. And then, to avoid an incredibly taxing mile-high climb each morning, you just eventually relent and agree to teleport. The social effect on you of seeing your friends and loved ones teleport over and over again with no bad effects would get to you. "
This seems to be another significant misunderstanding in this discussion, or rather two different ways of looking at things that are commonly thought of as the same. When you speak of my seeing my friends and loved ones teleported with no ill effects is really a red herring. I know that when they are teleported a virtually exact copy of them was made, a copy which from every external measurement is identical to the original. It will have the same thoughts, emotions, and experiences (your definition of identity) but because it would not experience the same subjective events of the original if the original had not been destroyed, it does not abide by my definition of 'identity' in which case I would mourn the death of that loved one. Though I am sure it would be easier to get over, I would never lose the nagging feeling that somewhere, someone with the same hopes, dreams, fears, loves et all as my copied loved on in front of me now ceases to exist. But I digress, where the misunderstanding is, I believe, is that you perceive 'you' as what people external to you define you as. If your contribution to the universe were what made you valuable, then a copy of you would perform just as well, sans the original, with no net loss on the universe. For everybody other than you, that would be you. I would be less upset if someone were to tell me I was to be destroyed and copied, and that copy allowed to live my life with my loved ones because I know that the joy I would bring to the world would likely remain, than I would be to simply be destroyed. But that is not me, and I would still fear death, that is, the cessation of my subjective experiences, in such an instance.
Humans as self aware beings are unique in the universe in that they are aware of their own existence. In your case of observing no ill effects on ones friends, this would be fine if my friends were the only ones aware of my existence. Unfortunately I am as well, and thus destroying me ends my existence, while my friends may be fine with the copy, I will not be, because I am dead.
This is the difference between external and internal existence I suppose. I believe it a classic case of scientism to presume that our only existence of any value is value placed on our external existence. Do you not have thoughts that others, externally, are unaware of? If you do, then you must have an internal existence, separate from the existence of your friends perception of you. This is what would die.
Incidentally, I have not read a lot of sci fi really, I stick mostly to non-fiction, but if you can suggest a book that will help to clarify the logical implications of copying / teleporting I would check it out.
Regards,
Michael
--------------------------
Some thoughts on personal identity
Our identity is not some abstract collage of data and
programs. It is closely bound up with the notion of
purpose. What is our purpose?
This discussion has occurred here before, as in the
long discussions over the pseudo-question, "what is
the purpose of life?" Or worse, "what is the purpose
of the universe."
Consciousness is formed by and consists of feedback
loops. Those attempted loops that cannot complete
themselves tend to die out due to lack of
reinforcement. Those loops that contain internal
contradictions disapate energy uselessly, and
identifying them and resolving the contradictions is
an important maintenance task at minimum - independent
of the consequences in terms of useless or
self-destructive actions that may result. Those
mental processes that divorce themselves from any
possible reaffirmation via some kind of feedback
grounded in the real world eventually get forgotten.
The loops that survive, prosper and come to dominate
the process of consciousness, from the sensory/motor
of touching finger to thumb in the womb, to the
highest level concepts of mathematics, are the ones
that participate in and engender an integrated set of
loop processes, self-sustaining, self-correcting, and
capable of grounding in clear, complex,
life-supporting results in the real world.
Examples of such complex loops: romantic love
entanglements, creative work,
political/religious/philosophical causes.
We do not merely cling to our identities out of habit
or because our consciousness evolved out of combative
selection processes in a battle for the resources of
the mind and body. There is also an underlying thirst
to see that next phase of uniquely, individually
filtered, styled and integrated of data. I.e., the
continuation and fulfillment of the loop.
While there are peak moments in life when some major
underlying loop is reaffirmed, as in the fulfillment
of some great quest or love, there is always the
expectation and feeling that more is coming. And
those particular events that one has had a determining
or contributing part of are far more fulfilling than
those which are merely pleasing in the abstract,
although our identification with other people -
especially those "close" to us, intelligence in
general, life in general, order, structure, or the
endless possibilities of the universe at large, often
yields far more feedback than our own efforts.
Phil
--------------------------
Charlie Stross wrote that cells are replaced and refurbished atomically, and
therefore bits are the focus of identity. He also noted neurons are replaced
fully less frequently.
The continuity/section-by-section replacement argument takes this into
account. Continuity does not imply stasis, it only points out that
continuity is an essential figure of life, whether in sperm or egg cells or
neural systems. I guess mutation is also done in small stages.
Personally I am going to adhere to these principles in my augmentation and
avoid getting into the notion that anything other than a quantum duplicate
of me could be "me" - it's just a crude (atomic level) copy with my
apparent
memory. It doesn't mean that I can't split my brain (whatever mix of
nanotech, computronium and organic core that ends up as) but I will be
keeping continuity of my neural patternings and changing these maps only
slowly and carefully and in little sections at a time. If I split my network
I will physically grow extensions and/or split my brain physically and be
very careful with how I integrate broadcast linkage between my neural
network and those of others to avoid moral problems and suicide.
Towards Ascension
Avatar Polymorph
--------------------------
Michael writes
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-extropians_extropy.org
> [mailto:owner-extropians_extropy.org]On Behalf Of Dickey, Michael F
> Sent: Monday, October 28, 2002 1:52 PM
> [The title of this thread] should read 'Does the continuation
> of a particular perceived consciousness depend upon a 'particular'
> group of atoms (and not just any atoms)' With that in mind,
> does your answer remain the same?
That's what my title meant, and I don't think that you need
worry about people misinterpreting it. I understand completely
that at the present moment in history, one's identity indeed
*does* depend on atoms; what was meant, of course, as you
say, is "does it depend on particular atoms". If I have
understood you correctly, then yes, my answer remains the
same. Namely: in no way does one's identity depend on
particular atoms. (As hinted here, atoms in the long run
may have *nothing* to do with our identities---we might
eventually become plasma entities or patterns of photons.
All that is important is the pattern, and, as Frank points
out the *process*.)
> what I dispute is that the pattern [in a copy], which is identical
> to the reference pattern, and is imprinted upon a new group of atoms,
> is not a subjective continuation of the reference pattern. That is,
> it is not you.
You don't really know this! How can you be so *sure* that
teleporters really do anything to someone besides change
their location? Why, atoms were unknown to vastly better
philosophers than you or I for millenia, and you must read
at least enough SF to understand that duplicates would be
accepted as the original people *regardless* of what the
underlying theories are, so long as the theories do not
contain the equivalent of souls.
> The evidence I have for the fact that the same pattern
> in a different group of atoms is that if we were to copy
> the pattern and imprint it into a new group of atoms
> the new group/pattern will be identical to the reference,
> but would not experience the same subjective events as the
> reference, and therefore *would not* be a continuation of the
> subjective experiences of the reference (original)
Have you considered the case that the replacement is
done without altering the location? In that case, the
experience would be the same.
Most importantly, however, if your location suddenly
changes and so you start having "different experiences"
it does *not* alter your identity. The key word in
your paragraph is "continuity". You intuit that
continuity of experience is lost, while everyone who
argues with you about atoms does not see it that way.
Your posts are very long, and I'm sorry that I don't have
time at present to respond to them in detail.
> I should have emphasized 'continuation' of subjective experience, which
I
> guess I skipped over in typing that particular message.
Yes, right.
> Since the result says "copy and original, ...do not share same sensory
> experience" And you say that does not follow, the converse would be
that the
> copy and original DO share the SAME sensory experience. Would you assert
> then that both the reference and the copy *share* subjective experiences?
No, of course not. I would simply say that choosing which one
is the *reference* version is an arbitrary choice.
> I really do not know if I can explain it any clearer. This is either
> because I can not convey my ideas clearly enough, or there is a fundamental
> misunderstanding of what I am saying. If I walk into a scanner, and a copy
> is made of me, and we both walk out, I can not see what he sees, and he
can
> not see what I see.
An axiom of your thought---which you seem unable to challenge
---is that you *would* be the original and *would not* be
the duplicate. Here you should say "neither can see what
the other sees" without presuming to know which is the
*real* you.
Please remember that if *physics* is all that is really true,
and, as Jef agree with me, it's only our evolutionarily
derived identification with one set of bones that causes
us to think the "other" as *alien*, then there is
NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO OF THEM.
Again: suppose that indeed *physics* is all there is,
and that an almost infinitely long description using
only physical terms of one of them is therefore
extremely similar to an analogous description of the other.
Then in this case, we have *no* reason to suppose that
the one who happened physically to be the original
differs in any important way from the other. The
key point again (sorry to be repetitive): the
description from the point of view of physics
may be complete!
>> Suppose that you were forced (by the way, have you ever
>> read much SF?) to teleport the first few times---friends
>> grab you and throw you in to the teleporter terminal just
>> as the Thought Police are about to capture you all.
>> And then, to avoid an incredibly taxing mile-high climb
>> each morning, you just eventually relent and agree to
>> teleport. The social effect on you of seeing your friends
>> and loved ones teleport over and over again with no bad
>> effects would get to you. "
>
> When you speak of my seeing my friends and loved ones
> teleported with no ill effects is really a red herring.
> I know that when they are teleported a virtually exact
> copy of them was made, a copy which from every external
> measurement is identical to the original... I would
> never lose the nagging feeling that ... [despite the copy
> in front of me, my loved one] now ceases to exist.
I predict that you would quickly get used to it.
We relate to others overwhelmingly powerfully
on non-intellectual levels, and when the same
old foibles, the same old expressions, the same
old everything continued as before, your certainty
that that person was really gone would evaporate.
> Incidentally, I have not read a lot of sci fi really, I stick mostly to
> non-fiction, but if you can suggest a book that will help to clarify the
> logical implications of copying / teleporting I would check it out.
There have been treatments of this all the way back to
"Rogue Moon", a 1947 book, if I recall correctly. But
Greg Egan's AXIOMATIC is *the* book with which to jolt
your unconscious assumptions and gain a different and
puzzling (for me too!) take on all this.
Lee
----------------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: Lee Corbin [mailto:lcorbin_tsoft.com]
I apologize Lee, I will attempt to keep my posts more brief, but I fear that will contribute to misunderstandings of my points.
> [The title of this thread] should read 'Does the continuation
> of a particular perceived consciousness depend upon a 'particular'
> group of atoms (and not just any atoms)' With that in mind,
> does your answer remain the same?
"Namely: in no way does one's identity depend on
particular atoms. "
Then if you copied your pattern to a new group of atoms, would that new entity experience the same subjective events as you? If it did, then identity does not depend on particular atoms, but if it did not (the reasonable outcome) then since the only changed variable is the atoms, then one must logically conclude that in some manner identity does depend on atoms.
I contend that it is dependant on using the majority of the same atoms from one moment to the next. Copying replaces all atoms simultaneously, growth and development and simple existence through time only replaces a small number of atoms at any given moment.
> what I dispute is that the pattern [in a copy], which is identical
> to the reference pattern, and is imprinted upon a new group of atoms,
> is not a subjective continuation of the reference pattern. That is,
> it is not you.
"You don't really know this! How can you be so *sure* that
teleporters really do anything to someone besides change
their location?"
This is why I suspect you do not understand what I am saying. I "know" this through the simple thought experiment. If my pattern of my atoms is imprinted on new atoms, creating a new group of atoms in the same pattern, while I am still standing around, we do not feel / see / hear the same things. If he does not sense what I sense, then he must not be a continuation of me. There is no appeal to mystical thought, no soul, so irrationality, it purely the simplest explanation for observed phenomena.
observation - a copy of me does not have the same subjective experiences as me
conclusion - a copy of me is not the continuation of me, since to be the continuation of me it must share the same subjective experiences as me from one moment to the next.
"Why, atoms were unknown to vastly better philosophers than you or I for
millenia, and you must read
at least enough SF to understand that duplicates would be accepted as the original
people *regardless* of what the
underlying theories are, so long as the theories do not contain the equivalent
of souls."
So a lot of Sci Fi authors have said this, therefore it must be so? I do not dispute that many people (like you) would accept copies as the originals, instead of another person much like the original, but that does not mean that a) that are justified in doing so (argumentum ad populum) and b) that I must. And it does not necessitate the equivalent of souls, all one need to is show that a copy does not experience the same subjective events as the original to show that he is a copy, and not a continuation of the original subjective consciousness.
> The evidence I have for the fact that the same pattern
> in a different group of atoms is that if we were to copy
> the pattern and imprint it into a new group of atoms
> the new group/pattern will be identical to the reference,
> but would not experience the same subjective events as the
> reference, and therefore *would not* be a continuation of the
> subjective experiences of the reference (original)
"Have you considered the case that the replacement is done without altering the location? In that case, the experience would be the same."
Subjectively it would be the same, I do not know if I am continually destroyed and recreated in the same place from instant to instant. But is that reason enough to assume that I am being destroyed from one instant to the next and to then think it ok to be destroyed and recreated the next instant somewhere else without worry? If you first show that I am being destroyed and recreated from one instant to the next then I will consider this a valid argument (as I addressed this point in my post to gts) but just because it is possible does not mean it is occurring and that we should adjust our lives to something we merely imagine as a possible explanation for the way the universe works.
But even if it were subjectively the same, if a copy was placed elsewhere at the next instant, it is clear that it would not experience the same subjective events as me. If the copy was placed where I was, that means I was destroyed. That I was destroyed does not invalidate the fact that the copy was not a continuation of my consciousness. And the individuals operating the scanning and reconstruction machine that scanned and recreated me in an instant would know what happened, and if logical would know that subjectively the copy they created is not a continuation of my subjective consciousness, they would know if they had made the copy somewhere else and not destroyed me, the copy and me would not feel the same events.
"Most importantly, however, if your location suddenly changes and so you start having "different experiences" it does *not* alter your identity.
How can my location 'suddenly change' exactly without me either moving from point a to b (and thus having the same pattern and same atoms) the only way it can suddenly change is if I were teleported. If I were teleported without destroying the original, the teleported entity would clearly have different subjective experiences then I would, thus it is not a continuation of me.
"Your posts are very long, and I'm sorry that I don't have time at present to respond to them in detail."
No problem, I will try to keep them shorter, but it seems necessary to describe these points in detail to help prevent misunderstanding, as in cyberspace people continually address either what they think you mean, or your literal words instead of the ideas you are trying to convey. The same points seem repeated, if you think a copy is you, then shouldn't you and the copy share the same experiences? If you do not, he is a different person, regardless of whether or not the copying process destroyed you and/or moved him. You said you have seen valid objections to this? Which one?
> I should have emphasized 'continuation' of subjective experience, which
I
> guess I skipped over in typing that particular message.
"Yes, right."
Yes, right, I see you chose not to respond to the very next sentence "As I have emphasized from the get go, a copy will not experience the same subjective events that a reference or original does, thus it CAN NOT be a continuation of the consciousness of the original. "
> Since the result says "copy and original, ...do not share same sensory
> experience" And you say that does not follow, the converse would be
that the
> copy and original DO share the SAME sensory experience. Would you assert
> then that both the reference and the copy *share* subjective experiences?
"No, of course not. I would simply say that choosing which one is the
*reference* version is an arbitrary choice."
AND
""An axiom of your thought---which you seem unable to challenge ---is
that you *would* be the original and *would not* be
the duplicate. Here you should say "neither can see what the other sees"
without presuming to know which is the *real* "
So you admit that a copy and an original do not share the same experiences? Then would you agree that a copy is NOT a continuation of the consciousness of the original?
I can tell them apart, whichever one walked out of the 'scanner' side of the 'scanner copying machine'. But it does not matter if you cant tell them apart, it does not defeat the point that they were separate and that one was the original and was is the copy. One of these was clearly the 'reference' pattern, and one must clearly be the pattern imprinted onto a new grouping of atoms using the 'original' as a 'reference'.
"Which one is the original?" is not the same question as "Was
there an original?"
AND
"then there is NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO OF THEM."
Depends on what you consider significant. Do you disagree that one of them was made up of the same atoms that made up his pattern the instant before? And the other one is made up of atoms that were not arranged into his pattern the instant before? There is clearly a difference, rather you consider it significant is a matter of opinion.
"Then in this case, we have *no* reason to suppose that the one who happened
physically to be the original
differs in any important way from the other. "
If he and the other do not share the same subjective experiences, then it is clear that he and the other differ in a pretty significant way, they are both individual unique entities and do not have some sort of shared consciousness.
"But Greg Egan's AXIOMATIC is *the* book with which to jolt your unconscious assumptions and gain a different and puzzling (for me too!) take on all this."
I will check it out
Michael
-----------------------------
Jef writes
> Paraphrasing to verify my understanding: Lee is talking about
> "survival of identity", and is suggesting that we make a couple
of
> changes in our thinking. (1) He is saying we should broaden our
> concept of self-identity to include copies of ourselves, even if they
> have branched from the original and have somewhat different
> experiences.
Yes.
> This concept of identify can be justified by pointing
> out that we currently claim a constant identity despite many changes
> to our selves over the years. (2) He is suggesting we overcome our
> human nature, evolved to think of ourselves as constrained within a
> single body, and begin to value "survival of our identity" (as
> defined above) equally with our current concept of "survival of
> self".
Precisely. Actually, I recommend that we use our newer "human"
nature to analyze the problem, and that a somewhat more
appropriate solution is to accept duplicates as selves.
> I think I clearly see Lee's logic, and his statements have value, but
> I disagree with what seems to be a value judgment at the end of his
> reasoning. I don't see any reason why I should value other branches
> of myself equally with myself. I think it's more useful to consider
> them as separate individuals who have the special relationship of
> being branches of myself.
In some ways, it is not only more *useful* but actually
necessary to continue to adopt the present view. Suppose
that I and my duplicate are strapped down, and you begin
to torture one of us. Then soon, just as Julia and Winston
in 1984, each of us says, "Stop! *Please* to it to him!".
In this case the way that we are wired (and we can never
forget that all we are is wiring) dictates that we regard
a duplicate as *other*. But, Jef, you already appear to
understand this, as you have referred already to our
primitive, early-evolved instincts or whatever.
But in *other* ways, e.g. the thought experiment where
according to physics a version of Lee Corbin *will*
wake up tomorrow and *will* go to the bank and deposit
ten million dollars---it is better that causally that
version of me descend from my frozen duplicate, and
*this*, over here, commit suicide. It's better for
*me* this way.
It must help those who aren't following us here to
focus on the *physics* of the situation in my bedroom
tomorrow morning. A version of me wakes up. Who is
to say that it's not me? *Every* morning in my
bedroom a slightly different version of me wakes up.
If souls don't exist, why aren't they all me?
To elaborate, if we have a metric among objects that
yields the "distance" between them and me in terms
of similarity, then objects such as I was, oh, say
about 50 years ago would *not* be me, because I
was a very small child then. But if tomorrow any
more recent version of me wakes up---say the version
that was writing to this list last year---well, hell,
that's me and I survived *that* replacement.
Yes---it is non-intuitive for many to take this
view from physics seriously, and to realize that
we *only* are patterns, and that we *aren't*
atoms and aren't locations, and don't have anything
at all like a soul.
It is also scary and paradoxical to realize that
the duplicate sitting across the table from you
is---according again to physics and that similarity
metric---really you too! And because it is confounded
by *immediate* experience---pinch him and you won't
yell---it's indeed worthy to be called what I have
always called it: the Identity Paradox.
But, as you have said in so many words, if we can
rise above our animal programming and comprehend
our own advanced nature as *patterns*, then we have
a prescription for action in every situation,
difficult and impossible (in some scenarios) to
follow as it may be.
> Stated another way, I can see why we currently value "survival of
> self", even if only because of very strong evolutionary programming.
> It appears there is an implied assumption here that if we agree that
> "survival of self" is important to us now, then we must also
agree
> that the broader "survival of identity" will be similarly important
> to us with the broader technical capabilities we will have in the
> future. I would argue that we will have broader choices to go with
> the broader capabilities, and that it would be more advantageous to
> consider all copies to be separate individuals with special
> relationships to each other due to branching.
I understand that you and I still disagree about
some things, but the above I clearly agree with.
Lee
-----------------------------
gts writes
> If survival of identity *separate from self* (i.e., as
> a non-living label or record) is the only object here
> then this discussion is pointless and trivial.
>
> We might just as well make holographic interactive
> talking images of ourselves now so that posterity will
> be able to pretend to interact with us after we die.
> Such devices would not allow for true *survival*. They
> would be nothing more than high-tech tombstones.
That's right. The key thing to discuss, in my opinion,
is the kind of personal identity that actually causes
one's own experiences to continue. Needless to say,
just what that is is very problematical!
You also wrote (earlier, I think---sorry I've lost track)
> Jef Allbright wrote:
> > I'm saying that in this hypothetical future we will
> > fondly appreciate seeing our "branches" set out on
> > their own, but will think of them as a new kind of
> > twin sibling, rather than as "our self".
> Yes, that is exactly how I see it also, Jef.
I see my duplicate as my true self for most purposes
of anticipation and all purposes of survival.
For example, pinch me but not my duplicate, and he
does not cry out. Yet I believe that just because
I'm not forming memories of something at one location
doesn't mean that it isn't happening to me at another.
Suppose (as is often the case, it seems) both my
duplicate and I are tied down, and the Nazi officer
says, "Okay, ve have decided to kill one of you
[he gestures to me] and zen torture ze other [he
gestures to my duplicate] to death."
A certain animal part of me says "Do it to him,
please just kill me!", but I firmly believe that
it is only an illusion that this is an escape.
The torture WILL STILL HAPPEN TO ME. From the
objective, physics oriented account of what
transpires in that room, Lee Corbin gets tortured
to death.
Moreover, I *must* identify with the entity that
gets tortured because we are so alike physically.
In fact, I *will* be him if the three operations
(a) erase five minutes of my memories
(b) teleport me to where my poor duplicate
is tied down
(c) add five minutes' memories of the
appropriate experiences
are carried out. Note that (a), (b), and (c) do
not affect identity by our normal intuitions.
(Assuming that one is "past", so to speak, the
first few of my "Seven Levels of Identity".)
> However in your following passage to Lee, to which I
> was responding, you seem to be giving validity to the
> idea that "survival of identity" is something
> important and distinct from "survival of self."
>> Jef Allbright wrote to Lee:
>>>
>>> In your posts later today, two of your points
>>> have become clearer, at least to me: (1) You are
>>> talking about survival of identity, and (2) you
>>> are saying that in the future, as the technical
>>> means become available, it makes sense for us to
>>> value the survival of our identity with
>>> importance equal to our current concept of
>>> survival of self.
> Those may be two of Lee's points, but do they really
> make any sense upon careful analysis?
> Because of divergence in experience and personality
> after a bifurcation, other versions of what were once
> "you" will be going about in life calling themselves
> by your name. However they will each have slightly
> different personalities, none of them exactly like
> yours,
Yes, but Gordon, the "you" of tomorrow will have
diverged from the you of today, as you know. And
so this is why you claim not to be the same person
tomorrow that you are today. Most people here,
including, me simply cannot accept that each micro-
second we become someone else.
"Other version of what were once "you" will be
going about in life calling themselves by your
name"? Well, according to you, *your* self will
also be going around calling itself by your name
too. All the duplicates have an equal claim on
"being you", of course.
> and those personalities will continue to diverge
> until they lose any resemblance to you. Thus
> they will not in actuality be carrying your true
> identity. Or to put it another way, they will be
> carrying your identity *in name only*.
Well, according to you---unless you've come around
to agreeing that you will be alive tomorrow---
*nobody* will be "carrying your true identity".
That's where I find a flaw in your thinking.
> If it is proposed by Lee that survival of our
> identities "in name only" is something we should seek
> and value more in the future,
oh, no, absolutely not.
> I for one at least find little satisfaction in knowing
> that I might live on in name only, and I hardly need
> to embrace extropianism as a means of finding ways to
> do so.
Exactly right. Non-cryonicists who imagine that they'll
live on because someone will read their books (e.g.,
Heinlein), or because they've had children, are cruelly
mistaken. Do any of your ancestors live on because you
do? If the Nazi officer lined up five of your ancestors
and you, and threatened to shoot someone, you would live
only if he happened to shoot your ancestors and not you.
> The desire for the survival of identity in that
> sense is trivial and common already in the world
> today, as in for example a father who wants sons so
> that his surname might survive into future
> generations.
Yes. Exactly so.
> The truth is that all we really want is survival of
> our *sense of self*. We want to transport this sense
> of self into other objects or persons. That is what
> this thread is about, or so I thought.
I say that this "sense of self" is completely inadequate.
Many insane people have the sense of being Napoleon, but
in fact they are not Napoleon, and poor Napoleon is as
dead as he can be (no cryonic chance for him to ever
live again!).
I have little interest in someone of the future becoming
so familiar with my posts, recorded conversations, taped
episodes on TV (if there ever are any), that they can
claim to be me. Unless they've got my MEMORIES and my
DISPOSITIONS, they're out of luck. Or rather, of course,
*I'm* out of luck!
Lee
--------------------------
Lee Corbin wrote to Michael F Dickey:
(This is quoted from another thread.)
> Most importantly, however, if your location suddenly
> changes and so you start having "different experiences"
> it does *not* alter your identity.
You are playing fast and loose with the word "identity," in this
thread and
others. You treat the concept of identity superficially, as if one's
identity were little more than a name and social security number.
But your identity extends far beyond your basic stats, Lee. It is far more
than the name on your driver's license.
Your identity is the answer to the question "Who are you?" As I wrote
elsewhere (to Dan F), if pressed to answer this question in detail, people
will respond with much more than name, rank and serial number. They will
give an account of their entire selves. Included in that description will be
a current account of their ever-changing personalities, personalities which
do in fact change with experience.
It appears you have concocted an entire system of thought based on a false
distinction between identity and self, not realizing or not acknowledging
that these two terms do not exist independently.
IDENTITY is a pointer to SELF, as in SELF-IDENTITY.
Your false reasoning has lead you to promulgate the ridiculous conclusion
that in the scenarios you describe, SELF = OTHER. That conclusion is clearly
false by any sane and workable definitions of the words "self" and
"other."
As I've stated, your argument fails because the conclusion invalidates the
premise, i.e., reductio ad absurdum.
-gts
------------------------
"Dickey, Michael F" <michael_f_dickey_groton.pfizer.com>
> the pattern, which is identical to the reference pattern, and is
> imprinted upon a new group of atoms, is not a subjective
> continuation of the reference pattern. That is, it is not you.
>The evidence I have for the fact that the same pattern in a
>different group of atoms is that if we were to copy the
> pattern and imprint it into a new group of atoms the new
>group/pattern will be identical to the reference, but would
>not experience the same subjective events as the reference
You must get paid by the word, I will say the same thing more concisely:
"The evidence the subjective experience is not the same is that the
subjective experience is not the same."
I must say I'm not entirely convinced.
I also think trying to find an exact definition of survival and death is
pointless, like most things we learn the meaning of those words from
example not definition. Whatever I mean when I say "John Clark did
not die yesterday" I will mean the same thing tomorrow if I'm lucky
enough to be able to say it tomorrow. If your criteria for survival is so
onerous that you can't even be sure you've survived right now then
what's the point? As for me, I think I've survived so I have and if my
"copy" thinks I've survived then I have.
John K Clark jonkc_att.net
------------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: John K Clark [mailto:jonkc_att.net]
"Dickey, Michael F" <michael_f_dickey_groton.pfizer.com>
> the pattern, which is identical to the reference pattern, and is
> imprinted upon a new group of atoms, is not a subjective
> continuation of the reference pattern. That is, it is not you.
>The evidence I have for the fact that the same pattern in a
>different group of atoms is that if we were to copy the
> pattern and imprint it into a new group of atoms the new
>group/pattern will be identical to the reference, but would
>not experience the same subjective events as the reference
"You must get paid by the word, I will say the same thing more concisely: "The evidence the subjective experience is not the same is that the subjective experience is not the same." I must say I'm not entirely convinced."
No, unfortunately I do not. I am trying to understand the positions in this argument, and trying to convey mine accurately, unfortunately this is a difficult medium to convey ideas accurately, people argue against what they think you must mean, or skip through your statements and attack literal snippets out of context instead of the idea you are trying to convey. Words are merely inefficient mechanisms to convey ideas, and filtering thoughts and ideas into words is not a lossless compression, so some redundancy seems to be required sometimes. But I digress...
Do we actually need to perform this experiment to see how it would come out? As I have said, copy me and my copy and I do not share the same subjective experiences (ask us what we see) Since my copy can not share the same subjective experiences as me, then it can not be a continuation of me. It is obvious it is a different individual entity with its own experiences. Thus, the evidence that subjective experience is not the same for a copy and an original is that if you perform the experiment (currently only a thought experiment) they are indeed not the same, can you think of better evidence than that? If there subjective experiences are not the same, they MUST be unique, isolated, separate individuals. Thus a copy is not me.
I will continue to argue this point until A) I argue adequately that this is the logical position to take or B) someone convinces me of a better more logical position to take.
The latter would require, as far as I can tell, someone to argue that logically a copy is indeed a continuation of the subjective consciousness of the original. Given the fact that a copy and me will see different things, and that we both can exist simultaneously, and are spatially separated, it seems unlikely.
It seems to me that extropian are much more likely to embrace this worldview, that a copy and a back up, etc. are indeed you, since it fits nicely and conveniently into their visions of the future. I have yet to see why one should logically believe this to be the case though, and I have presented reasons to logically think it is not.
I also think trying to find an exact definition of survival and death is pointless, like most things we learn the meaning of those words from example not definition."
What about agreeing on a definition for identity? For 'you, me, I' For entities being 'the same' (are they two separate, identical entities but spatially separated, or are they one entity entirely?) Is it not reasonable to agree on definitions before we attempt to make arguments that involve such words?
Michael
-----------------
gts writes
> Lee Corbin wrote to Michael F Dickey:
>
> (This is quoted from another thread.)
>
> > Most importantly, however, if your location suddenly
> > changes and so you start having "different experiences"
> > it does *not* alter your identity.
>
> You are playing fast and loose with the word "identity," in this
thread and
> others. You treat the concept of identity superficially, as if one's
> identity were little more than a name and social security number.
IN the context of the discussion, it should have been
apparent to you that I was discussing the notion well-
known to moral philosophers, (e.g. Derek Parfit, "Reasons
and Persons") of *personal identity*. I could name two
other books that also refer to this concept, and you might
want to check out Max More's Phd. thesis, "The Diachronic
Self".
I am *hardly* referring to nominal identity, as you seem to
be implying. Indeed, I am interested in the *very* notion
of what one is interested in having *survive*, as several
other posters appear to understand very well.
> But your identity extends far beyond your basic stats, Lee.
> It is far more than the name on your driver's license.
No kidding.
> It appears you have concocted an entire system of thought based on a false
> distinction between identity and self, not realizing or not acknowledging
> that these two terms do not exist independently.
It appears that you don't know what you are talking about.
I get the feeling that this subject matter is quite new
to you, yet you barge in with the same sense of authority
that (quite rightly) characterized your views on neural
research earlier in the threads on altruism.
Moreover, your overly aggressive dismissals, e.g., "such
rot", "preposterous", serve to convey an unusual-for-you
impatience and jumping to conclusions. If I didn't think
that people like Mike Perry and Robin Hanson utterly
agreed with me, and several others like Max More and
Derek Parfit probably agree with me, then I'd wonder
indeed if it wasn't going to turn out to be possible
that I was as deluded as you say.
Your own quick-tempered and abrupt reasoning fails to
impress me. Because the thought-experiments lead to
perplexing results, you immediately take the easy way
out and try to *define* your way clear. Here you
immediately conclude that one is not the same person
from day to day, or even millisecond to millisecond.
I think that you should admit that if a year ago
someone had attempted to persuade you of that, you
simply would not have listened a minute to "such
rot".
Gordon, we are verging on a new era where things that
have been true for 40,000 years---for example, the
one-to-one relationship between experience and memory
acquisition---are not necessarily true any longer, or
certainly won't. Please don't paint yourself into
corners with your odd definitions and peculiar axioms.
> Your false reasoning has lead you to promulgate the ridiculous conclusion
> that in the scenarios you describe, SELF = OTHER. That conclusion is clearly
> false by any sane and workable definitions of the words "self"
and "other."
Well, what is at stake is the evolutionarily new situation
of hypothetical duplicating machinery, applied to soulless
entities made up of atoms, a concept also that we are not
prepared for. Why it shouldn't be a surprise that your
knee-jerk intuitions aren't adequate.
I avoid simplistic equations like yours above, (or axioms
about humanity that have the words "every" and "all" in
them), and I would advise that you do the same. I'm merely
claiming that in *some* ways, one's duplicate---were we to
have the machinery to create one---is one's self, while
admitting that in other ways it is not. (It's just that
the ways in which we *are* our duplicates are more
important, in addition to being novel.)
As is every animal, we are familiar with the ways that our
duplicates are *not* our selves, and I'm drawing attention
to some ways in which they *are* ourselves. If it turned
out that someone had duplicated the entire city block
where you think you are, and you have been really for the
last few minutes out in the desert (complete with electricity),
then you should rest assured that if your block out there in
the desert is to be annihilated by H-bomb in the next moments,
gts will still live, and *you* will wake up tomorrow morning
in bed regardless.
Yes---I know that problems remain---I don't call it the
Identity Paradox for nothing. I merely say that we have
not *yet* become totally comfortable about how to articulate
some of these truths, nor can any of us, despite looking as
hard as possible into the future, state that we know how
all these things will be discussed in the indefinite
years to come.
> As I've stated, your argument fails because the conclusion
> invalidates the premise, i.e., reductio ad absurdum.
Nah. If all your opponents were always guilty of making
some elementary logical error, or being preposterous, or
of committing the gross errors of which you frequently
accuse them, then you'd have a major mystery on your
hands as to how gts managed to get so damn much smarter
than all the authors of those books, and all those other
correspondents.
Lee
----------------------
John writes
> I also think trying to find an exact definition of survival and death
is
> pointless, like most things we learn the meaning of those words from
> example not definition.
That's exactly right! Korzybski referred to "intensional" definitions
and "extensional" definitions. Among the former were Aristotelian
definitions whereby a tree is *defined* as [I forget the twenty word
technical definition] and a human being is *defined* as a featherless
biped. The latter are "by example" and "by operational definition".
No one learns the meanings of words in the Aristotlean fashion.
Just as you say, people (especially children) best learn the use
of words by example. One even learns what "hebetude" means by
learning a number of synonyms that the dictionary refers one to;
and one learned the meanings of *those* words from usage (context)
and example.
("hebetude" was Word of the Day on Nov 8:
http://www.dictionary.com/wordoftheday/archive/2001/11/08.html
Note the utility of the examples.)
Precise definitions and axioms are necessary (SFAIK) only in
mathematics, and it's been noted that a lot of thinkers in
less crystalline (and perhaps more difficult) fields of inquiry
appear to display "math envy".
Lee
----------------------
Why not simply apply some kind of Church-Turing hypothesis to the matter and
be done with it?
If I am convinced that I have "survived" uploading or whatever; then I have.
If my family and friends are convinced, then so much the better.
If there are alternate histories, of me in other world-lines, and they are
convinced that they have uniquely survived; then so be it.
Its not like we have the technology, not even Schwartzeneggers' Sixth Day
film (was that based in a Dicke short-no Pun!) is here to trouble our dreams.
There are other tasks at hand, Kurzweil willing and the creeks don't rise.
It may be better to ask, how might pattern identity theory corelate with what
we know of physics? Is the "pattern" made of swirling electron-proton
pairs
(cooper pairs), or is there a different mechanism. How does all this stuff
swirl about our neurology? Most physicists say that the brain is an
impossible place for quantum coherence to occur.
Spudboy
--------------------
Avatar Polymorph wrote:
> A computer hard drive turned off might have a clock ticking over but
> otherwise is asleep and turn it on and it is a bit awake and run its
> software and it is awake. Sort of anyhow.
>
> Wipe the hard drive clean and reinstall the software from a map you've
> made previously and it's a different dog.
Are a copy the same as the original? Well We allready have a precedence
in nature.
One-egged twins are the same in the beginning of their life. They come
from the same single cell. At one point that cell divide and becomes two
featus'
Anybody who argues that two copies of an upload are the same, must also
agree then that twins are the same person, or that the time passed and
the different experiences since the division has made them into
different individuals.
regards Max M Rasmussen, Denmark
-------------------
Concerning the discussion about uploading, I wrote:
>> I bet anything that we will still discuss this in 2040.
> >There's no hope, Eugen :-)
And Frank suggested:
> So s.o. should put together a "Copy Paradox FAQ" which should
be a
> must-read for everyone allowed to join a discussion like this ... ;-)
To make it even harder for them to disturb our scholarly discourse with
annoying beginner`s questions we might put up a contest or a written exam,
some kind of a freshman's initiation, elaborated and diabolically conducted
by an ExI celebrity of the candidate's own choice. If she answers 95 % of
the questions correctly she wins a virtual candlelight dinner with her
favourite ExI examiner. I think this might be a happy solution to get rid of
fundamental doubts about personal identity and continuity of consciousness
being preserved in the uploading process. Which after all is one of our
ultimate goals, right? That`s why I can already hear them freshmen singing:
"Nobody ever expects the Uploading Paradox Inquisition!"
> It is my feeling that we should first get rid of the notion of
> consciousness as a *thing*, instead adopting the notion of
> consciousness as a *process*. Then the question of identity looks
> quite different ...
I guess the term "continuity of consciousness" already implies the
notion of
a process, no matter if you choose a destructive or constructive uploading
version. Destroy yourself the Moravec way and keep on living as a solitary,
a unique successor of your former self, or choose to create 2,3,4 duplicates
of you and start a happy (?) family with *all* of you.
There might be another solution of the process that still seems to be a
paradox: keep on being the one and only representative of yourself, put the
copies to sleep immediately, before they can develop a notion of their
identity and get one of them activated when you're in serious trouble or on
the edge of finally and definitely dying. But this is a tricky issue
because it raises another fundamental topic: Is it ethically justifiable to
put your copies to sleep and have them at your disposal? One would think: as
long as they are still only "cool software" I must not grant them
the right
to develop a warm in vivo existence ... ExI stance...by building up a meat
body around their digital core via nanotech.
But time will probably prove us all wrong. The ultimate way of preserving
your continuity of consciousness might turn out to look completey different
from our speculations today. So let's be generally generous with these ideas
and try to be open for some fresh and more beautiful solutions.
humania
-------------------------------
Frank wrote:
> So s.o. should put together a "Copy Paradox FAQ" which should
be a
> must-read for everyone allowed to join a discussion like this ... ;-)
I'd be a keen reader of such a FAQ.
I've been dipping in and out of reading this thread (mostly out actually -so
sorry for the ignorance and non sequitors) because I recognize the
importance for such things to uploading and possibly cryonics. Neither of
these or teleportation being an experience I am keen to undergo anytime
soon. Indeed with my current scepticism I might be amongst the last to take
a teleporter ride as I can see no way of testing the thing with braver
volunteers that would satisfy me.
Major spilling of ignorance coming.
I actually bought Mike Perry book "Forever for all" from Amazon but
couldn't
finish it. I realized I needed to do some catch up reading in quantum
physics to even read it critically. So I picked up copies of "Schrodinger's
cat" and "Schrodingers Kittens" by John Gribbon and a natty litty
book
"Introducing Quantum Theory" by J.P McEvoy and Oscar Zarate. At this
stage
its probably fair comment to say I've forgotten most of what I read. But it
was reassuring to read that Bohr apparently said "anyone who is not shocked
by quantum theory has not understood it".
The whole idea of many worlds (invoked by Mike Perry in his book above)
seemed to me to be a complete reversal of the Ockams razor approach. It
seemed that every time an new uncertaintuy arouse in the existing model
rather than add an extra dimension or finessing some subtlety at the
boundary or even say damn we just don't know yet, what the many worlders do
is add a whole additional universe every time an uncertainty is encountered.
A little bit like we'd finished "mapping the edges" of the last one.
Practically, it would seem there are few more issues of eventual interest to
extropic types, including myself, but I will take a huge amount of
convincing before abandoning the view, in any non-hypothetical way, that
just because someone else (a copy claims to be me and appears to everyone
else to be me that they are me).
As I said, I'd be a keen reader of such a FAQ, anyone up to writing it?
Brett
-------------------------------
On Tue, 29 Oct 2002, Max M wrote:
> Are a copy the same as the original? Well We allready have a precedence
> in nature.
Yes. At the quantum level, which has a very measurable impact on the
equilibrium constant. Apart from that we have no precedence in nature.
Nature doesn't do macroscale synchronized deterministic discrete systems
with the same input very well. In fact we don't know a single example.
> One-egged twins are the same in the beginning of their life. They come
No. They are not the same. They are similiar, and diverging.
> from the same single cell. At one point that cell divide and becomes two
> featus'
>
> Anybody who argues that two copies of an upload are the same, must also
Two instances of an upload are the same if they evolve along the same
trajectory. Both trajectories are identical at the pattern level down to a
single bit.
Above is a definition.
> agree then that twins are the same person, or that the time passed and
> the different experiences since the division has made them into
> different individuals.
Two instances of an upload cease being identical at bifurcation. Whether
differences in external input or system noise or removal of evolution
constraints caused this is not relevant.
This is also a definition.
Above might come handy, and most of you still in this thread continue
arguing past each other.
---------------------------
Lee Corbin wrote:
> gts wrote:
> > Your false reasoning has lead you to promulgate the ridiculous
conclusion
> > that in the scenarios you describe, SELF = OTHER. That conclusion
is
clearly
> > false by any sane and workable definitions of the words "self"
and
"other."
>
> Well, what is at stake is the evolutionarily new situation
> of hypothetical duplicating machinery, applied to soulless
> entities made up of atoms, a concept also that we are not
> prepared for.
What is at stake here is the validity of rational thought as a means of
comprehending reality.
Your argument attempts to equate two mutually exclusive concepts ("self"
and
"other"). No rational argument can justify such a contradiction in
terms,
which means we need either 1) consider discarding the two terms as having no
meaning in the transhuman future (which leaves us essentially speechless in
matters pertaining to our relationships to people and objects in the world)
or 2) consider the possibility that perhaps your argument is not quite as
rational as you seem to think.
-gts
--------------------------
Eugen Leitl wrote:
> On Tue, 29 Oct 2002, Max M wrote:
> > One-egged twins are the same in the beginning of their life.
>
> No. They are not the same. They are similiar, and diverging.
I think Max meant that they are the same when they exist as a single zygote,
before the split and divergence.
It seems to me that development of identical twins is a very handy analogy
for thinking about the development of bifurcated adults. In both cases they
start as one and diverge into two distinct entities at the bifurcation. In
both cases, neither of the bifurcated versions can rightly consider himself
to be the other.
> Two instances of an upload cease being identical at bifurcation.
Yes, and people who are not identical certainly cannot have the same
identity. I wonder why some people find this so hard to swallow.
-gts
------------------------
owner-extropians_extropy.org wrote:
> Lee Corbin wrote:
>
>> gts wrote:
>>> Your false reasoning has lead you to promulgate the ridiculous
>>> conclusion that in the scenarios you describe, SELF = OTHER. That
>>> conclusion is clearly false by any sane and workable definitions
of
>>> the words "self" and "other."
>>
>> Well, what is at stake is the evolutionarily new situation
>> of hypothetical duplicating machinery, applied to soulless
>> entities made up of atoms, a concept also that we are not
>> prepared for.
>
> What is at stake here is the validity of rational thought as a means
> of comprehending reality.
>
> Your argument attempts to equate two mutually exclusive concepts
> ("self" and "other").
### Now, let's do some rational analysis here.
If I stay with somebody in a room, we exchange atoms by breathing. If my
atoms are "self", soon there will overlap of "self" and
"other".
Or maybe I start talking to somebody and exchange ideas. If "self"
is made
of ideas, there soon will be overlap of "self" and "other".
Perhaps I would choose to establish a direct neural link to the person I
talked to. In that case her thoughts would be accessible to me like the
thoughts originating within my own skull. If the feeling of direct access is
what makes "self", then there would be overlap of "self"
and "other".
Finally, after extensive mental communion (mediated by advanced hardware)
I/we would decide to rewire our prefrontal cortices (the material substrate
supporting the idea you call "self"), to voluntarily merge our motivational
concepts of self, without losing any of the memories and capabilities each
one of me/her had before we met. In that case again, there would be overlap
of "self" and "other".
"Self" and "other" are not simple mathematical statements
that could be
"mutually exclusive". These are complex mental constructs evolved
for
specific adaptationist goals, and as such cannot be easily stuffed in a
couple of glib definitions.
Be so kind and refrain from peremptory denouncement of your adversaries as
irrational. What we do, is not to play at sophistry and rejection of
rationality, but to expand the scope of rational thought to encompass and
possibly supplant the simple evolutionary adaptations which won't work well
anymore when uploading becomes available.
Rafal
------------------------------
On Tue, 29 Oct 2002, gts wrote:
> Yes, and people who are not identical certainly cannot have the same
> identity. I wonder why some people find this so hard to swallow.
I am an upload, and maintain an incremental backup which is up to date
within biological chronon (currently some 10 ms). I step up to a nuke in
person, and detonate it. My hardware is destroyed within ms, and the
remote backup is being instantly instantiated. What I see subjectively is
that I'm teleported to a new location. No bifurcation had time to occur.
I'm happy that I have kept a backup.
I am an upload, and maintain an incremental backup which is up to date
within biological chronon. Somebody tortures me for an hour, and then
kills me. The remote backup is being instantiated. I see subjectively is
that I'm teleported to a new location, after a harrowing experience.
I am an upload, and maintain an incremental backup which is up to date
within biological chronon. Somebody severes the link to the archive,
tortures me for an hour, and then kills me. The remote backup is being
instantiated as soon as the link is severed (or after an hour, or two
megayears). While I'm screaming and bleeding virtual blood all the way to
/dev/null the new instance of me perceives to be teleported after the link
has been severed (whew! it heaves a virtual sigh). The new instance of me
which has forked of (and thus is no longer me) has no idea what is
happening to me. All it knows is that it got reactivated at some point
when the link broke down. While I certainly wish I was in its place this
doesn't currently help me with the current predilection.
Would I be erased within few ms after the link has broken down there would
be no bifurcation. One could even automate that, except it would
inconvinient to croak at the slightest connectivity outage. People could
DoS you that way.
---------------------------
Jeff Allbright wrote:
>
> Stated another way, I can see why we currently value "survival of
> self", even if only
> because of very strong evolutionary programming. It appears there is
> an implied
> assumption here that if we agree that "survival of self" is important
> to us now, then we must also
> agree that the broader "survival of identity" will be similarly
> important to us with the broader
> technical capabilities we will have in the future. I would argue
> that we will have
> broader choices to go with the broader capabilities, and that it
> would be more
> advantageous to consider all copies to be separate individuals with
> special relationships to each other due to branching.
>
### A very good statement.
You can expand it further by appealing to evolutionary analysis.
Our mind is a low-power general reasoning device built atop a huge
conglomerate of highly efficient, specialized modules, or drives. All of
these modules, as well as the general reasoning device (the rational
intellect), evolved during the propagation of a pattern of chemical and
physical processes, that now constitute our bodies and brains. Throughout
evolution, parts of the pattern changed, some elements were eliminated when
they no longer supported the propagation of the whole unit, and branching
occurred trillions of times since the initial replicator arose billions of
years ago.
The most evolutionarily modern tools for survival are analytic concepts.
They allow a contingent analysis of the environment, and the choice of the
optimal, individual solution. One of the most important advances is the
ability to analyze parts of the mind to resolve conflicts and choose the
best solution. Initially, the rational intellect performing these analytic
tasks is merely a tool of the various drives. The drive to survive uses the
intellect to produce a simple notion of self. The drive to proliferate uses
reason to maximize the number of offspring. Etc.
However, if the rational intellect is allowed more in-depth, recursive
analysis, both of the drives I mentioned above can be re-framed, as tools
for pattern propagation. You are able to reach conceptually to the beginning
of evolution and internalize its direction for your own. Since the rational
intellect itself has no motivation, it can only borrow a motivation from the
lower levels, but not necessarily from any single module.
If it happens so that your simple-self module (with built-in notions of
temporal continuity and direct qualia and memory access) is ascendant over
others, you will get gts's attitude. If your altruism module (evolved during
the kin-selected phase of our evolution) wins, you might get a Gandhi-like
persona.
I think that Lee and I allowed our rational faculties to take over
motivation by borrowing liberally form the simple-self module, and the
altruistic module, and the pattern-propagation-through-children module. We
abstracted the most important elements of them - imperative to propagate a
pattern, with maximal similarity to the original, that is compatible with
temporally extended propagation (you can't propagate for long if you don't
change, but if you change too much, it's no longer propagation), and took it
as the prime directive.
If course, it is a value judgment - but a value determined much closer to
first principles than the simple-self value set.
Also, patterns that propagate more efficiently will overtake others. Since
I
will support my copying, teleportation, and uploading, while many of the
simple-selfers won't, in the end patterns like me will rule the world. Join
us.
Rafal
--------------------------
Rafal,
I am amused that Lee (and now you) are accusing me of calling others
irrational. If you read my words you'll see that I am attacking Lee's
argument, not his person. Moreover the basis of my refutation is none other
than that his argument is fallacious by reason of reductio ad absurdum,
which is to say that his conclusion is absurd enough to invalidate his
premises. For that reason I make no apologies for describing his argument
with adjectives synonymous with "absurd", e.g., "preposterous"
and
"irrational."
> ### Now, let's do some rational analysis here.
>
> If I stay with somebody in a room, we exchange atoms by breathing. If my
> atoms are "self", soon there will overlap of "self"
and "other".
I see no overlap here. You exhale some atoms which are later taken up by
another person. The atoms are first a part of your self and later a part of
another self. At no time are they overlapping.
> Or maybe I start talking to somebody and exchange ideas. If "self"
is made
> of ideas, there soon will be overlap of "self" and "other".
Again I see no overlap between self and other. You can conceive of an idea
similar or identical to an idea that another also conceives. There then
exists two instantiations of that conception, one in your mind and one in
the other's mind.
> Perhaps I would choose to establish a direct neural link to the person
I
> talked to. In that case her thoughts would be accessible to me like the
> thoughts originating within my own skull. If the feeling of direct access
is
> what makes "self", then there would be overlap of "self"
and "other".
Again I see no overlap. If you are aware that her thoughts are coming from
her rather than from you, then clearly they are from "other." If you
think
they are coming from you, then you are decieved by the illusion created by
the neural link. That deception does not obviate the otherness of her
thoughts.
> Finally, after extensive mental communion (mediated by advanced hardware)
> I/we would decide to rewire our prefrontal cortices (the material
substrate
> supporting the idea you call "self"), to voluntarily merge our
motivational
> concepts of self, without losing any of the memories and capabilities each
> one of me/her had before we met. In that case again, there would be
overlap
> of "self" and "other".
In that far out case I would consider the merged individuals as a very
complex self, similar to a person with mulitiple personality disorder (but
without the pathology connotation).
> "Self" and "other" are not simple mathematical statements
that could be
> "mutually exclusive".
The distinction between self and other is the most basic of human
cognitions. It occurs to us in or before early infancy, perhaps even in the
womb. It is the first rational thought we can have, and upon it rests all
subsequent logic.
One might even say we are not persons in the world until we discover this
critical distinction between self and other. Certainly we cannot think "I
exist in the world" until we realize the otherness of the world in which
we
exist.
-gts
---------------------------------
Eugen Leitl wrote:
> I am an upload, and maintain an incremental backup which is up to
> date within biological chronon (currently some 10 ms). I step up to
> a nuke in person, and detonate it. My hardware is destroyed within
> ms, and the remote backup is being instantly instantiated. What I see
> subjectively is that I'm teleported to a new location. No bifurcation
> had time to occur. I'm happy that I have kept a backup.
Yes, I can agree. The key is that no bifurcation had time to occur, so there
is no disparity in self/identity/personality. For the moment I'll take your
word for it that a 10 ms biological chronon is a sufficiently short time
interval (in my own arguments along these lines I used Planck Time, which as
you know is of much shorter duration).
> I am an upload, and maintain an incremental backup which is
> up to date within biological chronon. Somebody tortures me for
> an hour, and then kills me. The remote backup is being instantiated.
> I see subjectively is that I'm teleported to a new location, after
> a harrowing experience.
Yes.
> I am an upload, and maintain an incremental backup which is
> up to date within biological chronon. Somebody severes the link
> to the archive, tortures me for an hour, and then kills me. The remote
> backup is being instantiated as soon as the link is severed (or after
> an hour, or two megayears). While I'm screaming and bleeding virtual
> blood all the way to /dev/null the new instance of me perceives to be
> teleported after the link has been severed (whew! it heaves a virtual
> sigh).The new instance of me which has forked of (and thus is no longer
> me) has no idea what is happening to me. All it knows is that it got
> reactivated at some point when the link broke down. While I certainly
> wish I was in its place this doesn't currently help me with the current
> predilection.
Excellent illustration.
-gts
----------------------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: gts [mailto:gts_optexinc.com]
Eugen Leitl wrote:
> I am an upload, and maintain an incremental backup which is up to
> date within biological chronon (currently some 10 ms). I step up to
> a nuke in person, and detonate it. My hardware is destroyed within
> ms, and the remote backup is being instantly instantiated. What I see
> subjectively is that I'm teleported to a new location. No bifurcation
> had time to occur. I'm happy that I have kept a backup.
"Yes, I can agree. The key is that no bifurcation had time to occur, so there is no disparity in self/identity/personality. For the moment I'll take your word for it that a 10 ms biological chronon is a sufficiently short time interval (in my own arguments along these lines I used Planck Time, which as you know is of much shorter duration)."
As I have acknowledged as well, since time itself does not exist at any increment shorter than the Planck Time, then the universe can be thought of as being destroyed and re-created from every instant to the next. However, the question remains important, is the entire universe is destroyed and recreated simultaneously or is each part of it destroyed and recreated on its own Planck-time schedule. If the former were the case, I would not object to a teleported that scans, destroys, and copies me in the interval the plank time, as this happens all the time anyway. If the latter was the case, I would object, since at any given interval of time the vast majority of the things that made up my pattern were present at the instant before. If the scanner copier was not operating at Planck time intervals, I would object. In Eugen's case mentioned above, even at 10 ms, the atoms that make up your pattern were disassembled and that pattern was imprinted to a new group of atoms. This is still not a subjective continuation of you, since if you were not destroyed, you and the copy would experience different things, and this if a far greater time scale than the plank length.
> I am an upload, and maintain an incremental backup which is
> up to date within biological chronon. Somebody severes the link
> to the archive, tortures me for an hour, and then kills me. The remote
> backup is being instantiated as soon as the link is severed (or after
> an hour, or two megayears). While I'm screaming and bleeding virtual
> blood all the way to /dev/null the new instance of me perceives to be
> teleported after the link has been severed (whew! it heaves a virtual
> sigh).The new instance of me which has forked of (and thus is no longer
> me) has no idea what is happening to me. All it knows is that it got
> reactivated at some point when the link broke down. While I certainly
> wish I was in its place this doesn't currently help me with the current
> predilection.
"Excellent illustration."
Eugen and GTS, would you not prefer, given the conditions I have outlined, to instead have your consciousness distributed in real-time amongst multiple entities? Just as I have outlined, if that vast majority of the things that make up your pattern were part of the same group that made it up the instant before, I believe it logical to consider it a continuation of you. Given that, one may replace ones neurons one at a time with silicon equivalents, over a length of time being uploaded AND maintaining subjective continuity. Once uploaded, one could start spreading his computational parts to other groups of atoms, one small part at a time. If my consciousness were distributed amongst, say, 1 million equally powerful computers, at any given time one of them only containing 1 millionth of my consciousness, then the loss of 1 would not amount to the loss of anymore than 1 millionth of myself.
Instead of making continuous backups of yourself, store your consciousness amongst distributed systems, and then interact with the world as a physical representation of yourself. That representation, which is controlled by you and transits all sensory experience to you, would be the one tortured.
To clarify, nothing I have outlined is incompatable with the common extropian themes of 'uploading' 'copying' and 'backups'. Except what I outline ensures is that you are indeed present from one moment to the next, instead of just a copy of you.
Michael
--------------------------
On Tue, 29 Oct 2002, Dickey, Michael F wrote:
> The latter would require, as far as I can tell, someone to argue that
> logically a copy is indeed a continuation of the subjective consciousness
of
> the original. Given the fact that a copy and me will see different things,
> and that we both can exist simultaneously, and are spatially separated,
it
> seems unlikely.
Can we get someplace by considering the concept of cellular division?
Many bacteria and cells divide. When that happens each gets half of
original DNA, proteins, lipids, cytoplasm, etc.
So we put Damien under general anesthesia, disassemble him atom by atom,
then reassemble 2 copies, each of which has half of the original Damien's
atoms. So they are both "copies" but would seem to equally have Damien's
"identity". When they both come out of it, how could they *not* view
themselves subjectively as the continuation of the original? (Note
how I've probably doubled the number of good books for us to read
by using this strategy. ... takes brief bow ... )
Robert
------------------------
On Tue, 29 Oct 2002, gts wrote:
> Eugen Leitl (perhaps -- the trail is messy) wrote:
>
> > Two instances of an upload cease being identical at bifurcation.
>
> Yes, and people who are not identical certainly cannot have the same
> identity. I wonder why some people find this so hard to swallow.
Its hard to swallow because it doesn't happen often in our
experience. Its like a con-person's shell game. "I put
the identity here under this cup, now watch closely as I
move the cups around, the hand is faster than the eye
my friend, now can somebody tell me where the identity is?"
Actually what is interesting is that a single individual can have
multiple identities (e.g. multiple personality disorders).
Given the fact that at least some brains seem to be able
to keep one set of memories distinct from another set
it seems that once uploads are feasible, there ought
to become a trade in "memories" and/or "identities".
One might be able to do this even pre-uploads with
high bandwidth memory-to-memory interpersonal links
(ala The Matrix).
So you get up in the morning, make your cup of coffee and
the big decision is "Who do I want to be today?".
The interesting thing is that I'll never have to get a PhD.
If I want one I can just borrow Anders or Eugene's "identity".
(Assuming they get the PhDs before uploading is feasible.)
Robert
-------------------------
Michael F Dickey wrote:
> However, the question remains important, is the entire universe is
> destroyed and recreated simultaneously or is each part of it
> destroyed and recreated of its own planck-time schedule.
I've been thinking about this problem since you first mentioned it to me a
few days ago, Michael. I would have answered except that your message was
downloaded onto another computer of mine (I've been out of town since then,
working on another of my computers). I planned to answer it the next time I
returned to my other computer so that I could quote your original properly
(sorry I've been too lazy to pull it from the web archives :-)
Here for now is my brief and tentative answer:
First of all I think the conundrum you pose is not real in the way you think
it is. We need to remember that the universe is quantized *only in relation
to an observer*. I think then that we must look at things from the
perspective of the subject being teleported. The teleportation subject is
the
observer/experimenter. Given the proper measurement instruments, the
subject's experience of the world would be quantized according to Planck's
constant, including his experience of time.
I do not believe it correct to state that "the entire universe is destroyed
and recreated simultaneously," because this option makes no account of
an
observer, but of your two choices above I believe this is the more accurate
description. Due to the central role of the observer, one could say that
*his* entire measured universe is quantized, lock in step.
-gts
-----------------------
gts wrote:
> Rafal,
>
> I am amused that Lee (and now you) are accusing me of calling others
> irrational. If you read my words you'll see that I am attacking Lee's
> argument, not his person. Moreover the basis of my refutation is none
> other than that his argument is fallacious by reason of reductio ad
> absurdum, which is to say that his conclusion is absurd enough to
> invalidate his premises. For that reason I make no apologies for
> describing his argument with adjectives synonymous with "absurd",
> e.g., "preposterous" and "irrational."
### The above paragraph is, eh, interesting. In the first sentence you imply
disagreement with my request to avoid "calling others irrational".
Then you
present what you see as a reason to call Lee irrational (BTW, this reason is
flimsy - a reductio is valid only if premises are shared, and we and you do
not share premises). Finally you are unapologetic about using the words you
mentioned, directly contradicting the thrust of the first sentence.
As my grandma might exclaim, "Um Gotteswillen!"
-------
>
>> ### Now, let's do some rational analysis here.
>>
>> If I stay with somebody in a room, we exchange atoms by breathing.
>> If my atoms are "self", soon there will overlap of "self"
and
>> "other".
>
> I see no overlap here. You exhale some atoms which are later taken up
> by another person. The atoms are first a part of your self and later
> a part of another self. At no time are they overlapping.
### Yes, I know, you are not an atomist - I included this part only in case
there are any atomists in the audience.
-------
>
>> Or maybe I start talking to somebody and exchange ideas. If "self"
>> is made of ideas, there soon will be overlap of "self" and
"other".
>
> Again I see no overlap between self and other. You can conceive of an
> idea similar or identical to an idea that another also conceives.
> There then exists two instantiations of that conception, one in your
> mind and one in the other's mind.
### What if the two instantiations of the idea of self, carried by either
person, had the *same* referent?
At some point enough shared ideas translate into a shared mind, continuously
transforming self into other.
------------
>
>> Perhaps I would choose to establish a direct neural link to the
>> person I talked to. In that case her thoughts would be accessible to
>> me like the thoughts originating within my own skull. If the feeling
>> of direct access is what makes "self", then there would be
overlap
>> of "self" and "other".
>
> Again I see no overlap. If you are aware that her thoughts are coming
> from her rather than from you, then clearly they are from "other."
If
> you think they are coming from you, then you are deceived by the
> illusion created by the neural link. That deception does not obviate
> the otherness of her thoughts.
### Let's say I construct a visual field out of data from the left striate
cortex in my skull and the right striate cortex in the other skull, and feed
the output to my parietal cortex spatial modeling areas. I will see a world
through a very wide interocular distance, as long as all four of my/her eyes
are pointed in the same direction. This will be an experience not achievable
to my unlinked self, not illusory, and quite useful, for example for
measuring distances, even at interstellar distances.
My vision and her vision will be one, even if our other perceptions remain
separate. This is a clear case of overlap of self and other.
Which brings me to a piece of advice - expand you horizons. You will see
more.
------
>
>> Finally, after extensive mental communion (mediated by advanced
>> hardware) I/we would decide to rewire our prefrontal cortices (the
>> material substrate supporting the idea you call "self"),
to
>> voluntarily merge our motivational concepts of self, without losing
>> any of the memories and capabilities each one of me/her had before
>> we met. In that case again, there would be overlap of "self"
and
>> "other".
>
> In that far out case I would consider the merged individuals as a very
> complex self, similar to a person with multiple personality disorder
> (but without the pathology connotation).
### At exactly how many bits per second exchanged through the link do our
separate selves merge into the complex self? You are surely not implying
that there is a sudden all-or-nothing switch from the self + other to
self(squared). This would be the old Zeno paradox, reincarnated at the
(neo)callosum.
No, no, of course there is a continuous change from two individuals to one,
through increasing overlap of self and other.
----------------
>
>> "Self" and "other" are not simple mathematical
statements that could
>> be "mutually exclusive".
>
> The distinction between self and other is the most basic of human
> cognitions. It occurs to us in or before early infancy, perhaps even
> in the womb. It is the first rational thought we can have, and upon
> it rests all subsequent logic.
### I am afraid your beliefs in this matter are in stark disagreement with
current notions about personality development. The consensus is that the
rudimentary sense of self emerges around 15 - 18 months of age, and
continues developing through childhood, even (to a minor extent) in
adolescence and adulthood. See Erikson, Mahler, Lewis and Brooks-Gunn,
William James.
Rafal
---------------------------------------
On Tue, 29 Oct 2002, Dickey, Michael F wrote:
> In Eugen's case mentioned above, even at 10 ms the, the atoms that
> make up your pattern were dissassembled and that pattern was imprinted
> to a new group of atoms. This is still not a subjective continuation
> of you, since if you were not destroyed, you and the copy would
> experience different things, and this if a far greater time scale than
> the plank length.
This is silly. There is no point in oversampling your system as the
you-process won't profit from extra precision. If I don't notice even a
flicker, save having time to think "I've bifurc..." that's most assuredly
a subjective continuation. If an absent tree doesn't fall in a nonexisting
forest, do we really give a damn whether we have a logging permit?
> Eugen and GTS, would you not prefer, given the conditions I have
> outlined, to instead have your conscioussness distributed in realtime
> amongst multiple entities? Just as I have outlined, if that vast
I don't know what this 'consciousness' thing is. I'm a process. A sequence
of pattern frames. Subjectively, it doesn't matter how many instances of
the same process they are. In reality I would prefer to have more
instances of me, because real processes can be terminated, and they have
the potential to bifurcate, thus creating more individuals (which I would
have to split my infrastructure with, though, so one shouldn't overdo it).
> majority of the things that make up your pattern were part of the same
> group that made it up the instant before, I believe it logical to
> consider it a continuation of you. Given that, one may replace ones
Huh?
> nuerons one at a time with silicon equivalents, over a length of time
> being uploaded AND maintaining subjective continuity. Once uploaded,
It's not silicion, but incremental in vivo uploading would give you
subjective identity. (So would discontinuous destructive upload, because
the you-process has been suspended).
> one could start spreading his computational parts to other groups of
> atoms, one small part at a time. If my consciousness were distributed
> amongst, say, 1 million equally powerfull computers, at any given time
> one of them only containing 1 millionth of my concioussness, then the
> loss of 1 would not amount to the loss of anymore than 1 millionth of
> myself.
If the process is identical, having multiple instances of it has only
purpose for extra redundancy in case of failures, or potential to create
raw material for a borganism.
> Instead of making continuous backups of yourself, store your
> concioussness amongst distributed systems, and then interact with the
I've already mentioned that synching distributed systems is nontrivial.
> world as a physical representation of yourself. That representation,
Multiple instances of yourself can't interact with the world unless you
fan out the I/O stream to a single robot.
> which is controlled by you and transits all sensory experience to you,
> would be the one tortured.
You completely lost me here. You cannot have multiple instances of one
process which are different. That's an oxymoron.
> To clarify, nothing I have outlined is incompatable with the common
> extropian themes of 'uploading' 'copying' and 'backups'. Except what
> I outline ensures is that you are indeed present from one moment to
> the next, instead of just a copy of you.
I wonder why I've broken my resolve to not participate in such threads.
They _never_ go anywhere. It's like an upload caught in a loop.
Eugen
------------------------------
From: Robert J. Bradbury
On Tue, 29 Oct 2002, Dickey, Michael F wrote:
> The latter would require, as far as I can tell, someone to argue that
> logically a copy is indeed a continuation of the subjective consciousness
of
> the original. Given the fact that a copy and me will see different things,
> and that we both can exist simultaneously, and are spatially separated,
it
> seems unlikely.
"So we put Damien under general anesthesia, disassemble him atom by atom, then reassemble 2 copies, each of which has half of the original Damien's atoms. So they are both "copies" but would seem to equally have Damien's "identity". When they both come out of it, how could they *not* view themselves subjectively as the continuation of the original?"
I am not disputing that both would view themselves as subjective continuations of Damien's Identity, I am saying that even though they believe they are, they are not. In your example, half of damiens original atoms were used for one copy and half for the other copy, what was the intermediary state of these atoms? If they were removed from the original reference damien, they were in one instant part of the pattern that made up the one damien and in the next not part of that pattern. Were they collected into a pile of atoms, and then used as raw materials to construct the two copies? If that is the case, the original pattern made up of the original group of atoms was at some point completely destroyed, thus there would be no continuation of the subjective experience of the original reference Damien. Or so my argument goes...
Your question confuses what I have been trying to argue, I have not argued that the atoms themselves hold some mysterious 'piece' of damiens consciousness and that is why a copy is not him, I only worked backward from the result of my oft quoted thought experiment. If we copied damien, he and his copy would not experience the same subjective events, thus the copy of him is not a subjective continuation of him. If that were the result of this experiment (which I believe it reasonable to assume it would be, because if it were not *that* would imply a mysterious magical connection) Then I ask, why is that the case? I say it is because the original Damien was comprised of both a pattern and a group of atoms that made up that pattern, and the vast majority of that group of atoms was present in the same pattern that made up damien the instant before, thus he was a continuation of the previous one.
Michael
---------------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: gts [mailto:gts_2000_yahoo.com]
Michael F Dickey wrote:
> However, the question remains important, is the entire universe is
> destroyed and recreated simultaneously or is each part of it
> destroyed and recreated of its own planck-time schedule.
"I've been thinking about this problem since you first mentioned it to
me a few days ago, Michael. I would have answered except that your message was
downloaded onto another computer of mine (I've been out of town since then,
working on another of my computers). I planned to answer it the next time I
returned to my other computer so that I could quote your original properly
(sorry I've been too lazy to pull it from the web archives :-)"
No Problem GTS, I admit I was curious to know what you thought of it.
"Here for now is my brief and tentative answer: First of all I think the conundrum you pose is not real in the way you think it is. We need to remember that the universe is quantized *only in relation to an observer*."
Is that true? Isnt this a fundamental issue of knowing how the universe actually exists without guesses about it? Most practicing scientists feel that there is an objective truth out there somewhere, and we are continually getting closer and closer at describing it. If time exists at no smaller interval than the Planck time, then are you saying it only exists at no smaller interval because observers can see no smaller interval? Or does there truly exist no smaller interval?
Is this the same as the quantized nature of space at the Planck length? As a particle moves through space, if space is quantized, then it can not be a smooth continuous flow, and that particle must jump from one spot to the next in minute quantum tunneling events. One could envision the quantization of space as a giant grid where a particle can only exist in one grid square at a time, and not part in one and part in the other. If it is moving, to move it must disappear from one square and re-appear in the next. Is this grid the same for all particles? Similarly, as a particle moves through time, it can only exist at time intervals that are even multiples of the Planck length of time. Is this 'time grid' the same for all particles? If that is the case, then all particles, as they move through time, must disappear from one time grid square to appear in the next. If all particles are synchronized, then all of them must disappear simultaneously. If they are not, then some would disappear while others would not. It seems that if the latter where the case, we should be able to observe the quantization of time (in theory at least) if the former were the case, we could not since all of our instruments would disappear at the same time. If quantum theory predicts that time is quantized, and we can observe that quantization, then each particle must not be in the same grid, correct? Or I could just be rambling incoherently.
You say that the universe is quantized only in relation to an observer, does that mean in an absolute sense, it is not quantized? I was under the impression that observed or not, space and time are quantized, their dimensions being the Planck length and Planck time, respectively.
If it is not quantized in an absolute sense, then it must be smooth and continuous, and our observations must be quantized. If that were the case, I certainly *would not* teleport anywhere in any short amount of time.
"I think then that we must look at things from the perspective of the
subject being teleported. The teleportation subject is the observer/experimenter.
Given the proper measurement instruments, the subject's experience of the world
would be quantized according to Planck's constant, including his experience
of time."
AND
"I do not believe it correct to state that "the entire universe is
destroyed and recreated simultaneously," because this option makes no account
of an observer, but of your two choices above I believe this is the more accurate
description. Due to the central role of the observer, one could say that *his*
entire measured universe is quantized, lock in step."
How can he observe the quantization of time, if his observation instruments are also undergoing the same quantization? I would think that if one could observe it, then all particles must not be in sync, but I must admit my knowledge is hugely limited in this subject. Any related sites or experiments anyone know to shed light on this?
Again, if that is the case, if all matter is in sync as it progresses through time, I would not object to a spatial teleportation that took place at a time interval of the Planck length of time.
Michael
----------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: Eugen Leitl
On Tue, 29 Oct 2002, Dickey, Michael F wrote:
> In Eugen's case mentioned above, even at 10 ms the, the atoms that
> make up your pattern were dissassembled and that pattern was imprinted
> to a new group of atoms. This is still not a subjective continuation
> of you, since if you were not destroyed, you and the copy would
> experience different things, and this if a far greater time scale than
> the plank length.
"This is silly. There is no point in oversampling your system as the you-process won't profit from extra precision. If I don't notice even a flicker, save having time to think "I've bifurc..." that's most assuredly a subjective continuation. "
Your copy may assert up and down that he is a subjective continuation of the reference original, but unless your copy and you experience the same thing, he can not by definition be a subjective continuation. Do you contend that because we believe something to be true that it must be true? He is a different, distinct individual. You walked into a passive atomic level scanner, he walked out of an atomic assembly chamber. You are looking north, he is looking south, you see clouds, he sees a clear blue sky. You are different people, if he can not see what you see, then he can not be a continuation of your subjective consciousness, he must be a copy of it that is now moving along his own time space line.
> Eugen and GTS, would you not prefer, given the conditions I have
> outlined, to instead have your conscioussness distributed in realtime
> amongst multiple entities? Just as I have outlined, if that vast
"I don't know what this 'consciousness' thing is."
You do not have to know what it is to realize that a copy and you do not share the same subjective experience, and thus he can not be a continuation of your subjective consciousness.
I'm a process. A sequence of pattern frames. Subjectively, it doesn't matter how many instances of the same process they are. In reality I would prefer to have more instances of me, because real processes can be terminated, and they have the potential to bifurcate, thus creating more individuals (which I would have to split my infrastructure with, though, so one shouldn't overdo it)."
Nothing I have said precludes copying, it just suggest that logically, that copy is not you, but is a copy of you. This makes him no less valuable as an individual, and no less a person.
> majority of the things that make up your pattern were part of the same
> group that made it up the instant before, I believe it logical to
> consider it a continuation of you. Given that, one may replace ones
"Huh?"
This would be why I keep having to say the same things over and over again, most people do not apparently read my arguments.
Briefly, Consider this thought experiment. I walk into a scanner, I am copied, me and my copy walk out. My copy can not see what I see, and I can not see what he sees. If he can not see what I see, he can not be a continuation of my subjective experiences. If this is the result of the experiment, that he can not see what I see, then I ask 'why' is that the case. He has the same pattern as me. The only difference I see is that he has different atoms. But we know that any individual atom has no unique property over another atom, *except* its location. The atoms he is made up of are part of his pattern, the atoms I am made up of are part of my pattern. So far so good. But why is he not a subjective continuation of me? His pattern is made of atoms, and so is mine? Well my pattern was made of the same atoms at the previous instant that they are made of this instant. His atoms, in the previous instant, were a homogenous pile of CHNOPS and a few minerals. If the result is that he does not see what I see and thus is not a subjective continuation, then given the factors I just mentioned, the *only* explanation present for this is to maintain subjective continuity one requires the same pattern and the same atoms. (that is, the vast majority of the pattern remains from one instant to the next, and the vast majority of atoms remains from one instant to the next) Given that, please point out what you consider to be logically invalid in this argument. This is, of course, on the condition that said experiment turns out the way I guess it would, I have no reason to suspect logically otherwise.
"I wonder why I've broken my resolve to not participate in such threads. "
Of course it is because you find my arguments so compelling (joke)
Michael
----------------------------------
Rafal Smigrodzki wrote:
> >> Or maybe I start talking to somebody and exchange ideas. If "self"
> >> is made of ideas, there soon will be overlap of "self"
and "other".
> >
> > Again I see no overlap between self and other. You can conceive of
an
> > idea similar or identical to an idea that another also conceives.
> > There then exists two instantiations of that conception, one in your
> > mind and one in the other's mind.
>
> ### What if the two instantiations of the idea of self, carried by either
> person, had the *same* referent?
In that case I would conclude that one or both persons were thinking insane
thoughts, i.e, that they were not thinking rationally. Two distinct persons
cannot logically be one person, regardless of their thinking about the
subject.
> >> Perhaps I would choose to establish a direct neural link to the
> >> person I talked to. In that case her thoughts would be accessible
to
> >> me like the thoughts originating within my own skull. If the feeling
> >> of direct access is what makes "self", then there would
be overlap
> >> of "self" and "other".
> >
> > Again I see no overlap. If you are aware that her thoughts are coming
> > from her rather than from you, then clearly they are from "other."
If
> > you think they are coming from you, then you are deceived by the
> > illusion created by the neural link. That deception does not obviate
> > the otherness of her thoughts.
>
> ### Let's say I construct a visual field out of data from the left striate
> cortex in my skull and the right striate cortex in the other skull, and
> feed the output to my parietal cortex spatial modeling areas. I will
> see a world through a very wide interocular distance, as long as
> all four of my/her eyes are pointed in the same direction. This will
> be an experience not achievable to my unlinked self, not illusory,
> and quite useful, for example for measuring distances, even at
interstellar
> distances.
>
> My vision and her vision will be one, even if our other perceptions remain
> separate. This is a clear case of overlap of self and other.
That would be interesting, but again I see no overlap of self and other. I
see only an extension of your sensory apparatus, not much different from two
people watching the same widescreen movie. The distinction of self/other
becomes relevant only when those shared perceptions are *cognized* by your
mind and by hers. Each of you will then find yourselves to be a distinct
self, with distinct thoughts and emotions about your perceptions, even if
your fields of vision share some or all elements in common.
> Which brings me to a piece of advice - expand you horizons. You will see
> more.
Thanks for the advice.
> > In that far out case I would consider the merged individuals as a
very
> > complex self, similar to a person with multiple personality disorder
> > (but without the pathology connotation).
>
> ### At exactly how many bits per second exchanged through the link do our
> separate selves merge into the complex self? You are surely not implying
> that there is a sudden all-or-nothing switch from the self + other to
> self(squared). This would be the old Zeno paradox, reincarnated at the
> (neo)callosum.
>
> No, no, of course there is a continuous change from two individuals to
> one, through increasing overlap of self and other.
Quite frankly I have too many questions about the multiple-person mind-meld
monstor that you describe for me to reply here. I would need to examine and
interview it (or you) in a lot more detail to understand exactly what you
mean by it. Your argument here reminds me of something I just read from
Robert B in another message: "Its like a con-person's shell game. 'I put
the identity here under this cup, now watch closely as I move the cups
around, the hand is faster than the eye my friend, now can somebody tell me
where the identity is?'"
> > The distinction between self and other is the most basic of human
> > cognitions. It occurs to us in or before early infancy, perhaps even
> > in the womb. It is the first rational thought we can have, and upon
> > it rests all subsequent logic.
>
>
> ### I am afraid your beliefs in this matter are in stark disagreement with
> current notions about personality development. The consensus is that the
> rudimentary sense of self emerges around 15 - 18 months of age
Have you ever raised children, Rafal? If so then imagine for a moment that
an infant could understand your words as you explained to him that he is too
young to perceive that his mother's breast for which he screams when hungry
is not separate and other than him.
>See Erikson, Mahler, Lewis and Brooks-Gunn,
>William James.
Assuming you read these authors then you are confusing the development of
personality with the much more rudimentary recognition of self/other. It
appears that even our house-pets distinguish between self and other.
Thank you for engaging me in an interesting (and rational) discussion.
-gts
-----------------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: John K Clark
"Dickey, Michael F" <michael_f_dickey_groton.pfizer.com> Wrote:
> As I have said, copy me and my copy and I do not share the same subjective
> experiences (ask us what we see)
"OK I will ask. If the you two are really identical you will answer my question in synchronization if you are not then you will not."
So to be identical you must mean we have to be experiencing the same subjective events, for that to be the case we would have to take up the same space at the same time, which is impossible. If we are in separate places, we must be different entities. If we do not experience what the other experiences, then one can not be a subjective continuation of the other, thus he is not the other.
>Since my copy can not share the same subjective experiences as me [...]
"I thought that's what you were trying to prove."
I don't know what to suggest here except to read what I am actually saying instead of, perhaps, what you think I am saying. Everything I am arguing is based on the outcome of this thought experiment. If you copy me and my copy and I do not experience the same thing, he *can not* be a continuation of me. As I have said, I do not know this is how this experiment would turn out, but if it turned out any other way, *that* would suggest the existence of a magical entity that connected us. If you think the copy and the reference would experience the same thing, that of course would contradict my arguments. Please see my post to Eugen just before this one for my explanation of why I draw the conclusions I do from this thought experiment.
> is obvious it is a different individual entity with its own experiences.
"Not obvious at all IF THE TWO ARE REALLY IDENTICAL, so please don't come back with stuff about them seeing different things because then they would no longer be the same."
Honestly I have never cared if semantically they were 'the same' (see my previous discussion on what we mean by 'the same') I care if one of them is a continuation of me. It is reasonable to conclude that the copy is not a subjective continuation of me (if the thought experiment turns out the way I predict) because he and I do not share the same subjective experiences.
"As I've said nineteen dozen times when they start to see different things
they will diverge and that's why I don't want my
backup older than a second or two."
I do not doubt they see different things, the fact that they do *proves* my point, that they MUST be different entities, and that a copy *can not* be a continuation of me. How can you assert that he sees different things AND is a continuation of you if you were not destroyed?
>Thus a copy is not me.
"But you may be the copy and if I were to prove that you are is there any reason to be the slightest bit upset about it? I can't think of one."
No, unless I found that the original was destroyed in the process. I know that I dread destruction, so I would be reasonably sure that the reference that I am a copy of from a few moments before also dreaded destruction, thus I would mourn his loss.
Tell me, if you were in a room full of copies made very recently (a few seconds) and you killed 10 of them, would you feel like you killed 10 people? Or 1 person? What if they were a week old? A year?
>Is it not reasonable to agree on definitions before we attempt to make
>arguments that involve such words?
"No I don't believe it is , definitions are vastly overrated, examples are much more important. You've "defined" death in such an odd way that it's entirely possible that John Clark is already "dead" thus I have little use for your word and don't care if I'm "alive" or "dead". Do you really have a problem with the simple idea that if you think you have survived then you have?"
You do not believe that definitions are important when arguing? What if we were arguing if farmouzabala was vitchilimi? Would you not want a definition of both farmouzagbala and vitchilimi? Well we are arguing if a copy is you, shouldn't we also define 'copy' and 'you' to come to a meaningfull resolution?
Michael
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