The Identity Debate: My copy and Me
> Lee Corbin wrote:
>
> > Yes, one's duplicate's attributes *do* vary from one's, but
> > to a ridiculously small degree.
>
> Even people who differ by "ridiculously small" degrees are different
> people, Lee. There is no equivalency between them, which means they are
> not "one person in two places at the same time."
"It seems to me that you keep ducking *my* question, or my insinuations,
at
least: isn't it true that you *are* the same person that you were yesterday
despite the fact that there are small differences between you? And if you
agree to that, then you can see why logically I can consider myself to be the
same person as a close duplicate."
Ahh, it has been a couple months since we had this discussion. I still find
it difficult to understand how people can assert that a copy of you is you.
gts may at the same time consider himself the same person as he was a few
minutes ago while considering himself a different person than a copy made a
few minutes ago and still be logically consistent. You said "And if you
agree to that, then you can see why logically I can consider myself to be
the same person as a close duplicate" But gts is made up of the same atoms,
molecules, and neurons in the same pattern performing the same functions as
gts t-10s was. However, a duplicate of gts is made up of entirely different
atoms, molecules, and neurons, even though they are in the same pattern.
Imagine this thought experiment. You walk into a room, a non-destructive
scanner copies you and creates a duplicate, now you and your duplicate are
isolated. Can you see, feel, hear, taste anything that your duplicate can?
If you think you can, then you are indeed the same person in two different
places, but this hardly seems logical. If you think you cant, then you are
two separate persons in separate places, albeit persons that are identical.
However, since everything you experience is now separate, the you in the
other room is a different person. If it is a kept a secret who is the
original and who is the copy, then no test can tell them apart. But just
because no one can tell who the original is, does not mean there wasn't an
original in the first place.
I consider there to be three parts to a person
1) the pattern of his molecules / atoms
If we took our brain and put it into a blender, we still have the same
atoms, but no person, so the pattern is important
2) the molecules / atoms that make up his pattern
If we took different molecules / atoms and put them into the same pattern
(copying) then the person behaves identical to the original, but can not
sense, feel, what the original feels when sensory isolated. Therefore they
are different persons, and the atoms that we are made up of are important.
Destroying the original does not change this.
3) the rate of change of those molecules / atoms in that part are orders of
magnitude smaller than the total atoms / molecules that make up the pattern,
so at any given time the vast majority of the molecules and atoms that make
up your pattern are the same as the ones at the instant before.
If none of our atoms are replaced, we remain the same person (same pattern,
same atoms) if all are replaced, we are a different person (same pattern,
different atoms, different subjective experience). If only one atom were
changed per second, then the vast majority of our atoms in our pattern are
the same as the second before. It seems reasonable that if the rate of
replacement is kept significantly low (whatever the existing natural rate
is, say .001% of neurons are replaced each day) than at any given instant
the vast majority of you (99.999%) is the same atoms and pattern as you were
the instant before.
Our brains are in a constant state of change, we are not made up of the same
atoms today that we were made up of 1 year ago, yet we still consider
ourselves to be the same person as we were a year ago (albeit with some new
bits). Does this mean that we are justified in saying that a copy is me,
because just as the atoms in our brains change over time to eventually all
be replaced, a copy merely replaces all of those atoms at once. I think
logically the significant difference is that in one case all of the atoms
are replaced, thus none of the molecules and atoms that make up your pattern
were the same ones that made up your pattern the instant before. It is
clear from case 2) that the molecules are important to the subjective you,
to your continual perception of consciousness, because in a different group
of molecules with the same atoms separated sensory experiences occur.
Replacing All of your atoms in your pattern is a far different effect than
replacing less than all, or less than 1 millionth of them. As in ANY case
other then replacing them all, that vast majority of atoms that make up your
pattern are the same ones that were making up your pattern the instant
before.
I, for one, will not ever walk into a destructive copying or uploading
mechanism, as this will surely lead to my demise. If I were to pursue
uploading, I would prefer a few neurons be replaced at a time, at a rate
near or less the normal background replacement rate of the atoms that make
up my pattern. If I were to pursue distributed backups, I would create
other neurons that are linked to mine at the same or slower rate than they
are naturally replaced. If my pattern were distributed amongst multiple
groups of atoms in that particular pattern at any given time, then the
destruction of one (as long as it were a minority of the overall group)
would not lead me to consider myself a different person. Thus uploading and
distributed backups are both possible while retaining a continuity of
consciousness with logically sound perception that you are still the same
you.
GTS, I believe Harvey, myself, and a few others seem to be the rare defenders
of this position (that a copy is not me and were I destroyed and
copied, I would still be dead) Last time it came up it was even mentioned
that being destroyed and copied is no different from going to sleep and
waking up. I would hardly consider these similar, as one involves a complete
destruction of you, and the other does not. 'How do you know you
are the same person when you wake up that you were when you went to sleep'
was the question I believe. Such questioning seems to ignore basic
principles in science such as parsimony and occam's razor. I am reasonable
in assuming I am the same person because a) my atoms are the same b) my
pattern is the same C) there is no destructive scanner copying machine in my
room that I wake up out of
Michael
------------------------------
"gts" <gts_optexinc.com>
> Even people who differ by "ridiculously small" degrees are different
> people Lee, There is no equivalency between them
The test for equivalence is to exchange the objects (or people) and see if there is any change. If external observers can not tell if the exchange actually happened and if the people directly involved can not tell either then they are equivalent and although there are two bodies there is only one person at that instant.
John K Clark jonkc_att.net
----------------------------
John K Clark wrote:
> > Even people who differ by "ridiculously small" degrees
are different
> > people Lee, There is no equivalency between them
> The test for equivalence is to exchange the objects (or
> people) and see if there is any change. If external observers
> can not tell if the exchange actually happened and
> if the people directly involved can not tell either
> then they are equivalent and although there are two bodies
> there is only one person at that instant.
But in this case there are changes if we exchange the objects, even if
they are very small changes. The differences can be detected objectively
by those who might make very accurate measurements, and subjectively by
the persons themselves who might make very accurate self-assessments.
-gts
----------------------------
Michael F Dickey wrote:
> I still find it difficult to understand how people
> can assert that a copy of you is you.
I'm glad to see I'm not the only one. :)
The closest I can come to believing anything remotely similar would
involve an instantaneous destructive teleportation, as mentioned here
previously (by Jef Allbright, I think).
It would not be necessary that my actual atoms be transported to another
location. There is an equivalency principle of physics that states that
subatomic particles of the same type are identical, e.g., one electron
is identical to any other electron. (In fact, according to one theory
there is only one electron in the entire universe, but I digress.)
If subatomic particles at the destination location could be assembled in
the exact states as those that comprise me at the origin location,
instantaneously and destructively such that I vanish here and appear
there in the same instant, then I see at least a faint possibility that
my sense of self might live on in that teleported duplicate. I think the
teleportation process would need to take place in less than the shortest
meaningful division of time, which is the time it takes for a photon to
traverse one Planck length -- a very, very short time interval.
The above assumes of course the truth of my materialist view of
consciousness as an entirely physical phenomenon. If materialism is
wrong then we're ghostly spirits potentially capable of all manner of
weirdness.
-gts
-----------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: John K Clark [mailto:jonkc_att.net]
"gts" <gts_optexinc.com>
> Even people who differ by "ridiculously small" degrees are different
> people Lee, There is no equivalency between them
"The test for equivalence is to exchange the objects (or people) and see
if
there is any change. If external observers can not tell if the exchange
actually happened and if the people directly involved can not tell either
then they are equivalent and although there are two bodies there is only one
person at that instant."
That is not the only test for equivalence. If you claim that they are only
one person, then by necessity they should share the same sensory input. If
we were to separate the two bodies we would find they experience different
sensory input. E.g., one can not see what the other sees. Thus the only
possible explanation is that they are two bodies and two people. How can
you assert that they are only one person when they clearly do not share the
same simultaneous subjective consciousness?
Michael
-----------------------
On Wed, 23 Oct 2002, Dickey, Michael F wrote:
> Ahh, it has been a couple months since we had this discussion. I
Surprise, I've got deja vu all over. That matrix is so glitched I can't
see past artifacts. Do people never read archives these days?
> still find it difficult to understand how people can assert that a
> copy of you is you. gts may at the same time consider himself the same
A perfectly synched copy of you is you. Because there is no measurable
difference between them, by definition.
> person as he was a few minutes ago while considering himself a
> different person than a copy made a few minutes ago and still be
> logically consistent. You said "And if you agree to that, then you
If there was no bifurcation both copies think exactly the same thing at
the same time. If they don't, they're obviously not copies.
> can see why logically I can consider myself to be the same person as a
> close duplicate" But gts is made up of the same atoms, molecules,
and
> nuerons in the same pattern performing the same functions as gts t-10s
> was. However, a duplicate of gts is made up of entirely different
> atoms, molecules, and nuerons, even though they are in the same
> pattern.
I thought we were talking about in machina models. There is no way to make
perfect copies of life animals, and to keep them synched without
trajectory forcing via heavy instrumentation with nanoware.
I'm not going to read and reply to the rest of it. Read The Fine Manual.
---------------------
> still find it difficult to understand how people can assert that a
> copy of you is you. gts may at the same time consider himself the same
"A perfectly synched copy of you is you. Because there is no measurable
difference between them, by definition."
If a perfectly synched copy of me is me, then how come my copy would not experience the same sensory information that I experience? Don't I experience all the sensory input that I experience? Would I then see, hear, and feel what my copy feels? If not, then that copy is not me, it is someone else who thinks they are me.
Just because there is no measurable difference between two sub atomic particles, does not mean they are the *same* sub-atomic particle, does it? What if two electrons have the same mass, same spin, same momentum, etc. etc. etc. Are they the 'same' electrons, or do they have an existence independent of one another, and are merely identical?
No measurable difference does not mean that two entities are one, only that they are identical.
Michael
---------------------
Dickey, Michael F.
> No measurable difference does not mean that two entities are one, only
> that they are identical.
The Identity of Indiscernibles is a principle of analytic ontology first
explicitly formulated by Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz in his Discourse on
Metaphysics, Section 9 (Loemker 1969: 308). It states that no two distinct
substances exactly resemble each other. This is often referred to as
'Leibniz's Law' and is typically understood to mean that no two objects have
exactly the same properties. The Identity of Indiscernibles is of interest
because it raises questions about the factors which individuate
qualitatively identical objects. Recent work on the interpretation of
quantum mechanics suggests that the principle fails in the quantum domain.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible/
http://dmoz.org/Society/Philosophy/Philosophy_of_Logic/Identity/
- scerir
---------------------
Michael Dickey writes
> Ahh, it has been a couple months since we had this discussion. I still
find
> it difficult to understand how people can assert that a copy of you is
you.
> gts may at the same time consider himself the same person as he was a few
> minutes ago while considering himself a different person than a copy made
a
> few minutes ago and still be logically consistent. You said "And if
you
> agree to that, then you can see why logically I can consider myself to
be
> the same person as a close duplicate" But gts is made up of the same
atoms,
> molecules, and neurons in the same pattern performing the same functions
as
> gts t-10s was. However, a duplicate of gts is made up of entirely different
> atoms, molecules, and neurons, even though they are in the same pattern.
What one must first do, however, is dispense with the idea
that the *particular* atoms have anything to do with one's
identity. Namely, if during the next nanosecond it were
somehow possible to remove atom1 from your body and replace
it with an identical atom---and QM assures us that all atoms
of a given element excluding different isotopes are equivalent
---then I don't think that you would notice the difference.
If one does agree with me, then, that the *particular* atoms
have nothing to do with your personal identity, then the
objection you make in your last paragraph falls to the ground.
> Imagine this thought experiment. You walk into a room, a non-destructive
> scanner copies you and creates a duplicate, now you and your duplicate
are
> isolated. Can you see, feel, hear, taste anything that your duplicate can?
No, I certainly can not! But then here it is assumed that
you are addressing *one* of the two, and that is what that
*one* will say.
> If you think you cannot [right, I cannot], then you are
> two separate persons in separate places, albeit persons
> that are identical.
So say you. I contend that we are actually the same
*person*, though clearly what is to be contended is
what is meant by that construction. (This is, of
course, the entire basis of the discussion.)
> I consider there to be three parts to a person
>
> 1) the pattern of his molecules / atoms
>
> If we took our brain and put it into a blender, we still have the same
> atoms, but no person, so the pattern is important
>
> 2) the molecules / atoms that make up his pattern
>
> If we took different molecules / atoms and put them into the same pattern
> (copying) then the person behaves identical to the original, but can not
> sense, feel, what the original feels when sensory isolated. Therefore they
> are different persons, and the atoms that we are made up of are important.
> Destroying the original does not change this.
>
> 3) the rate of change of those molecules / atoms in that part are orders
of
> magnitude smaller than the total atoms / molecules that make up the pattern,
> so at any given time the vast majority of the molecules and atoms that
make
> up your pattern are the same as the ones at the instant before.
>
> If none of our atoms are replaced, we remain the same person (same pattern,
> same atoms) if all are replaced, we are a different person (same pattern,
> different atoms, different subjective experience).
What evidence would you ever have that this is the case?
Is there any way that you can know that this is not being
done to you each millisecond in an operation that requires
only one nanosecond? If you talked to someone who was,
in your terms, a thousand different people each second
you'd still have a very normal conversation with him.
It begins to devolve into unstable concepts to imagine
that you, or he, are a thousand different people during
an ordinary second.
> Our brains are in a constant state of change, we are not made up of the
same
> atoms today that we were made up of 1 year ago, yet we still consider
> ourselves to be the same person as we were a year ago (albeit with some
new
> bits). Does this mean that we are justified in saying that a copy is me,
> because just as the atoms in our brains change over time to eventually
all
> be replaced, a copy merely replaces all of those atoms at once? I think
> logically the significant difference is that in one case all of the atoms
> are replaced, thus none of the molecules and atoms that make up your pattern
> were the same ones that made up your pattern the instant before. It is
> clear from case 2) that the molecules are important to the subjective you,
> to your continual perception of consciousness, because in a different group
> of molecules with the same atoms separated sensory experiences occur.
> Replacing All of your atoms in your pattern is a far different effect than
> replacing less than all, or less than 1 millionth of them. As in ANY case
> other then replacing them all, that vast majority of atoms that make up
your
> pattern are the same ones that were making up your pattern the instant
> before.
But I still think that you are incorrect for the reasons I gave above.
> I, for one, will not ever walk into a destructive copying or uploading
> mechanism, as this will surely lead to my demise.
Yet as I have said many times before, you would soon
be in the small minority as more practical people
used teleportation to get about quickly and cheaply.
Finally, you'd be seen to be an old fogey from the
last century who had some strange hang-up about atoms.
Lee
-----------------------------
"Dickey, Michael F" <michael_f_dickey_groton.pfizer.com> Wrote:
>If you claim that they are only one person, then by necessity they should
>share the same sensory input.
Certainly, otherwise they would no longer be identical because they would
have different memories.
>If we were to separate the two bodies we would find they experience
>different sensory input.
Not if they were equally distant from the center of a symmetrical room, then
each would see exactly the same thing the other saw.
> I still find it difficult to understand how people can assert that a copy
>of you is you.
For some reason I don't understand people always look at things from the
point of view of "The Original", but do you have any reason for thinking
that right now, at this very instant, you are "The Copy" and was made
only one
hour ago?
John K Clark jonkc_att.com
---------------------
Both are made of atoms and both contain the same information so if an exact
copy of me is not me then just what is it that the one has and the other
does not? I can't think of a damn thing unless it turns out that religious
people were correct after all and everybody possesses a non material soul
that can only be made by God. I'm not holding my breath.
John K Clark jonkc_att.com
---------------------
--- John K Clark <jonkc_att.net> wrote:
> Both are made of atoms and both contain the same
> information so if an exact
> copy of me is not me then just what is it that the
> one has and the other
> does not?
Each has a different history. One is "the original".
It is unique. It is the first of its kind. It is
'unprecedented'. It's history runs from its moment of
origin, up to the present.
The other is the nth copy of "the original". Its
history begins from the moment of its production.
Part of that history is the origin of its 'design'.
For any copy of something, by the very definition of
copy (duplicate, xox, etc), its pattern, its form and
function, its design, its specifications require, and
are completely dependent upon, an original (in the
general case, or "the" original, in a specific case)
(with the exception of a copy of an (n-x)th copy;
n>x).
Jeff Davis
-----------------------
The following---that I posted a year or two ago on Cryonet (and I
think on Extropians---is pertinent to the identity question, and
I know several of the present debaters have not seen it:
In over thirty years of lively disputes about identity, I have found
that people fall, along one particular scale, into seven categories:
1. Will travel by space warp, but won't permit disassembly of atoms.
He or she objects to disintegration and reassembly of the atoms
constituting his or her own person (given, of course, that this
has become technologically reliable). This is the most skeptical
position of the seven.
2. Will permit teleportation, but only if the same atoms are used.
Subject agrees (as always, for suitable reward) to be disintegrated
here and later reassembled at a remote location . However the
subject forbids disassembly here and reconstitution at a distant
location using different atoms.
3. Will teleport, unless there is a delay.
Suppose the original at the point of departure is scanned and the
information is used to construct the remote duplicate, but then there
is a delay before the original is destroyed. This is not acceptable.
The subject anticipates that he or she will experience seeing his or
her duplicate emerge from the distant teleporter station, and that
this will void the transferal of identity to the remote. The local
will then experience disintegration, and that this will mark the
actual death of the subject.
4. Will teleport, but finds backups to be useless.
Subject finds it a waste of money to get "scanned" for the purpose
of getting himself or herself restored in the event of catastrophe.
Not long after the scan is complete, the subject exclaims, "That
information is me the way I used to be! Were I to die, and that
person brought back to life, it wouldn't really be me."
5. Finds backups acceptable, provided that they've had no run time.
Subject finds it desirable to keep frozen physical duplicates in
storage (in case anything happens to him or her), but only provided
that the duplicate, whether physically instantiated or merely kept
safe as information, is completely identical to him or her at a
particular past instant. In this case, he or she expects to survive
physical destruction of the present body, but not if that body has
already been reanimated and is having experiences elsewhere.
6. Anticipates future experiences of duplicates, but only one in
particular.
This is the nearly incoherent "closest continuer" theory. If you
must die, but N duplicates of you were made at several points in
the past, then you "really are" whichever one of them survives
and is the most similar to you. Somehow your soul, or identity,
is transferred by hidden celestial machinery into this particular
one, but not into any of the others.
7. Logically, but not necessarily emotionally, anticipates all
experiences of all duplicates past or future, near or far.
By subscribing to "the faith of a physicist", the subject believes
that any physical object at any coordinates whatsoever is the same
person that he or she is, provided only that the physical process
running in the object resembles him or her closely enough.
The extreme difficulty of sitting across a table, watching
your physical duplicate, and honestly being able to exclaim,
"There goes I, by the grace of God", or of being able to say
with a straight face, "Logically, I anticipate the dinner that
I had last night as much as I anticipate tonight's repast",
prevents almost everyone from accepting level seven.
My own belief is that nonetheless, one is lead inexorably
through countless thought experiments to level seven, and to
the realization that the other concepts of personal identity
are outmoded legacies of evolution which cannot sustain
careful scrutiny.
Lee Corbin
------------------------
On Wed, 23 Oct 2002, Jeff Davis wrote:
> Each has a different history. One is "the original".
> It is unique. It is the first of its kind. It is
> 'unprecedented'. It's history runs from its moment of
> origin, up to the present.
Please show you how you can tell which is the original, without resorting
to external storage. (Space is unlabeled. Trajectory tracking requires
external storage of information).
Analogy: Two CDs from the same master containing OpenBSD contain the same
software. If the bit pattern would flip synchronously on both of them it
would be still the same pattern.
> The other is the nth copy of "the original". Its
> history begins from the moment of its production.
> Part of that history is the origin of its 'design'.
> For any copy of something, by the very definition of
> copy (duplicate, xox, etc), its pattern, its form and
> function, its design, its specifications require, and
> are completely dependent upon, an original (in the
> general case, or "the" original, in a specific case)
> (with the exception of a copy of an (n-x)th copy;
> n>x).
This is meaningless, as long as you can't provide a measurement procedure
allowing you to tell two copies apart.
Why do we keep having the same discussion, year, after year, after year?
Eugen Leitl
----------------------------
NOTE - one need not acknowledge an immaterial nature to the soul to realize that the continuity of perception depends not only on the continuous existence of a pattern but also on the continuous existence of the substance that makes up that pattern.
I am attempting to appeal to reason. Acknowledging that the same atoms are necessary to ensure a continuity of consciousness (or the survival of *me* and not a copy) does not make some special appeal to the nature of any particular atoms besides them being what comprise your pattern at that moment in time. No one is denying that from one second to the next that the set of atoms that make up your pattern is identical. But the atoms that make up your pattern can change while you are still the same person. This depends on the portion of the atoms that are changing. I contend that whatever the natural background rate of change is, is a fine base line for me, as we all ready accept that and deal with that. However, I would not be in favor of replacing half my brain any more than I would be in favor of removing half of my brain.
This is not the same thing as looking at any two things (apples, people, sub atomic particles) and saying all of their measured properties are the same *except* one is to my left and one is to my right. The only way to remove this distinction is to have the two things take up the same spatial location. The only way to do that is to destroy one and immediately replace it with another. Thus if one thing is destroyed and replaced with an identical copy in the same place, no test can tell these apart. However, this is NOT what copying does. When I am copied there is a copy standing to the side of me
Going to sleep and waking up, or merely existing as time moves could be considered analogous to continually being destroyed and recreated as a perfect copy, BUT there is no reason to suspect that this is actually occurring. Just because it is *possible* that it is occurring does not make it just as likely that it IS occurring.
1 - the pattern
The pattern is important to the definition of a person. If the same atoms are re-arranged into a different pattern, (say, in a blender) then that person is no more.
2 - the atoms
If the same pattern is recreated with different atoms (a copy) then the copy and the original each share their own unique sensory experiences and are thus each their own unique person.
3 - Copying vs. replacing
If an instanteous scanning copying machine
- the particular atoms -
What one must first do, however, is dispense with the idea
that the *particular* atoms have anything to do with one's
identity...If one does agree with me, then, that the *particular* atoms
have nothing to do with your personal identity, then the
objection you make in your last paragraph falls to the ground.
- replacing only a few atoms at a time -
Namely, if during the next nanosecond it were
somehow possible to remove atom1 from your body and replace
it with an identical atom---and QM assures us that all atoms
of a given element excluding different isotopes are equivalent
---then I don't think that you would notice the difference.
> If you think you cannot [right, I cannot], then you are
> two separate persons in separate places, albeit persons
> that are identical.
"So say you. I contend that we are actually the same *person*, though clearly what is to be contended is what is meant by that construction. (This is, of course, the entire basis of the discussion.)"
To contend that two separate entities with separate sensory experience and locations in space are the same entity (person, whatever) is illogical. Even if they have the same memories and previous sensory experiences, they are separate, unique, distinct individuals. They are very similar, of course, but they are not the *same* person, unless you contend that people in two separate rooms can possibly be the same person.
> If none of our atoms are replaced, we remain the same person (same pattern,
> same atoms) if all are replaced, we are a different person (same pattern,
> different atoms, different subjective experience).
"What evidence would you ever have that this is the case? Is there any way that you can know that this is not being done to you each millisecond in an operation that requires only one nanosecond?"
What evidence do I have that the universe exists beyond my imagination? My evidence is that there is no evidence to remotely suggest we are being destroyed and copied with each nanosecond, therefore it is reasonable to assume that we are not.
> I, for one, will not ever walk into a destructive copying or uploading
> mechanism, as this will surely lead to my demise.
"Yet as I have said many times before, you would soon be in the small minority as more practical people used teleportation to get about quickly and cheaply."
Too bad for them, as all the evidence indicates that they are killing themselves each time they step into it.
The same person vs. the same person
There seems to be two different contentions of a copy and an original being the 'same person' One contends that the two seperate entities are 'one' person. The other contends that each individual
-------------------------------------
Dickey, Michael F.
> No measurable difference does not mean that two entities are one, only
> that they are identical.
"The Identity of Indiscernible ...states that no two distinct substances exactly resemble each other. Recent work on the interpretation of quantum mechanics suggests that the principle fails in the quantum domain. "
Thanks, this serves to re-enforce the point (and it is quite interesting additionally) If the principle fails in the quantum domain then two distinct particles may have identical quantifiable descriptions, but they must, by definition, be at two different places. Thus they are still spatially separated, and still unique in some aspect. Even if all of their properties are identical, they can not exist in the same place at the same time.
> But in this case there are changes if we exchange the objects, even if
> they are very small changes. The differences can be detected
"Two physical objects in the same quantum state are provably indistinguishable. Okay? If they weren't, e.g. the equilibrium equation wouldn't be true."
They are distinguishable because they are not in the same place at the same time.
Michael
---------------------------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: Lee Corbin [mailto:lcorbin_tsoft.com]
Michael Dickey writes
> You said "And if you
> agree to that, then you can see why logically I can consider myself to
be
> the same person as a close duplicate" But gts is made up of the same
atoms,
> molecules, and neurons in the same pattern performing the same functions
as
> gts t-10s was. However, a duplicate of gts is made up of entirely different
> atoms, molecules, and neurons, even though they are in the same pattern.
"What one must first do, however, is dispense with the idea
that the *particular* atoms have anything to do with one's
identity."
I disagree, the 'particular' atoms do have something to do with ones identity, and I have attempted to show this logically, please point out any fallacious aspects to my argument, as I would be eager to hear them. The particular atoms have no special attributes, no magical properties, the only significance to them is that they happen to be the atoms that make up that pattern at that time.
If the particular atoms had nothing to do with ones identity, then if we transferred the pattern, then subjective experience would be retained, would it not? This is obviously not the case, because if we transfer the pattern into another group of atoms (make a copy) then the other group of atoms, which now share the same pattern as the original, do not have the same sensory experience as the original pattern / group of atoms.
claim - the pattern is important to identiy, the atoms are not
hypothesis - copy the pattern but is different atoms, see if they share the
same sensory experience
result - copy made, copy and original, although difficult to distinguish, do
not share same sensory experience
conclusion - identity can be copied, but does not retain subjective continuity
claim - the atoms are important, the pattern is not
hypothesis - use the same atoms, but change the pattern, see if identity is
still recognizable
result - mushed pattern up in blender, does not answer question 'who are you'
conclusion - pattern is an integral part to identity.
claim - the atoms AND the pattern are important to identity
hypothesis 1 - change atoms, retain pattern
result 1 - accomplished by transferring pattern to new atoms, entity two does
not experience the same subjective sensations that reference pattern does (see
above). Conclusion, changing atoms but retaining pattern must be new identity.
hypothesis 2 - change atoms, change pattern
result 2 - mushed pattern in blender, then copied new pattern, entity does not
exhibit any identity
hypothesis 3 - retain atoms, change pattern
result 3 - mushed pattern in blender, same atoms. No identity recognizable
hypothesis 4 - retain atoms, retain pattern
control reference, no changes made, entity has recognizable identity matching
that of previous state in time.
Through these thought experiments, it is clear that a copy, which is made of new atoms with the same pattern, will not experience the same subjective events that the reference or original does, even if we can not determine who is the reference and who is the original, one of them was. And they are two distinct identities. If a copy is made the retains the original pattern but is using new atoms, and comparing it with the original reveals separate sensory experiences, and they must be two distinct separate entities, then copying the pattern to new atoms and destroying the original will result in a new entity that would not have shared a subjective continuity of experience with the original. The original was destroyed.
"Namely, if during the next nanosecond it were somehow possible to remove atom1 from your body and replace it with an identical atom---and QM assures us that all atoms of a given element excluding different isotopes are equivalent ---then I don't think that you would notice the difference. If one does agree with me, then, that the *particular* atoms have nothing to do with your personal identity, then the objection you make in your last paragraph falls to the ground."
You assert, if I can correctly interpret this, that if we replaced one atom and you appeared to be the same person, then this is identical to replacing ALL atoms and then assuming that you are the same person? If you read through your statement, your logical conclusion 'If one agrees with me, the particular atoms have nothing do to' should more accurately be said 'if one agrees with me, than THAT particular atom has nothing to do with your personal identity' You jumped from one atom having no significance to ALL atoms having no significance. Presenting this as a simple logical argument shows why I would disagree with it, as the conclusion does not follow logically from the premise.
premise - replacing one atom in your brain does not significantly affect your
personality
conclusion - Therefore replacing all atoms in your brain does not significantly
affect your personality
I would agree with you that the particular atom you are referencing has nothing to do with your personality if it is replaced with an identical atom. But give the fact that if we replace recreate the pattern in all new atoms and the copy does not share its sensory experience with the original, then it is reasonable to assume that replacing all atoms without keeping the original means that the copy does not share continuity of sensory experience with the original either. Replacing 1 atom is far different than replacing all atoms.
> If you think you cannot [right, I cannot], then you are
> two separate persons in separate places, albeit persons
> that are identical.
"So say you. I contend that we are actually the same *person*, though clearly what is to be contended is what is meant by that construction. (This is, of course, the entire basis of the discussion.)"
Agreed, there seems to be some confusion as to what 'the same person' means. People seem to be confusing 'those two people are the same (identical)' with 'That is the same person' If we copied an apple, one could point at both apples and claim they are identical, but one can not (logically) point at both apples and claim that are the *same* (i.e. only one) apple, as they obviously exist separately spatially. I do not disagree that one can point at an original and a copy and state a) I can not tell which is which (unless referencing the copying process) and b) their personalities are identical, they are similar people, if not entirely the same. But I would disagree if one claims that they are 'one' person, as they are obviously two, albeit identical, people, each with their own distinct existence and sensory experience.
> 3) the rate of change of those molecules / atoms in that part are orders
of
> magnitude smaller than the total atoms / molecules that make up the pattern,
> so at any given time the vast majority of the molecules and atoms that
make
> up your pattern are the same as the ones at the instant before.
>
> If none of our atoms are replaced, we remain the same person (same pattern,
> same atoms) if all are replaced, we are a different person (same pattern,
> different atoms, different subjective experience).
"What evidence would you ever have that this is the case?"
Would you like to present evidence that if none of your atoms are replaced or your pattern does not change then you are a different person? My evidence is the fact that no other evidence exists suggesting otherwise and it is the simplest explanation for observed phenomena. Just because we can imagine other possibilities that are outside the realm of the testable does not mean they are all equally valid as explanations. If you are referring to 'if all atoms are replaced we are a different person' see the above thought experiments for the evidence.
"Is there any way that you can know that this is not being done to you
each millisecond in an operation that requires
only one nanosecond?"
No, is there anyway I can know true knowledge? Is there anyway I can know that the entire universe was not created just a microsecond ago with all our atoms arranged in a manner to trick us into thinking that it has been around a while? But just because I can not KNOW that this is not the case does not mean it isn't reasonable to assume that is not the case. If someone should present evidence that I am being destroyed and re-copied every microsecond in operations that only require nanoseconds then I would take that into account and make a judgment accordingly, however just because we can imagine that this is a possible scenario does not make it a plausible one. How would you know that you ARE being copied and destroyed each microsecond? What test would show it? This is similar to the 'how do you know you are not destroyed and copied every time you go to sleep' argument. I know it because I do not wake up in a destructive scanner in a large laboratory, I wake up in my bedroom in my house.
"If you talked to someone who was, in your terms, a thousand different people each second"
I do not believe I ever implied that.
> I, for one, will not ever walk into a destructive copying or uploading
> mechanism, as this will surely lead to my demise.
"Yet as I have said many times before, you would soon be in the small minority as more practical people used teleportation to get about quickly and cheaply. Finally, you'd be seen to be an old fogey from the last century who had some strange hang-up about atoms."
That strange hang up being based on science and reason. Oh well, to bad for the rest of them. I'll wait for wormholes (which may come about before destructive copier / teleporters anyway)
Michael
-----------------------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: John K Clark [mailto:jonkc_att.net]
"Dickey, Michael F" <michael_f_dickey_groton.pfizer.com> Wrote:
>If you claim that they are only one person, then by necessity they should
>share the same sensory input.
"Certainly, otherwise they would no longer be identical because they would
have different memories."
AND
>If we were to separate the two bodies we would find they experience
>different sensory input.
"Not if they were equally distant from the center of a symmetrical room,
then
each would see exactly the same thing the other saw."
Aside from the unusual special case you noted above, if you accept that to be one person one must share sensory input with oneself, then noting and accepting that a copy and an original *do not* share sensory input would acknowledge that they are two, separate, distinct individuals. If a copy does not experience the same sensory information that an original does, then it is obvious that they (the two of them) are not one person. If the original were destroyed in the process, it is still just as logical to assume that the copy would not share sensory experience with the original had he not been destroyed. Thus they are not the same people (i.e., the original does not experience the sensory input of the copy)
To assert that this new copy is sharing subjective experience with the original even if the original were destroyed is no different than asserting it would have some magical telepathic link with the original were it not destroyed. If that turned out to be the case if this thought experiment were actually performed, I would definitely rethink my position. But somehow I doubt that would be the result of the experiment.
"Both are made of atoms and both contain the same information so if an exact copy of me is not me then just what is it that the one has and the other does not? I can't think of a damn thing unless it turns out that religious people were correct after all and everybody possesses a non material soul that can only be made by God. I'm not holding my breath."
But both are not made up of the *same* atoms. Reference the thought experiments mentioned previously, but in short, if I copied your pattern to new atoms, but kept you around. You would not share sensory experience, thus the copy and the original you are two separate individuals (although identical) To assert that a copy is you implies a telepathic magical connection that transcends both the patterns and the atoms. It is clear the subjective experience of the original you ends with the destruction of the original you, because if the original was still hanging around after a copy, the copy and the original you would not share sensory input. If you did, *that* would imply some kind of religious magical soul.
Michael
------------------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: Eugen Leitl [mailto:eugen_leitl.org]
On Wed, 23 Oct 2002, Travis Shutt wrote:
> It's seems I may have heard somewhere that there are no two subatomic
> particles that are the same? So it seems that any copy of yourself
"Two systems in the same quantum state are indistinguishable. It's not
just
a good idea, it's the law."
But to be in the same quantum state, they must occupy the same space, which is impossible. That is also the law. Thus one can not look at a copy and an original and claim they are the same because there atoms and molecules are each individually identical, they are different because one is on the right of you and one is on the left.
> would theoretically be different, but I'm not sure how that would
> apply to your soul or psychological make up.
"If you can build me a soul detector, you have a case."
Its not necessary, just keep the original and the copy around and ask one if he sees what the other sees, if not, there is no soul.
On Wed, 23 Oct 2002, Jeff Davis wrote:
> Each has a different history. One is "the original".
> It is unique. It is the first of its kind. It is
> 'unprecedented'. It's history runs from its moment of
> origin, up to the present.
"Please show you how you can tell which is the original, without resorting to external storage."
It is not necessary to prove which one is the original to acknowledge that one of them must be.
"This is meaningless, as long as you can't provide a measurement procedure allowing you to tell two copies apart."
You can, they do not occupy the same time and space, thus they are different from one another.
"Why do we keep having the same discussion, year, after year, after year?"
Because all of our lives and existence depend on this subject.
Michael
----------------------
On Thu, 24 Oct 2002, gts wrote:
> Sure. However it is not possible for two objects to exist in the same
> quantum state in the first place, as per the Pauli Exclusion
> Principle.
No. PEP says that no two electrons in an atom (that is, the _same_ atom)
can have identical quantum numbers. This has nothing to do that two or N
different atoms in the same quantum state are indistinguishable.
This is useless for macroscale objects because you can't put them into the
same quantum state. However, we don't think using single quantum states.
Here it is perfectly possible to put discrete systems (say, a computer
simulating a virtual robot arm in a blocks world) in a synchronized state
(state as in information processing state, not quantum state).
Similiarly, you can theoretically synch two recently copied meat people
into same state in regards to cognition (the spatiotemporal pattern of
molecular activity called life), and keep them that way.
It's a tour de force, and hence only useful as a gedanken. It is
considerably easier with discrete deterministic systems, but it's still
mostly useful as a gedanken. I can't see any possible uses for this off
hand.
Eugen
-----------------------
> Sure. However it is not possible for two objects to exist in the same
> quantum state in the first place, as per the Pauli Exclusion Principle.
> -gts
In QM no information can be cloned (xoxed)if
the number of states is equal or greater than 3
[Wootters, Zurek, 1982].
Or, in other terms, a cloning (xoxing) of 2 non
orthogonal states violates the unitarity of evolution
[D'Ariano, Yuen, 1996].
Or, in other terms, the linearity in QM (linear
superposition of quantum states) forbids the
perfect xoxing. Fortunately! Leibniz principle!
scerir
------------------------
On Thu, 24 Oct 2002, gts wrote:
I'm overposting today, but...
> Seems to me that that the supposed paradox is explained much more
> easily by noting the simple fact that the similarity of their visual
> experiences is due only to an optical illusion. The paradox is
It is not similiarity, and no illusion. It's the boundary condition
asserting conservation of identity. As soon as you deviate from them, you
get two (or N) people.
> illusory, literally. Let them each have access to a compass and then
> compare their experiences.
They can't. Trajectory forcing causes selective agnosia. Depending how it
is implemented, they both would see what A would have seen, or what B
would have seen, or something inbetween. You can tell them that there are
several of instances of them in perfect sync. It wouldn't matter, they
couldn't consciously diverge. The perfect mirror man routine (didn't the
Stooges use to do that?).
As soon as they would see something different their input would have to
deviate. They would have become distinguishable. You can still cause the
fork to fuse by brute force. After the prongs fuse again they will all
remember seeing the same thing when questioned about the event which
caused the temporary bifurcation.
Eugen
-------------------------
gts wrote:
> However the problem also goes deeper than the question of absolute
> copies: it is about the continuity of the sense of self. Even
> assuming a perfect copy of me can exist, how can I be in two places
> at one time as you say is possible?
>
> If I am tasting wine in Napa Valley while my allegedly perfect
> duplicate is guzzling beer in Tijuana, then does my wine taste like
> beer? Or does my duplicate's beer taste like wine? Or do we both
> complain that our drinks have been adulterated with wine or beer as
> the case may be?
>
> The idea that a person can be in two places at one time, Lee, is to my
> way of thinking sheer and utter nonsense.
It seems to me that gts and Lee are still not connecting in the sense of
understanding what the other person is saying.
<referee>
I see Lee saying that while there are two separate physical bodies (copies),
doing separate things in separate places, that it makes the most sense to
say that it is the same *person/identity* doing all these things at the same
time. It comes down to whether or not you accept this radical definition of
identity as useful.
I see gts arguing something else, that it's silly to say that the same
person can be in two places at once, and in the context that he's talking
about, of course he's right.
</referee>
Right now we have a lot of discussion about the meaning of "identical"
with
offshoots into quantum physics and philosophy of Identity of Indiscernibles,
which is in itself an interesting topic -- but all this debate is apart from
the concept Lee is championing.
I observe the same thing that bothered me during an earlier discussion about
altruism. I see endless debate swirling about definitions, but completely
missing the key point. I observe Lee energetically stirring the pot, and it
often seems that he is intentionally being obtuse, but perhaps this is
because he believes this is the best way for people to come to their own
conclusions.
It would be nice to get to the stage in the discussion where each
understands the other's viewpoint, and then move on to the more interesting
implications of various concepts of identity.
- Jef
--------------------
Dan Fabulich wrote:
> The point of this is just in certain situations
> we can ignore rather significant differences.
I can agree with that. It makes sense from a pragmatic viewpoint.
However I am no pragmatist; I must insist that the differences between
the objects remain real even if we decide they are not relevant to
whatever purpose we have in mind.
For example if for pragmatic reasons you find it useful to drink coffee
from a real garbage truck then I won't object, but please don't expect
me to keep a straight face when you tell me the garbage truck is
actually a coffee cup. :)
> We can draw the distinction out more clearly with an example.
> You don't believe in personal continuity over time, so we'll speak in
> your language for a moment. Consider Lee, who *does* believe that
he's the
> same guy he was yesterday. Is his belief relevant in figuring out
> whether he really IS the same guy he was yesterday? No; at least,
> not in a language in which persons are defined to be different
> people across time (due to a metaphysical commitment to temporal
> parts or whatever). Just because he thinks he persists doesn't
> mean he really does.
>
> Now consider the scenario from within a language more like
> Lee's, in which people *do* persist over time (at least
> under ordinary circumstances). You believe that you don't.
> But is that relevant in figuring out whether you really do
> persist over time? Again, no, not in this language; in
> this language, it's the "same person" at different times,
> as a point of definition, regardless of what you think
> about the matter.
All I see above are two valid arguments that neither Lee nor I should
beg the question of identity. My assertion that personality changes
constantly through time is certainly not evidence that it changes
constantly, nor is his assertion that personality persists evidence that
it persists. In terms of my personal inventory method of checking for
identity, any such statements we or our alleged dupes might make would
not be evidence for either case. However if for example Lee stated that
his personality persists and his copy stated that his does not persist
then we would have clear evidence that Lee is not his copy. This would
be so not because either assertion is true. It would be so simply
because the beliefs conflict.
>> I don't think so. A true duplicate would describe himself
>> in exactly the same way as his original and have exactly
>> the same idea of what is relevant to his identity.
>> To use Eugene's word, they would be "synched" in every way.
>
> All this says is that the duplicates would agree as to
> whether they were the same person; they'd find
> the same properties relevant, whatever those
> properties might be. This is obvious. :)
Right, it is perfectly obvious. It is also perfectly obvious that two
individuals who did *not* give the same account of themselves and who
did *not* offer the same ideas of what is relevant would *not* be the
same person. And there we have a simple and obvious test for the
equivalency of identity.
And as you know it is my contention that given enough time to discuss
and compare notes, the original and his alleged dupe would eventually
find some area of disagreement. The disagreement might be large and very
significant to them or it might be small and insignificant to them, but
it would be a disagreement nonetheless. That disagreement would be
evidence of their inequality *even if they agreed it was insignificant
to them*.
To use the simplest kind of example, the original might say "I am
looking up at the sky" while the other says "I am looking down at
my
shoes." That difference in their self-descriptions is sufficient reason
to call them different people, even if they are friendly to Lee's way of
thinking and so prefer to sweep their differences under the rug for the
purpose of making a dubious argument. :)
-gts
------------------------
"Dickey, Michael F" <michael_f_dickey_groton.pfizer.com> Wrote:
> Aside from the unusual special case you noted above, if you accept that
to
> be one person one must share sensory input with oneself, then noting and
> accepting that a copy and an original *do not* share sensory input would
> acknowledge that they are two, separate, distinct individuals.
Yes. In most cases the two would start to diverge almost immediately and the
differences would only increase as time went by. That's why the prospect of
getting vaporized would make me rather unhappy if my backup was older than a
second or two.
> But both are not made up of the *same* atoms.
The way to tell if two objects are the *same* is to exchange them and note
the changes; if you do this for atoms absolutely nothing changes.
Atoms have no individuality, if they can't even give this interesting
property to themselves how can they give it to us? I'll give you an example.
In my right hand I'm holding a hydrogen atom, his name is Ed. In my left
hand I'm holding another hydrogen atom and his name is Ted. As you closely
watch I bring the two together and cool them down (slow them down in other
words) until it's almost absolute zero. They form an object called a
"Bose Einstein Condensate", something with one quantum state not two
as
there were before. I now heat it back up to room temperature, the condensate
is destroyed and you see two hydrogen atoms just as you did before, but
according to the laws of physics it is imposable to tell even in theory who
is Ed and who is Ted, both now have the same history. Stuff like that
happens all the time at the quantum level.
John K Clark jonkc_att.net
---------------------
Jef the Ref wrote:
> gts wrote:
>> If I am tasting wine in Napa Valley while my allegedly perfect
>> duplicate is guzzling beer in Tijuana, then does my wine taste like
>> beer? Or does my duplicate's beer taste like wine? Or do we both
>> complain that our drinks have been adulterated with wine or beer as
>> the case may be?
> <referee>
>
> I see Lee saying that while there are two separate physical
> bodies (copies), doing separate things in separate places,
> that it makes the most sense to say that it is the same
> *person/identity* doing all these things at the same
> time.
Yes indeed that is what he is saying. However his idea that his view
"makes the most sense" certainly does not alone make his view the
most
sensible. As I see it either I am in Napa or else I am in Tijuana, and
either I am drinking wine or else I am drinking beer.
Please Jef, if you think you can see things as Lee sees them, try to
answer my questions above in his terms in a way that "makes the most
sense." I cannot attempt to do so without writing fantastic gibberish.
-gts
----------------
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On Thu, 24 Oct 2002, Dickey, Michael F wrote:
> But to be in the same quantum state, they must occupy the same space,
No. You're wrong. Read it up.
> which is impossible. That is also the law. Thus one can not look at
Which law?
> a copy and an original and claim they are the same because there atoms
> and molecules are each individually identical, they are different
> because one is on the right of you and one is on the left.
That's not a property of the objects. Translation is featureless for
unlabeled space. That's a property of the observer. *You* are labelling
them. The composite system of you and first object and you and second
object is distinguishable.
> > would theoretically be different, but I'm not sure how that would
> > apply to your soul or psychological make up.
>
> "If you can build me a soul detector, you have a case."
>
> Its not necessary, just keep the original and the copy around and ask one
if
> he sees what the other sees, if not, there is no soul.
Two people in perfect sync see and think in unison. If they don't, they
are not in perfect sync.
> On Wed, 23 Oct 2002, Jeff Davis wrote:
>
> > Each has a different history. One is "the original".
> > It is unique. It is the first of its kind. It is
> > 'unprecedented'. It's history runs from its moment of
> > origin, up to the present.
>
> "Please show you how you can tell which is the original, without resorting
> to external storage."
>
> It is not necessary to prove which one is the original to acknowledge that
> one of them must be.
Bzzzzt. You just resorted to external storage. Try again.
> "This is meaningless, as long as you can't provide a measurement
procedure
> allowing you to tell two copies apart."
>
> You can, they do not occupy the same time and space, thus they are
different
> from one another.
Translation in a flat potential box does not change the quantum state of a
system (nonflat potential is equal to labelling space along the gradient).
If it did, equilibrium constant would break, and the world as we know it
would cease to exist. We all would die instantly.
Because we're alive you're wrong.
> "Why do we keep having the same discussion, year, after year, after
year?"
>
> Because all of our lives and existence depend on this subject.
Stuff and nonsense. CR, or morphing to a healthy lifestyle, or relocating
to safe neighbourhood is far more important, yet I notice a remarkable
absence of such discussions on this list.
The identity discussion is irrational in face of the fact that you daily
do and fail to do decisions influencing your life, yet are highly
inconsistent in assigning relevance (emotion is metric for resource
assigment).
I'm equally inconsistent, yet I'm aware of the fact. I'm trying to change
my evaluation function. Speaking of which, I'm out of this thread.
-----------------------
Eugen Leitl wrote:
> On Thu, 24 Oct 2002, gts wrote:
>
>> Sure. However it is not possible for two objects to exist
>> in the same
>> quantum state in the first place, as per the Pauli Exclusion
>> Principle.
>
> No. PEP says that no two electrons in an atom (that is, the
> _same_ atom) can have identical quantum numbers.
Actually PEP was later generalized to all fermions -- not only electrons
as originally conceived by Pauli.
According to the modern version of PEP, fermions cannot have the same
quantum numbers when contained in a "closed system" but I'm not aware
of
any rule that limits the definition of "closed system" to atoms only.
Certainly a molecule is a closed system describable in terms of quantum
mechanics. And if molecules then why not also larger macroscopic
systems?
Position is, after all, one of the four quantum numbers that cannot be
duplicated by two fermions within a system. I note that regardless of
spin, momentum and mass, two electrons cannot occupy the same position
even if they are traveling apparently free through empty space.
-gts
---------------------
Dan Fabulich wrote:
> gts wrote:
>
>> I can agree with that. It makes sense from a pragmatic viewpoint.
>> However I am no pragmatist; I must insist that the
>> differences between the objects remain real even if we decide
>> they are not relevant to whatever purpose we have in mind.
>
> Are the differences between a horse and a horse's head
> "non-real" when we say that there's only one thing in the barn?
I would simply ask you to clarify your meaning. Do you really mean to
imply there is no horse body attached to that horse head? If so then the
difference in the barns is very real. If not then there is no
difference.
> Are the differences between
> your whole right hand and your right hand minus a molecule
> (which is still a hand) "non-real" when we say that you have
> just one right hand?
Here you are describing a real difference. My right hand minus one
molecule would not be my right hand. The difference may be small and you
might judge it insignificant in deciding which hand you will claim as
yours, but the difference is nevertheless real.
>> However if for example Lee stated that his personality
>> persists and his copy stated that his does not persist
>> then we would have clear evidence that Lee is not his copy.
>> This would be so not because either assertion is true.
>> It would be so simply because the beliefs conflict.
>
> Conflicting beliefs aren't necessarily relevant...
I see beliefs as extremely relevant for purposes of distinguishing
between two people who appear on the surface to be identical. Beliefs,
attitudes, opinions, etc... this is the stuff of which personalities are
made. Even Lee has agreed that my person changed when I experienced a
religious conversion and became a devoted disciple of Thor. Yet
apparently he disagrees that smaller personality changes should also
matter. He (and perhaps you also) might say that large changes in
personality such as religious conversions "count" but that small changes
in personality "don't count." You and he are certainly entitled to
feel
that way but your subjective judgments about what degree of change
should count does not affect the hard objective fact that even small
changes in personality are real. The decision to ignore small
differences does not make them unreal.
> Most of us are happy to say that there's just one person, even
> when her opinion changes over the years..
As am I, for most purposes. However we are here getting at the very
nature of identity and personality. It is wise here I think to use more
exact language.
I mentioned in another message to you, one to which I don't think you
replied, that in my view we persist through time only in a manner
analogous to that by which a whirlpool persists through time as it moves
down a river. We refer to these whirling patterns as "I" or "me"
and
speak of them as though they are fixed objects. This is very convenient
for purposes of communication and social development of the species --
it helps to get the bills paid -- but upon closer examination we see
that the whirlpools to which we are referring change with each passing
moment. The "I" idea is merely a useful label used for describing
the
general whirling patterns that comprise our ever-changing personalities.
I believe it a mistake, both psychologically and philosophically, to
consider "I" as a reference to a fixed object. Unfortunately this
belief
is prevalent in the West (but not so much in the East -- Buddha knew
better). This false belief in "I" as a fixed object leads some people
to
feel guilty and depressed for the bad choices they believe their
present-persons made in the past and it leads other people to become
egotistical and narcissistic for the good choices they believe their
present-persons made in the past. Much wiser I say to attribute those
successes and failures to our past-persons, and to learn from them in
the same way that we learn from the successes and failures of others.
-gts
----------------------------
--- Eugen Leitl <eugen_leitl.org> wrote:
> On Wed, 23 Oct 2002, Jeff Davis wrote:
>
> > Each has a different history. One is "the
> original".
> > It is unique. It is the first of its kind. It is
> > 'unprecedented'. It's history runs from its
> moment of
> > origin, up to the present.
>
> Please show you how you can tell which is the
> original,
This is one of those logical 'problems' that I see
repeated again and again on this topic. Just because
someone/everyone is unable to distinguish between two
items doesn't mean they aren't an original and a copy.
Observer ignorance/inability is a separate matter
from the facts of identity. If a tree falls in the
forest and no one is there to hear it, it still makes
the same huge crashing sound. Unless you can
establish that the laws of nature are observer
dependent, you need to retire this 'argument'.
> > The other is the nth copy of "the original". Its
> > history begins from the moment of its production.
> > Part of that history is the origin of its
> 'design'.
> > For any copy of something, by the very definition
> of
> > copy (duplicate, xox, etc), its pattern, its form
> and
> > function, its design, its specifications require,
> and
> > are completely dependent upon, an original (in the
> > general case, or "the" original, in a specific
> case)
> > (with the exception of a copy of an (n-x)th copy;
> > n>x).
>
> This is meaningless, as long as you can't provide a
> measurement procedure
> allowing you to tell two copies apart.
Just because you don't know, or can't know, the
difference, doesn't mean it doesn't exist. What's
more, the argument seems to me not just disingenuous,
but even a bit ridiculous. To make a copy, you have
to have an original from which to make it. It is
impossible then to have the two without
creating/having, in the process of making the copy,
the means of distinguishing the two. Destroying the
evidence, or losing it, or whatever, and then claiming
in full view of everyone, some fanciful state of
affairs, is, well, pure stubbornness.
> Why do we keep having the same discussion, year,
> after year, after year?
Stubbornness?
Jeff Davis
__________________________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
Y! Web Hosting - Let the expert host your web site
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-------------------------
"Jeff Davis" <jrd1415_yahoo.com>
> Just because someone/everyone is unable to
> distinguish between two items doesn't mean
> they aren't an original and a copy.
Here we have a case where the laws of Physics say it is imposable to ever
tell the difference between two things and you say nevertheless there is a
huge difference between the two. You could state exactly the same thing more
concisely and honestly simply by saying they are different because they have
a different soul. You could say it, but I don't care to.
> Just because you don't know, or can't know, the
> difference, doesn't mean it doesn't exist.
All I can say is such an attitude has proven itself to be notoriously
unproductive in the past and I see no reason that will change anytime soon.
I think I'll stick to the scientific method.
John K Clark jonkc_att.net
-------------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: Eugen Leitl [mailto:eugen_leitl.org]
Sent: Thursday, October 24, 2002 12:33 PM
To: Dickey, Michael F
Subject: RE: duck me!
"You're making several wrong assumptions. I won't discuss the matter on the list anymore, because I'm sick and tired explaining the same thing to different people over the years."
I am sorry that you find the discussion not worth engaging in, I am only attempting to understand any valid objection to my logical argument. I still see no reason to expect, as a simplest explanation, that a copy is an entity that is experiencing the same subjective events that an original did. If you can provide any good sites you may know of that illustrate all the common arguments and counter arguments in such a case I would be eager see it.
"In all such cases within some 10 ms copies of meat people will become different, albeit initially very similiar persons. It only gets downhill then."
I do not dispute that once the copy is made, or that the copy and the original become more different with each ms that passes. I dispute that they are ever *not* different in the first place, simply because there are two of them, they must be different.
> >If we were to separate the two bodies we would find they experience
> >different sensory input.
>
> "Not if they were equally distant from the center of a symmetrical
room,
> then
> each would see exactly the same thing the other saw."
>
> Aside from the unusual special case you noted above, if you accept that
to
"It is unusual, because synching is an unusual case."
I am not sure exactly what you mean here or are trying to argue. I am new to this group and this subject, so please forgive my ignorance. What do you mean by 'synching' exactly? (I understand your reluctance to discuss this topic, so do not feel obliged to respond if you do not have the inclination or the time)
>
> But both are not made up of the *same* atoms. Reference the though
"Prove it. Distinguish two protium atoms in ground state."
AND
> particles may have idenatical quantifiable descriptions, but they must,
by
> defination, be at two different places. Thus they are still spatially
"Space is not labeled. Quantum state is not dependent on translation in a perfectly flat potential box."
If you can see two atoms that you are wishing to compare, one is on the right and one is on the left. That is how they are distinguishable. They do not occupy the same space at the same time. This is relevant because it has been argued that you can not tell an exact copy apart from an original (with zero change in time) because there are no distinguishable characteristics (just as you can not tell two identical sub atomic particles apart, you can not tell a collection of sub atomic particles that is identical to another collection apart) I argue that you can at the very least acknowledge that their are indeed two collections, and if there are two collections they must be separate, distinct individuals. And if one can not sense what the other senses, than they do not share subjective experiences. Thus a copy does not share subjective experience with an original, even if you can not tell the original and the copy apart, this is still the case. This is the core of my argument I and still do not understand or can recognize any real objections to it.
> the copy and the original you would not share sensory input. If you did,
> *that* would imply some kind of religious magical soul.
"You and John talking about two different things. You don't actually disagree."
I am trying to understand exactly what John is saying still, I have a separate email going to him.
> seperated, and still unique in some aspect. Even if all of their properties
> are identical, they can not exist in the same palce at the same time.
"They don't have to be in the same place at the same time. Read up on quantum physics."
AND
"Two physical objects in the same quantum state are provably
> indistinguishable. Okay? If they weren't, e.g. the equilibrium equation
> wouldn't be true."
>
> They are distinguishalbe because they are not in the same place at the
same
> time.
"You're wrong. Hint: where is that information stored. Another hint: it's not stored in the system you're measuring. Hint, hint."
They do not have to be in the same place at the same time to not be considered separate particles? The point that I am trying to make with this argument above is that even if all of the measured properties are identical for each particle, they are still two separate particles, they are not one particle. Similarly, even if all measured properties are identical between an original and a copy, it does not mean that the original and the copy are one entity, they are still two, separate, distinct entities. Perhaps I do not understand what you are presenting as a counter-argument here?
Regards,
Michael
--------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: John K Clark [mailto:jonkc_att.net]
"Dickey, Michael F" <michael_f_dickey_groton.pfizer.com> Wrote:
> Aside from the unusual special case you noted above, if you accept that
to
> be one person one must share sensory input with oneself, then noting and
> accepting that a copy and an original *do not* share sensory input would
> acknowledge that they are two, separate, distinct individuals.
"Yes. In most cases the two would start to diverge almost immediately
and the
differences would only increase as time went by. That's why the prospect of
getting vaporized would make me rather unhappy if my backup was older than a
second or two."
> But both are not made up of the *same* atoms.
"The way to tell if two objects are the *same* is to exchange them and note the changes; if you do this for atoms absolutely nothing changes. Atoms have no individuality, if they can't even give this interesting property to themselves how can they give it to us? I'll give you an example."
That is one way to tell if objects are the 'same'. If I change one atom in my pattern, you are right, there are no discernable changes. But if I change *all* atoms in my pattern, there is a discernable change. Because if I did the equivalent of recreating my pattern with a new group of atoms, the original pattern with the original atoms will not experience the same subjective events that the new pattern with the new group of atoms experiences, thus they are different beings. This is the core of my argument. If you copy and original, the original and the copy do not share the same sensory experience, so they *must not* be the same person (that is, *one* entity) They may be the same as in they are both identical to one another (as the change in time approaches zero) but they are two distinct separate entities. Similarly, if you copy an original and destroy the original, there is no reason to suspect that this new copy is a continuation of the subjective experience of the original. To presume as much would imply that the original and the copy are telepathically linked in some way, this is quite unscientific. It would be easy to prove they are not by just not destroying the original, and then asking them both if they are sensing the same events. If they are not, then a copy is not the continuation of the consciousness of the original. I have asserted through these logical arguments that to maintain a continuation of consciousness or subjective experience one must retain the same pattern in the same atoms (that is, in the atoms that make up that pattern)
To use your example of vaporization, if you backed yourself up, and then were vaporized, your backup would not remember being vaporized. *you* were the one who was vaporized. If your backup does not remember that, then it is not *you*, it is a copy of you from a few seconds before. You would not feel as though you woke up after being vaporized.
"In my right hand I'm holding a hydrogen atom,... but according to the
laws of physics it is imposable to tell even in theory who
is Ed and who is Ted, both now have the same history. Stuff like that happens
all the time at the quantum level. "
It does not happen at the macroscopic level, so the analogy is flawed. A better analogy would be to assume that you were to take to hydrogen atoms and mix them up and then ask which was the one in your left hand before you mixed them up. I could not tell, of course, but that does not mean that at one point in time one of them was in your left hand and it does not mean that they are actually 'one' hydrogen atom, as I can clearly see one in each hand.
> Just because someone/everyone is unable to
> distinguish between two items doesn't mean
> they aren't an original and a copy.
"Here we have a case where the laws of Physics say it is imposable to
ever
tell the difference between two things and you say nevertheless there is a
huge difference between the two."
The huge difference is that they are two distinct separate entities. In the case of sub-atomic particles, one is at point xyz in space and the other is at point x+1,y+1,z+1 in space. They exist in two separate spaces, thus they are two different entities. I can point at them, one with each finger, and say 'see, they are two different particles, they may be the 'same', but they are two distinct particles' In the case of an original and a copy, they may also not have any test to tell them apart, but one of them came out of the copy end of the scanner copier and the other came out of the scanner end. Also, the most significant factor telling them apart is that there are *two* of them, one on my right side one on my left. Again, I can point at them and say 'see, they are two distinct separate entities that exist independently from one another' To assert that there is 'no difference' between them is to not acknowledge that there are two of them.
"You could state exactly the same thing more concisely and honestly simply by saying they are different because they have a different soul. You could say it, but I don't care to."
A soul is not necessary to invoke, it is only necessary to look and see two distinct separate entities to realize that there are two of them.
> Just because you don't know, or can't know, the
> difference, doesn't mean it doesn't exist.
"I think I'll stick to the scientific method."
If so, them demonstrate to us, logically and scientifically, that it is reasonable to assume a copy of me shares the same subjective experience as I do.
Michael
---------------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: Eugen Leitl [mailto:eugen_leitl.org]
On Thu, 24 Oct 2002, Dickey, Michael F wrote:
> But to be in the same quantum state, they must occupy the same space,
"No. You're wrong. Read it up."
AND
> which is impossible. That is also the law. Thus one can not look at
"Which law?"
The Pauli Exclusion Principle. GTS already elaborated on this, but to re-iterate
-------------
"The Pauli exclusion principle is a quantum mechanical principle which states that no two identical fermions may occupy the same quantum state. "
Examples of fermions: electrons, protons, neutrons, quarks
from - http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pauli_exclusion_principle
"The Pauli principle is also responsible for the large-scale stability of matter. Molecules cannot be pushed arbitarily close together, because the bound electrons in each molecule are forbidden from entering the same state as the electrons in the other molecules "
"Astronomy provides the most spectacular demonstrations of this effect, in the form of white dwarf stars and neutron stars. In both types of objects, the usual atomic structures are disrupted by large gravitational forces, leaving the constituents supported only by a "degeneracy pressure" produced by the Pauli exclusion principle"
-------------
There is no doubt that the Pauli exclusion principle dictates that it is impossible for two fermions to be in the same place at the same time, or do you assert that this is not the case?
Similarly, if two particles that are otherwise identical take up two distinct places in space, one can tell them apart by tracking their location in space-time. In the same manner, one can keep track of an original and a copy just by watching where they are standing, not that it is really necessary in order to acknowledge that one of them was the original.
> a copy and an original and claim they are the same because there atoms
> and molecules are each individually identical, they are different
> because one is on the right of you and one is on the left.
"That's not a property of the objects. Translation is featureless for unlabeled space. That's a property of the observer."
Does it matter? You can still tell one from the other, even if it is only in reference to you, or some other property of space-time. They are still distinguishable. If we are talking about telling an original apart from a copy (which I think is the topic of this discussion) then one merely need acknowledge that their are indeed two entities, one must be the copy and one must be the original. If they do not experience the same subjective events, then they are distinct individuals.
>
> Its not necessary, just keep the original and the copy around and ask one
if
> he sees what the other sees, if not, there is no soul.
"Two people in perfect sync see and think in unison. If they don't, they are not in perfect sync."
To have the same sensory input, to be 'in synch' then, two people must also occupy the same space at the same time. Which is impossible.
> "This is meaningless, as long as you can't provide a measurement
procedure
> allowing you to tell two copies apart."
>
> You can, they do not occupy the same time and space, thus they are
different
> from one another.
"Translation in a flat potential box does not change the quantum state of a system (nonflat potential is equal to labelling space along the gradient). If it did, equilibrium constant would break, and the world as we know it would cease to exist. We all would die instantly. Because we're alive you're wrong."
What exactly am I wrong about? Do you assert that two different objects can indeed take up the same place at the same time? You are only arguing that your inference from my statement is wrong. Again, if two entities are otherwise identical but are at different locations, one can still differentiate between the two. This is a fact, it is true, and we are not all dead because of it. Just because translation is not a quantum state does not mean you can not use it to tell two particles apart that are otherwise in the same quantum state. One is on my left, one is on my right...
Michael
--------------------------
Anyone who thinks objects do not have intrinsic history, obviously has no
soul.
;-)
- Jef
John K Clark wrote:
> "Jeff Davis" <jrd1415_yahoo.com>
>
>> Just because someone/everyone is unable to
>> distinguish between two items doesn't mean
>> they aren't an original and a copy.
>
> Here we have a case where the laws of Physics say it is imposable to
> ever tell the difference between two things and you say nevertheless
> there is a huge difference between the two. You could state exactly
> the same thing more concisely and honestly simply by saying they are
> different because they have a different soul. You could say it, but I
> don't care to.
---------------------------
Michael F Dickey wrote:
We seem to agree on most every point in this discussion, and your
agreement is refreshing and very welcome, but here is an area in which I
think we differ:
> This is the core of my argument. If you copy and original,
> the original and the copy do not share the same sensory experience,
> so they *must not* be the same person (that is,
> *one* entity) They may be the same as in they are both
> identical to one another (as the change in time approaches zero)
> but they are two distinct separate entities. Similarly, if you
> copy an original and destroy the original, there is no reason
> to suspect that this new copy is a continuation
> of the subjective experience of the original. To presume as
> much would imply that the original and the copy are telepathically
> linked in some way, this is quite unscientific.
I agree wholeheartedly that copies made in different locations are
suspect due to different sensory experience. However imagine a situation
in which we instantaneously destroy and replace your original person
with an exact copy in the exact same position, but made from entirely
different atoms. If I understand you correctly, you are arguing that the
use of different atoms would mean that you would die and that your copy
would not be you. If so then I disagree.
In the special case I describe above I think you would continue as the
same person with same sense of self. In fact you would have no way to
know that anything had actually occurred. The only requirement for this
continuity of self would be that the replacement process take place in
the blink of an eye -- in a time interval shorter than the quantum
interval of time -- such that the duplicated atoms and particles would
appear in exactly the same states as your original atoms and particles.
This observation above is what leads to me ponder the possibility of
instantaneous destructive teleportation. If what I say in the above
paragraph is true then instant destructive teleportation might also work
if the original quantum states (with adjustments for position) could be
duplicated instantaneously by an assemblage of particles at the
destination location.
In the case of instantaneous non-destructive teleportation, in which
your original survives, the two versions of you would diverge in the
first moment such that two distinct people would exist. Those two
distinct people would be like identical twins who share some memories in
common. They would be intimately related, but neither would consider
himself to be the other.
-gts
----------------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: gts [mailto:gts_optexinc.com]
Michael F Dickey wrote:
We seem to agree on most every point in this discussion, and your
agreement is refreshing and very welcome, but here is an area in which I
think we differ:
> This is the core of my argument. If you copy and original,
> the original and the copy do not share the same sensory experience,
> so they *must not* be the same person (that is,
> *one* entity) They may be the same as in they are both
> identical to one another (as the change in time approaches zero)
> but they are two distinct separate entities. Similarly, if you
> copy an original and destroy the original, there is no reason
> to suspect that this new copy is a continuation
> of the subjective experience of the original. To presume as
> much would imply that the original and the copy are telepathically
> linked in some way, this is quite unscientific.
"I agree wholeheartedly that copies made in different locations are
suspect due to different sensory experience. However imagine a situation
in which we instantaneously destroy and replace your original person
with an exact copy in the exact same position, but made from entirely
different atoms. If I understand you correctly, you are arguing that the
use of different atoms would mean that you would die and that your copy
would not be you. If so then I disagree."
AND
"This observation above is what leads to me ponder the possibility of
instantaneous destructive teleportation. If what I say in the above
paragraph is true then instant destructive teleportation might also work
if the original quantum states (with adjustments for position) could be
duplicated instantaneously by an assemblage of particles at the
destination location."
That would indeed be the implication of my argument. In its simplest form, that fact that the copy appears in the same place as the original in the same state removes the only differentiating factor available before, that of position. This falls inline with the same argument of whether or not we are continually destroyed and recreated as we move through time. As I understand it, there is no interval of time shorter than the plank length, thus any sub atomic particles that exist through time do not have a smooth continuous existence, but instead of many brief existences that are tied only by their average similarity in space and time. (the same could be said of moving through space) The implications of this can destroy my theory or support it, here are the two scenarios I can think of.
As all matter travels through time, it exists in many short finite intervals of time, not as a continuous smooth timeline.
(bare with me here as my wording my not be up to par with current lingo)
1) does all matter share the same intervals, that is, if we are to view the existence through time of subatomic particles through some hypothetical unaffected observer, would particles be in synch with one another in the process of being destroyed and recreated at every planck length interval of time? OR..
2) does each sub atomic particle have its own unique timing through the quanta of time. That is, if we were observing multiple sub atomic particles, would all of their destructions and recreations occur at different times when compared with one another?
As I noted above, I believe the same concern exists when moving through space, as space does not exist in any smaller intervals than the Planck length, and the same two scenarios would apply when moving through space.
I have no idea which of these is the accurate description of reality, or if we even know (or can know) or even if I explained it clear enough to make any sense to anyone else!
But assuming that one of these is an accurate description of reality, then the implications are significantly different in regards to copying. In case one, essentially, the entire universe pops into and out of existence at every Planck length interval of time at the same time. This necessarily means that any being in it, composed of a pattern of matter, also pops into and out of existence at this small interval of time. If this is the case, then it matters not if I were destroyed and teleported somewhere else instantly, because the only difference between that and what happens all the time is the position, which I do not feel it is reasonable to presume has any bearing on continual subjective consciousness. This requires, obviously, that the scanning / copying / teleporting process takes place at the plank length of time, in any interval longer the situation changes as the two scenarios are no longer identical. If this is the way the universe works, then I agree with you in your objection.
Assuming that case 2 is the accurate description of reality, then this satisfies one of my previously mentioned requirements, that at any one instant in time the vast majority of the stuff that makes up your pattern is the same that it was an instant of time before. If that were the case then destructive scanning copying transporting would violate that, and make none of the things that made up my pattern part of the things that made up my pattern the instant before. In this case I would not agree with your objection, and would not consider myself the same person if all of my particles were instantly destroyed and recreated by others at the very next instant in time.
I have the sneaking suspicion that case 2 is the more accurate description of reality, but that may be mere wishful thinking.
Regards,
Michael
-------------------------
On Fri, 25 Oct 2002, gts wrote:
> This interesting little gem from scerir seems to have passed by almost
> unnoticed in yesterday's flurry of messages to this thread. I am
> reposting scerir's words without comment:
It is of course completely impossible to imagine quantum systems in the
same state which have not been cloned, yet are in the same state, eh. And
yet are indistinguishable (I repeat my usual recommendation to reread the
appendices for "The Physics of Immortality" for a sketch of a proof
why
you would die instantly if this was not the case). I wonder why I keep
writing this, as no one seems to read my posts anyway.
As usually, physics (which I claim no specific understanding in, despite
having survived PCIII) is either being played fast and loose with, or sees
a highly selective interpretation. If you iterate this, you'll a mechanism
by which people with a clue are being silenced, or driven off the list.
Nevermind the fact that systems in the same quantum state are a gedanken
to illustrate a concept, while synchronizing large scale evolution of
deterministic systems is practically possible, and in fact trivial, albeit
done rarely as there is not much need for it in practice.
What I would really welcome to hear is a succinct explanation of evolution
of (macroscopic or nanoscopic) deterministic discrete systems given in
terms of quantum energy levels (rather, groups thereof) and transitions. I
have some very faint idea which I would like to put some meat on.
> > In QM no information can be cloned (xoxed)if
> > the number of states is equal or greater than 3
> > [Wootters, Zurek, 1982].
> >
> > Or, in other terms, a cloning (xoxing) of 2 non
> > orthogonal states violates the unitarity of evolution
> > [D'Ariano, Yuen, 1996].
> >
> > Or, in other terms, the linearity in QM (linear
> > superposition of quantum states) forbids the
> > perfect xoxing. Fortunately! Leibniz principle!
Eugen
------------------------
"Dickey, Michael F" <michael_f_dickey_groton.pfizer.com>
>This is the core of my argument. If you copy and original, the
>original and the copy do not share the same sensory experience,
>so they *must not* be the same person
If that's the core then I don't see what were arguing about. I've said many
times that usually (but not always) the two would not share the same sensory
experience and yes that would soon make them non identical and yes that
would soon make them different people. All I'm saying is that as long as
they remain the same (and that won't be long in most cases) there is only
one person.
>if you copy an original and destroy the original, there is
>no reason to suspect that this new copy is a continuation
>of the subjective experience of the original.
Oh I think there is an excellent reason to suspect a continuation of
consciousness, just ask the fellow if he had any subjective experience
yesterday or last month or last year and I'll bet he'll say "yes".
In fact
you will probably have an extremely difficult time convincing him that he's
the copy made just last night and not the original. I'll just say that if I
am the copy and the original John Clark was vaporized last night an instant
after I was made then I don't care in the least if the same thing happens
again tonight because I feel fine.
> It does not happen at the macroscopic level, so the analogy is flawed.
Macroscopic objects are made of atoms, you say atoms are what give us a
unique subjective experience but science says atoms are identical and I just
don't see how something without individuality can give us individuality.
Besides your atoms are in flux, you are literally not the man you were a
year ago.
> The huge difference is that they are two distinct separate entities. In
>the case of sub-atomic particles, one is at point xyz in space and
>the other is at point x+1,y+1,z+1 in space. They exist in two
>separate spaces, thus they are two different entities. I can point at
>them, one with each finger, and say 'see, they are two different
>particles,
Are they? How do you know they are not constantly exchanging positions? It's
not as silly a question as it may sound at first because that thought
experiment is at the core of one of the most important ideas in modern
physics, exchange forces. The general idea is that you describe two
electrons mathematically in two different way and then (mathematically)
instantly exchange them, now although the equations at first seem very
different you know that all electrons are the same so the system has not
changed and by knowing that two completely different looking equations
are really the same all sorts of interesting things can be found.
> A soul is not necessary to invoke,
The laws of Physics say the two atoms are identical and a difference in
their history can never be found even in theory but you say the two are
nevertheless somehow very different. The laws of Physics say it's bread and
wine but a Catholic says it's the body and blood of Jesus Christ. Six of
one, half a dozen for the other.
John K Clark jonkc_att.net
-------------------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: John K Clark [mailto:jonkc_att.net]
"Dickey, Michael F" <michael_f_dickey_groton.pfizer.com>
>This is the core of my argument. If you copy and original, the
>original and the copy do not share the same sensory experience,
>so they *must not* be the same person
"If that's the core then I don't see what were arguing about. I've said
many
times that usually (but not always) the two would not share the same sensory
experience and yes that would soon make them non identical and yes that
would soon make them different people. All I'm saying is that as long as
they remain the same (and that won't be long in most cases) there is only
one person."
Then this is where we disagree. There is not 'one person' because there are obviously two of them standing in front of me, even if they are in boxes and sharing the same sensory input. Unless they share the same exact subjective experience at the same exact time (that is, they are two manifestations of one consciousness) then they are logically not one person. You can say that the appear to be if there external conditions are manipulated to make them appear to share the same experiences (e.g. put them both in black boxes, for instance) but the second they are outside of identical subjective experience, it is clear that they do not share the same subjective experience. If they do not share it outside their box, why do you propose that the nature of the universe alters the second they step into that box? At no point in time are they 'one' person as A) they are not two manifestations of one consciousness and b) are obviously two people. Please point out the flaw in this logic.
>if you copy an original and destroy the original, there is
>no reason to suspect that this new copy is a continuation
>of the subjective experience of the original.
"Oh I think there is an excellent reason to suspect a continuation of
consciousness, just ask the fellow if he had any subjective experience
yesterday or last month or last year and I'll bet he'll say "yes"."
So because he thinks he had continually subjective experience then he did? I was not aware that our thoughts formed the structure of the universe. What if we copied the pattern and reproduced as a computer program and that computer program insisted that it had its own subjective history. Would you consider that a continuation of the subjective history of the original, who stands outside the computer looking amused at the computer program? It is quite obvious that even though this program (i.e., a different manifestation of this pattern) believes itself to be the continuation of the consciousness of the original, it does not make it so, and it is not a continuation, as this is clearly impossible with the original still around and watching the event. If we kill off the original, this does not make the problem disappear, the copy is still not a continuation of the original conscious subjective experience.
> It does not happen at the macroscopic level, so the analogy is flawed.
"Macroscopic objects are made of atoms, you say atoms are what give us
a
unique subjective experience but science says atoms are identical and I just
don't see how something without individuality can give us individuality."
That is not what I said, please stop mischaracterizing my arguments. At no point in time did I imply that any particular atom has any property different from any other of the same type. In fact I explicitly stated that this is not the case. The only significance to these atoms is that 1) they are the atoms that the pattern is made of (all other atoms in the universe are not part of the atoms that make up this pattern) and 2) that vast majority of the atoms that make up this pattern at any particular instant in time is the same ones that made up the pattern at the instant before.
"Besides your atoms are in flux, you are literally not the man you were a year ago."
Again, at any particular instant in time the atoms that make up your pattern are the same ones that made up your pattern the instant before. If all of them change over a great deal of time, it matters not, because from one instant of time to the next, that vast majority of them are identical. If your pattern was comprised of 100 atoms, and atom 01 was replaced at one instant in time, then at the next instant in time your pattern is now also comprised of 100 atoms, but atom 01 is now atom 01a. This does not change the fact that NOW at this instant, your pattern is comprised of 100 atoms, at the next instant, atom 74 may be replaced by 74a. But at any one particular instant in time, 99 of your atoms that comprise your pattern were the same as the instant before. It matters not that ALL of your atoms are replaced over a great deal of time at one at a time, it matters if ALL of your atoms are replaced AT ONCE. There is a significant difference between these two scenarios, in one of them almost every single atom that made up your patter was present at the instant before. In the other NONE of your atoms that made up your pattern before are present. We can clearly show that in the second case, when NONE of your atoms are the ones that made up your pattern before, that the new pattern made of new atoms is a different person, because it does not share the same subjective experience as the original group of atoms. You seem to assert that replacing one atom at a time is no different then replacing all atoms. This does not seem logical, given the circumstance described above.
> The huge difference is that they are two distinct separate entities. In
>the case of sub-atomic particles, one is at point xyz in space and
>the other is at point x+1,y+1,z+1 in space. They exist in two
>separate spaces, thus they are two different entities. I can point at
>them, one with each finger, and say 'see, they are two different
>particles,
"Are they? How do you know they are not constantly exchanging positions? It's not as silly a question as it may sound at first because that thought experiment is at the core of one of the most important ideas in modern physics, exchange forces."
Is there any evidence to suggest that they are as the simplest explanation? If not, then it is more reasonable to assume that they are not then it is to assume that they are. You have mentioned using the scientific methodology before, the scientific methodology does not place all possible explanations as equally likely.
> A soul is not necessary to invoke,
"The laws of Physics say the two atoms are identical and a difference in their history can never be found even in theory but you say the two are nevertheless somehow very different."
I say they are different because one is in one place and the other is in a different place. Actually, every atom is different because they are all in different places. Do you dispute this? If you do, then you must be insisting that all atoms are in the same place simultaneously, have any experimental evidence that suggests this as the simplest explanation? They are even more significantly different in this scenario because of ones location it may be part of a pattern that creates a sentient being, while another may be part of a pattern of a rock. Is this not a significant difference?
Michael
-----------------------------------
GTS - John K Clark wrote to Michael F Dickey:
>> if you copy an original and destroy the original, there is
>> no reason to suspect that this new copy is a continuation
>> of the subjective experience of the original.
> Oh I think there is an excellent reason to suspect a continuation of
> consciousness, just ask the fellow if he had any subjective experience
> yesterday or last month or last year and I'll bet he'll say
> "yes". In fact you will probably have an extremely difficult
> time convincing him that he's the copy made just last night
> and not the original.
I agree. In fact I think the words "original" and "copy"
have no real
meaning in any discussion of perfect copying.
This must be where your and my opinions diverge then. If one of these entities steps out of the scanning side of the machine, he is obviously the 'original' If one of these entities atoms that comprised his pattern were at the moment before scanning also part of the groups of atoms that made up his pattern, then this is clearly different from the 'copy'. The copies atoms that make up his pattern at the previous instant in time were obviously part of a different structure, perhaps a pile of stock atoms ready to be assembled. In these cases, the atoms of the original are 'different' from those of the copy in a recognizable manner.
Similarly, as mentioned above, if the vast majority of the atoms that are present in the original were present in the original at the previous instant in time then it is reasonable to assume he has had a subjective continuation of consciousness. It is reasonable to assume this since the opposite of almost all atoms being present at the instant before is no atoms being present at the instant before but sharing the same pattern can be clearly shown to NOT produce a continuation of consciousness (ask a copy and an original if they see the same thing) in only two logical scenarios one can be proven not true, then the other must be true.
> Macroscopic objects are made of atoms, you [Michael] say atoms
> are what give us a unique subjective experience but science
> says atoms are identical and I just don't see how something
> without individuality can give us individuality.
> Besides your atoms are in flux, you are literally not the man
> you were a year ago.
"Indeed you are not even the same man you were a moment ago."
Which is something I have never disputed. We are all different as we travel through time, but as the above example about atoms making up the pattern attempts to show is that there is a significant difference between very few atoms being replaced at one instant to the next verses every atom being replaced at one instant to the next. one (the later) clearly does not include a subjective continuity of consciousness.
This statement and objection also implies that ALL ATOMS must remain the same for continuity to continue, thus if all atoms are eventually replaced, continuity is destroyed, thus, so this argument seems to go, it does not matter if they are replaced all at once or one at time. The above thought experiment clearly shows, however, why replacing all of the atoms at once is different then replacing one at a time, as replacing all creates a new entity with its own subjective consciousness. I only argue that the vast majority of atoms need to be the same as the ones that were present the previous instant. The fact that all atoms are otherwise identical is what makes it possible for you to both 'not be the same man you were a moment ago' (made of all the same atoms) while simultaneously still being the same man you were a moment ago (pattern) the key difference is the RATE of replacement.
Michael Dickey wrote:
>> The huge difference is th...
>> can point at them, one with each finger, and say 'see,
>> they are two different particles,
John Clarke replied:
> Are they? How do you know they are not constantly exchanging
> positions? It's not as silly a question as it may sound...
> changed and by knowing that two completely different looking equations
> are really the same all sorts of interesting things can be found.
"Yes. It is very possible that the universe ultimately contains only a single electron, only a single proton, only a single neutron, etc. (Kinda' reminds me of Platonism.)"
It is possible, but it is not likely. Would you bet your life on the 'possibility' that the universe is made up of only one proton, one nuetron, and one electron? Or would you bet your life on the 'possibility' that the universe is made up of the number of electrons, protons, and nuetrons that seem to be present by counting.
-------------------------
Dan said
"To answer Michael/Jef's objections, *even the history gets obscured in
this example*. If mere history was enough to distingush particles with
perfectly similar quantum properties, *even logically* [by name], a
variety of important proofs in physics would fall apart."
Those are the same innacurate representations of my argument that John seems to subscribe to. I have never asserted that any particular atom has some magical signature that makes us able to tell it apart from all others. The driving factor of this argument is that if two sub atomic particles, other indistinguishable, are indeed recognizable as 'two' seperate particles, then they must, be definition, be different in some way. As GTS pointed out, position is part of the quantum description of a particle that is also described by the Pauli Exclusion principle, which means no two fermions can take up the same space at the same time. If it is acceptable to agree that two atoms exist, and not just one, then, if they are otherwise identical, we must be able to tell them apart by where they are. We can easily see that one is part of a pattern that makes up a consciouss entity, while the other is part of a homogenous pile of atoms that is ready to be assembled into a copy of another pattern. At this state in time, these atoms are clearly different from one another.
"But if identity doesn't inhere in the atoms *or* in the history of those
atoms, then in what does it inhere? How can you tell whether something
counts as "you" or not? The answer, as I've argued, is "whatever
we
decide is relevant.""
I of course disagree, it is not a case of whatever we believe is fine. It is quite clear that a copy and an original do not share the SAME subjective experience, if they do not, then the copy can not be considered a continuation of the subjective conscious experience of the original, but instead must be considered a separate unique being.
----------------------
Ok, whats the problem here? Do other posters find me grossly incapable of clearly expressing my ideas? This seems like I keep saying these same things over and over again and are not seeing what I consider to be valid objections or, it seems, even accurate representations of what I am saying?
Please point out the faults in my originally represented thought experiments and I will concede defeat on any point that is show to be logically invalid, I am not in the business of merely ideologically defending my ideas, I truly see this as the simplest explanation for the way the world is, if someone can point to me why this is not the simplest explanation, please inform me!
1) - the pattern is important to subjective continuity of consciousness
if we destroy the pattern, but keep the atoms, continuity appears to be destroyed. e.g. mashed up an originals brain in a blender, same atoms, different pattern, no response to question 'who are you?'
2) - the atoms are important to subjective continuity of consciousness
if we keep the pattern, but use different atoms, continuity appears to be destroyed. e.g. arranged new group of atoms into pattern identic